City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

5-2019

Between Politics and Morality: Hans Kelsen's Contributions to the
Changing Notion of International Criminal Responsibility
Jason Kropsky
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3249
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

BETWEEN POLITICS AND MORALITY: HANS KELSEN’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
CHANGING NOTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
by
JASON REUVEN KROPSKY

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2019

© 2019
JASON REUVEN KROPSKY
All Rights Reserved
ii

Between Politics and Morality: Hans Kelsen’s Contributions to the Changing Notion of
International Criminal Responsibility
by
Jason Reuven Kropsky

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in
Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.

Date

John Wallach
Chair of Examining Committee

Date

Alyson Cole
Executive Officer
Supervisory Committee:
John Wallach
Bruce Cronin
Peter Romaniuk

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

iii

ABSTRACT

Between Politics and Morality: Hans Kelsen’s Contributions to the Changing Notion of
International Criminal Responsibility
by
Jason Reuven Kropsky

Advisor: John Wallach
The pure theory of law analyzes the legal normative basis of jurisprudence. According to
its author, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), the study of law as a science can only arise once “alien
elements” associated with sociology, politics, ethics and psychology are extracted from strict
legal cognition. But what happens when the international sphere of law that possesses the special
quality of holding state officials accountable for core international crimes requires intrusion by
extra-legal sources? Does Kelsen’s structural edifice collapse? Or is it reconstituted? In
examining how international criminal responsibility, a test case for Kelsen’s positive law claims
derives its legitimacy, this dissertation affirms the moral underpinnings of imputation at the
highest level of legal cognition. The central legal concept of imputation as an otherwise “depersonalized” or “de-psychologized” notion of responsibility under national legal conditions is
conceptually transformed through analysis of offenses of the magnitude of crimes against
humanity and genocide. The capacity for moral agency otherwise rejected as a term of legal
cognition under Kelsen’s general theory of law and state, under the conditions of international
criminal law are assumed to act on the willing state agent.
iv

Through a combination of theoretical and case study analysis, I argue that critics
misrepresent Kelsen’s position on international criminal responsibility by conflating it with a
political realist or classical legal positivist defense of the immunizing acts of state doctrine,
which protects state officials from prosecution by parties other than their own government. The
advice Kelsen dispensed to US Supreme Court Justice and Nuremberg Prosecutor Robert H.
Jackson in advance of the London International Military Tribunal (IMT) charter conference,
demonstrates the most convincing rationale used to date in formulating the modern conception of
individual (fault-based) responsibility in international law. While he violates his doctrinal
commitment to the separation of law from morality in justifying international prosecution,
Kelsen nevertheless establishes a unified description of a sphere of coercion based on the
principle non sub homine sed sub lege (“not under man, but under law”).
Modified to adapt to judicially adventurous opinions since 1993 with the creation of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), Kelsen’s dynamic analysis of
responsibility for core international crimes remains under-studied, and hence under-valued. A
revisionist account of Kelsen’s major writings on humanitarian law is necessary to promoting a
theory of international criminal responsibility inspired by the democratic values of compromise,
tolerance and relative peace. Despite his own emphatically contrary claims to purity, Kelsen’s
legal philosophy retains an implicit commitment to moral normative values in determining
culpability at the highest level of adjudication. His emphasis on the validity of retroactive legal
technique, arguably his greatest contribution to the study of international criminal responsibility,
defines the theoretical and practical scope of this term’s historically-modified definition.
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Chapter 1
The Transatlantic Influence of Hans Kelsen
I. The “Homeless Ghost” of International Criminal Law?
To political theorist Judith Shklar (1928-1992), the “homeless ghost” of law as “an
isolated block of concepts that have no relevant characteristics or functions apart from their
possible validity or invalidity within a hypothetical system” is exemplified by the formalism of a
certain positive or “human-made” legal philosophical tradition: the pure theory of law.1
What makes pure theory a “homeless ghost,” according to Shklar, is the denial of the
substance of norms or rules as the dominant concern of legal practitioners. Since the pure theory
of law ignores “the content, aim, and development of the rules that compose it,”2 she insists that
pure theory affirms that the actual application of law is a relatively predictable ordering of legal
rules free of moral and political ideas encompassing the continuous negotiation between its
practitioners. For Shklar, cognition of law cannot be separated from politics and morality, since
legal application invariably follows from the ideology of legal practitioners who profess a wide
range of moral and political convictions that impact the final articulation of legal opinions.
Shklar's view, therefore, follows in the vein of legal realism, the dominant twentieth century
tradition in American jurisprudence.3
Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), author of the pure theory of law, argues that a strict cognition
“The idea of treating law as a self-contained system of norms that is 'there,' identifiable without any reference to the
content, aim, and development of the rules that compose it, is the very essence of formalism...It consists...in treating
law as an isolated block of concepts that have no relevant characteristics or functions apart from their possible
validity or invalidity within a hypothetical system. But what aim is served by this 'homeless ghost'?” Judith Shklar,
Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 33-34.
2
Ibid.
3
See: D.A. Jeremy Telman, A Path Not Taken: Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law in the Land of Legal Realists, in
Hans Kelsen Anderswo/Hans Kelsen Abroad 353 (Robert Walter, Clemens Jabloner & Klaus Zeleny eds., 2010):
https://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1091&context=law_fac_pubs
1

1

of positive legal norms insures that certain ideological interests do not prejudice our
understanding of the legal cognition of imputable subjects, in accordance with momentary moral
or political appeals. Thus, the normative legal realm is predicated on generally prospective terms
of cognition, rather than, for example, a series of seemingly arbitrary decisions that have not yet
already been expressed legislatively, customarily, through judicial decisions, or, in the
international sphere, by the particular means of ratified treaties. The concept of the coercive or
legal norms, Kelsen argues in opposition to Shklar and the realist tradition, is the reason there is
a distinct sphere of cognition denominated “jurisprudence”.
Nevertheless, while Shklar succeeds in demonstrating some of the failings of formalism,
including an over-veneration for rule-following that impedes justice, she is wrong to claim that
Kelsen's philosophy does not incorporate consideration of the “content, aim and the development
of the rules.” One example alone should suffice: the “crimes” committed by Nazis. According to
Kelsen, core international crimes deserved punishment, in spite of the fact that no laws existed to
penalize individual (fault-based) humanitarian offenses at the time they were committed.4 Given
the abject nature of Nazi offenses, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg in
1945-46 necessitated the application of a criterion of justice that may be described as “extralegal”. Even though Kelsen criticized various procedural faults of the IMT prosecution,5 he

This point is thoroughly documented in chapter two.
“[The London Agreement’s] greatest merit is that it puts into force the idea of individual criminal responsibility for
violations of international law and thus improves—though not in general but for some particular cases—the
primitive technique of general international law with its collective responsibility. But, at the same time, the London
Agreement authorizes the International Military Tribunal to declare ‘groups or organizations’ as criminal, and
confers upon the competent national authorities of any signatory ‘the right to bring individuals to trial for
membership therein before national military or occupation courts.’ That means that an individual may be subjected
to a criminal sanction not because he, by his own behavior, committed a crime, but because he belonged to an
association declared as criminal. That means collective responsibility.” Hans Kelsen, “Will the Judgment in the
Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent,” International Law Quarterly 153, no. 1(2) (1947) in Perspectives on the
Nuremberg Trial, ed. Guénaël Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 285. On this count, Kelsen
opposes the imputation of criminality to any organization or group, and argues that the Nuremberg IMT especially
superseded its discretionary authority. The tribunal’s claim that “criminal guilt is personal, and that mass
4
5

2

nevertheless remained unwavering in his support for the validity of the proceedings6.
Contravention of the continental European maxim Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege
poenali (Latin, "[There exists] no crime [and] no punishment without a pre-existing penal law

punishments should be avoided” does not obviate the fact that “if satisfied of the criminal guilt of any organization
or group, this tribunal should not hesitate to declare it to be criminal because the theory of ‘group criminality is
new, or because it might be unjustly applied by some subsequent tribunals.’” See: Trial of the Major War Criminals
BeforeThe International Military Tribunal 12 (1947), 256 in M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical Evolution and
Contemporary Application (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 491. Kelsen’s commitment to
individual responsibility is no more apparent than here where he claims that “these provisions constitute a
regrettable regress to the backward technique of collective criminal responsibility, in open contradiction to the
progress made by the [London] Agreement in establishing the opposite principle in its provisions…” Kelsen,
“Precedent,” 285. Quincy Wright, a naturalist who assumed a significant role as Robert Jackson’s legal advisor in
the drafting of the IMT charter, like Kelsen opposed “guilt by association” on the grounds that “advanced systems of
criminal law accept the principle that guilt is personal. Guilt is established by evidence that the acts and intentions of
the individual were criminal.” Quincy Wright, “International Law and Guilt by Association,” American Journal of
International Law 43, no. 4 (1947): 746-747. Wright further comments that “criminal responsibility is based upon
psychological considerations and ought therefore to be a responsibility only of individuals. We should, therefore,
recognize that the individual is criminally responsible when he commits an act which is an offense against the law of
nations, and that a state cannot cover such an act with a blanket immunity if it is itself under an international
obligation.” Ibid., 748-749. Wright deviates from Kelsen’s argument (see: chapter three) that the judgment of the
Nuremberg Tribunal was authorized by the IMT charter at London on August 8, 1945, not preexistent laws
putatively criminalizing core international offenses, including the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In this respect, the idea that
the individual is criminally sanctionable based on an “international obligation” at the time of the offense is incorrect
from a Kelsenian standpoint. Nevertheless, Kelsen and Wright are in agreement with respect to the problem of “guilt
by association,” which reflects “primitive” and “politicized” judgment under autocratic rule. How Kelsen establishes
individual criminal responsibility based on the immorality of the offense without also acknowledging “fair warning”
principles, must mean either that Kelsen presumes (a) the authority of ICL courts to hold individuals responsible
while maintaining the primacy of the power of legal norms of the national legal order (or “state”) in the regulation of
behavior beyond the capacity of the individual to choose between “right” and “wrong” with respect to offenses of
the magnitude of crimes against humanity and genocide, or else (b) Kelsen acknowledges an intrinsic moral quality
that reflects “agency” even under a positive legal structuring like the pure theory of law that otherwise excludes the
psychological and moral motivations of the individual from legal cognition.
6
Despite endorsing the ad hoc and retroactive judgment of the IMT prosecution at Nuremberg, Kelsen was vocal in
his commitment to the ideal of a neutral court based on his model for a permanent compulsory international court
adjudicating core international crimes. He writes, “If the principle applied in the Nuremberg trial were to become a
precedent—a legislative rather than a judicial precedent—then, after the next war, the governments of the victorious
States would try members of the governments of the vanquished States for having committed crimes determined
unilaterally and with retroactive force by the former. Let us hope there is no precedent.” Kelsen, “Precedent,” 289.
As with Kelsen’s decision to embrace a higher principle of justice—“principles of civilization”—as the legal reason
for why major Nazi war criminals ought to be punished, the author of the pure theory of law recognizes that the
moral foundation of ICR animates an institutional goal reflecting Kelsen’s core concern: the modern legal
description of imputation as pertains to individual responsibility. Rather than adhering to the principle of legality
rule against ex post facto lawmaking, Kelsen endorses this exceptional methodology, especially in prosecution of
core international crimes, despite reservations, and therefore any argument propounded by Kelsen suggesting that he
does not endorse retrospective laws, in adherence of a strict construction of acts of state provisions, is necessarily
unwarranted. For a higher order account of Kelsen’s position on the legitimacy of the trial, see: Hans Kelsen, “The
Rule against Ex Post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals,” Judge Advocate Journal 2, no. 3
(1945).

3

[appertaining]")7 does not prove the violation of positive law precepts, Kelsen insists, since the
principle of non-retroactivity itself licenses exceptions. Furthermore, since there is no general
principle of international law that prohibits retroactive laws, Kelsen endorses this highly
irregular approach as a positive law claim to validity.
Given that the individual was not subject to penalizing norms for core international
crimes prior to the Nuremberg proceedings, Kelsen’s account of ex post facto lawmaking as a
valid methodological choice affirms the actual pattern of ICL in following a retroactive logic.
The effort to insure the valid application of international law in the adjudication of humanitarian
crimes by separating law from morality (“the separation thesis”), a key tenet of legal positivism,8
however, is contravened by the function of international legal theorists and practitioners
throughout the history of ICL in establishing a criterion for “principles of humanity” (or
“principles of civilization” in the Kelsenian lexicon), as well as other adventurous, if retroactive,
morally-laden methodological means to shore up gaps in the law. The problem of the relationship
between time and culpability persists throughout the history of this discipline—and Kelsen’s
legal philosophy helps “structure” a valuable conception of agency amidst the imposition of new,
if retroactive, standards of legality.
This dissertation highlights the dissonance between Kelsen’s efforts to define ICR in
accordance with a strictly legal positivist doctrine while readily promoting moral principles
traditionally associated with the school of natural law. This is especially the case when the “legal

See generally: Beth Van Schaack “Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and
Morals,” Georgetown Law Journal 97 (2008): 119-192.; See generally: Jerome Hall, General Principles of
Criminal Law (Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1947), 35-64.
8
See generally: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Legal Positivism,” last modified January 3, 2003,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/. Chapter two provides an extensive appeal to the major legal
positivist jurists, including John Austin and HLA Hart, especially as contrasting champions of “the separation
thesis”.
7

4

subject,” who is otherwise generally reduced in Kelsen’s particular vocabulary to a fictional
personification of a “bundle of legal norms,” as imputed “rights” and “duties” in accordance with
the “de-personalized” or “de-psychologized” account of “law,” is recreated as a point of
imputation (or responsibility) invested with “personal” or “psychological” characteristics. When
no future-oriented guide to sanctioned conduct exists, Kelsen nevertheless argues that state
officials retain the capacity to make moral choices, which reaffirm “principles of
civilization/humanity” or “principles of tolerance”. The particular meaning of these principles,
and their implications for Kelsen’s general moral conception, must be bracketed until the
conclusion, chapter six. After assessing both the philosophical value of Kelsen’s contributions to
the pure theoretical cognition of ICR (chapter 2), this investigation draws on empirical evidence
to demonstrate the progressive confluence between Kelsen’s contributions to the study of ICR
and the advancement of this institution through case study analysis of the pure theoretical
methodology applied to three stages of ICL history (chapters 3-5).
In foreshadowing the construction of an international criminal court as early as 1944 with
his design for a permanent compulsory international court adjudicating both matters between
states and individual criminal violations of international law, Kelsen blueprints a system of
adjudication, which, despite its post-modern fragmentation, has nevertheless succeeded in
operationalizing an International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. Even under contemporary
ad hoc conditions, Kelsen’s writings continue to benefit those who value a designated criterion
of validity. Why, then, did the author of the pure theory of law, the object of Shklar’s polemic,
argue for the merit of this highly irregular methodology, if not to state his unequivocal
recognition of the moral source animating positive legal claims at the highest level of
imputation? Does his express introduction of moral standards (i.e., “principles of civilization”)
5

not obviate his commitment to strictly positive legal analysis? Or is there another way to
reconcile the positivity of ICR with a changing moral cognition sharing democratic-affinities
with, for example, Roscoe Pound’s legal sociology?9 Is there a way to reimagine, as an emerging
group of Kelsen scholars have, the moral-normative core of the pure theoretical philosophy, one
that points to an explanation for Kelsen’s “extra-legal” resort to moral terms as justification for
ICL prosecution? The placement of Kelsen within the relativist/absolutist moral continuum,
however, is postponed until the concluding chapter—six.
This dissertation consequently embarks on a three-fold quest: (a) to distinguish the pure
theory of law as the most consistent positive or human made legal articulation of a valid
international law system adjudicating humanitarian crimes, (b) to demonstrate how even the
strictest positive theoretical application of ICL ends up incorporating morality, albeit through
formal, legal means, and (c) to show how legal practitioners engaged Kelsen's philosophy of
international criminal responsibility beginning with US Supreme Court Justice Robert H.
Jackson. Even before he assumed his assignment as chief US prosecutor at the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, Jackson was instrumental in incorporating Kelsen's
definition of ICR in Jackson’s other seminal role as US representative at the London IMT
Charter Conference from June 26-August 8, 1945.10 The next section considers Kelsen’s direct
role in helping to establish the definition of individual criminal responsibility in international law
prior to the constitution of this new (fault-based) system of adjudication.
While many of the points made here resurface in subsequent chapters, this introductory
account emphasizes biographical notes (section II), a general overview of the philosophy of ICR
For a general overview of Roscoe Pound’s description of “civilization, see his commentary on jural postulates in
Roscoe Pound, Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence, 5th edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943),
168, 179, 183-184.
10
This point will be expanded upon in the biographical notes (section II).
9

6

in the context of ICL history (section III), and a chapter-by-chapter outline reaffirming the
general methodological application of an historicized-account of the pure theory of law (section
IV). While Kelsen's own students in his “Viennese Circle of Legal Positivists,”11 such as Alfred
Verdross (1890-1980), later turned to a medieval scholastic interpretation of international
criminal responsibility based on the naturalist concept of jus cogens,12 and Hersch Lauterpacht
(1897-1960), a judge on the International Court of Justice (ICJ), to a neo-Grotian view of ICR,13
Kelsen claimed an express commitment to a thoroughly positive law notion of ICR. Is this even
possible? If it is not, why is it not? And what are its implications for the general understanding of
the relationship between law, politics and morality from the perspective of the test case of
international criminal law?
II: Biographical Notes
According to legal theorist W.B. Stern in a 1936 issue of The American Political Science
Review, “Among legal philosophers the time-honored dispute between natural law schools and
legal positivists arouses ever new interest. On the side of the positivists, the 'pure theory of law'
gains more and more ground.”14
Stern laments that, in contrast to the favorable reception that the pure theory of law
received in continental European circles, no American publication took account of its author
Hans Kelsen's book, Reine Rechtslehre (1934), or The Pure Theory of Law, translated into

Clemens Jabloner, “Kelsen and his Circle: The Viennese Years,” European Journal of International Law 9 (1998):
368-385, http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/9/2/1496.pdf.
12
Jus cogens (from Latin: compelling law; English: peremptory norm) refers “to certain fundamental, overriding
Principles of international law, from which no derogation is ever permitted,” Legal Information Institute, “Jus
Cogens, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jus_cogens.
13
See: Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law,” British Yearbook of International Law
23, no. 1 (1946).
14
W. B. Stern, "Kelsen's Theory of International Law," The American Political Science Review 30, no. 4 (1936): 73641.
11
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English in 1967. Kelsen’s project aimed at “cognition focused on the law alone,”15 separating out
political ideology and moralizing, as well as methodologies that reduced the law to natural or
social scientific study.16 In its purity Kelsen’s approach aimed to validate and unify national and
international legal orders on grounds that accounted for positive law free of ‘alien elements’.
Other methods of evaluation structurally distinguishable from jurisprudence, including ethics,
sociology, political science and psychology, according to Kelsen, introduced categorically
separate objects of cognition. In introducing ‘alien elements’ into the study of law, the so-called
jurisprude violates cognition within a delineated “coercively-authorized” frame, No matter the
ultimate merit—or even consistency—of such an approach, Kelsen’s study of imputation or the
“de-personalized” or “de-psychologized” notion of responsibility provides relatively neutral
ground in which to evaluate the object of this thesis: theoretical and practical implications of a
pure theoretical conception of international criminal responsibility.
Kelsen, an Austrian-Jewish17 refugee who arrived on North American shores in 1939 at
the age of 58, was mainly overlooked in his adopted country. A 2014 interdisciplinary conference
entitled “Hans Kelsen in America” aimed to “explor[e] the reasons for Kelsen’s lack of influence
in the United States, and proposed ways in which Kelsen’s approach to legal, political and
international relations theory could be relevant to current debates in the U.S. academy in those
areas.”18 The biographical notes on Kelsen are not merely of passing interest. Much can be

Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California, 1967), 7.
Andrei Marmor. "The Pure Theory of Law,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-theory/.
17
Although twice-converted, first in 1905 to Catholicism, and, again, in 1912 to Lutheranism, after the Second
World War Kelsen affirmed his personal identity as a Jew. According to legal scholar Reut Yael Paz, Kelsen
“confess[ed], for instance, in 1932 that ‘Eretz Israel is my miserable love’. After his immigration to the United
States, Kelsen considered himself a Jew.” Reut Yael Paz, “Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law as ‘a Hole in Time’,
Monde(s) 1, no. 7 (2015), 89. See also: Nathan Feinberg, “Hans Kelsen Veyaado” in Massot Besheelot Hazman
(Jerusalem: Magnes Publishing HouseThe Hebrew University, 1973).
18
Proceedings of Interdisciplinary Conference: Kelsen in America, Lutheran School of Theology, Chicago, Illinois,
June 2014. http://www.valpo.edu/law/kelsen-in-america. The Chicago conference, organized by Valparaiso Law
15
16

8

learned in chronicling, for example, the opposition of natural law philosopher Lon Fuller to Hans
Kelsen's legal philosophy, since Fuller represented a major force in modern natural law theory.
Although Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound supported Kelsen in his quest for U.S.
employment, there remains doubt as to whether Fuller may have directly opposed Kelsen's
nomination to the Harvard Law School faculty,19 of which Fuller was a member. Such an
appointment likely would have meant a far more influential role for Kelsen within the U.S. legal
academy. After a very prominent European career, Kelsen, generally ignored in American legal

School Dean Jeremy Telman, included leading experts in Weimar studies, including historians Peter Caldwell and
William Scheuermann; legal theorists Scott Shapiro and Brian Leiter; and some of the foremost Kelsen scholars
worldwide, including Jochen von Bernstorff, Jorg Kammerhoffer, Clemens Jabloner and Thomas Olechowski, the
latter two, co-directors of the Hans Kelsen Institute-Vienna. Notably absent, however, was the “Dean of North
American Kelsen Studies,” Stanley Paulson. At the September 27-29, 2018 IVR German-section Freiburg
conference on Kelsen where nearly three hundred scholars from four continents and twenty-eight countries gathered
to discuss “Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Conceptions and Misconceptions,” Telman presented on Kelsen’s
views of judicial interpretation. While his IVR presentation could not be integrated into the present study outside of
a few brief remarks, Telman affirms a Kelsenian “free law” interpretation similar to views expressed in the present
project, especially in chapter five. See: Jeremy Telman, “Problems of Translation and Interpretation: A Kelsenian
Commentary on Positivist Originalism” (paper presented at the Annual IVR German Section Conference, Freiburg,
Germany, September 29, 2018. The second largest contingent of Kelsen scholars represented at the Freiburg IVR, it
should be noted, were from Brazil, mostly from Sao Paulo, where Kelsen has assumed a central place in
jurisprudential study. See: Carlos Eduardo de Abreu Boucault, “Hans Kelsen - A Recepção da "Teoria Pura" na
América do Sul, Particularmente no Brasil,” Sequência (Florianópolis) no.71 (July/Dec. 2015),
http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2015v36n71. Boucalt notes the widespread reception of Kelsen’s writings
throughout Latin America, including Uruguay, Colombia, Argentina and Brazil in “Hans Kelsen - The Reception of
‘Pure Theory’ in South America, Particularly in Brazil“.
19
The Russian-trained scholar of international law, George Mazur, is confident that Fuller opposed Kelsen’s
appointment. In an email correspondence with Kelsen scholar Jeremy Telman on November 12, 2018, Telman
writes: “I talked with Fred Schauer about this. I have no information about this issue. George Mazur is convinced
that Fuller blackballed Kelsen and made sure that he not only did not get a position at Harvard but could not get a
position anywhere. I cannot discount that possibility, but there are so many other reasons why Kelsen could not land
a position, I am not inclined to accept George's theory when there is no evidence.” Frederick Schauer of the
University of Virginia, a leading constitutional law expert, does not see proof of Fuller’s effort to prevent Kelsen
from obtaining work at Harvard, which, in any event, he claims, cannot be determined insofar as Harvard continues
to embargo documents that could shed light on this relationship. See: Frederick Schauer, “Fuller on Kelsen; Fuller
and Kelsen” (paper presented at the Annual IVR German Section Conference, Freiburg, Germany, September 28,
2018. For evidence that Fuller merely took a critical position but did not work to block Kelsen’s appointment,
Nicola Lacey references a letter from Fuller to Dean Paul William Brosman of Tulane University “recommending”
Kelsen: ‘I have found Kelsen very stimulating as a colleague. He is conversationally very entertaining, and not at all
the heavy Teutonic type of scholar. His lectures have been pretty abstract, and I’m afraid most of our men got little
out of them. His English is quite good now, and, though there are slips in idiom, is easy to understand.” See: “Letter
from Fuller to Dean Paul William Brosman, Tulane University of Louisiana College of Law, January 10th 1942; The
Papers of Lon Fuller, Harvard Law School Library, box 2, folder 1 in Nicola Lacey “Out of the ‘Witches’
Cauldron’?: Reinterpreting the Context and Re-assessing the Significance of the Hart-Fuller Debate,” London
School of Economic: Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 18/2008, 11.
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circles with no school of law offering full time appointment to the recent émigré, assumed a
position as a political science instructor at the University of California-Berkeley in 1942.20 In a
1948-49 issue of The Journal of Legal Education. Fuller wrote:
I share the opinion of Jerome Hall21...that jurisprudence should start with justice. I place
this preference not on exhortatory grounds, but on a belief that until one has wrestled
with the problem of justice one cannot truly understand the other issues of jurisprudence.
Kelsen, for example, excludes justice from his studies (of practical law) because it is an
'irrational ideal' and therefore 'not subject to cognition.' The whole structure of his theory
derives from that exclusion. The meaning of his theory can therefore be understood only
when we have subjected to critical scrutiny its keystone of negation.22
But is this a correct assessment of Kelsen's contributions to the study of justice? Fuller,
who would later engage in one of the most notable debates in legal theory in the twentieth
century with HLA Hart, in which Fuller argues against Hart's division between law as it is and
law as it should be,23 would have gained from a sustained encounter with Kelsen. While it is
certainly true that Kelsen's legal philosophical project considers “justice an 'irrational ideal' and
therefore 'not subject to (legal) cognition',” it is Kelsen rather than Fuller who engages in a
comprehensive account of the legal basis for the 1945-46 International Military Tribunal (IMT)

See especially: D.A. Jeremy Telman, “The Reception of Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the United States: A
Sociological Model, Law Faculty Publication, Paper 7 (January 2008), http://scholar.valpo.edu/law_fac_pubs/7.;
D.A. Jeremy Telman, “A Path Not Taken: Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law in the Land of Legal Realists” in Hans
Kelsen Anderswo/Hans Kelsen Abroad, eds. Robert Walter, Clemens Jabloner and Klaus Zeleny (Manz:
Schriftenreihe Des Hans Kelsen-Instituts, 2010),
https://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1091&context=law_fac_pubs
21
Jerome Hall, an authority on American criminal justice and jurisprudence, provides a thorough account of this
principle. Chapter two revisits Hall’s writings on retroactivity with respect to the distinction made between what
Roscoe Pound refers to as “the humanitarian path” and “the totalitarian path.” See: Jerome Hall, General Principles
of Criminal Law (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960); Roscoe Pound, New Paths of the Law: First Lectures in the
Roscoe Pound Lectureship Series (Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, 2006).
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Lon Fuller, “The Places and Uses of Jurisprudence in the Law School Curriculum,” Journal of Legal Education 1,
no.4, (1949): 496.
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H.LA. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals," Harvard Law Review 71, no. 4 (1958): 593-629;
Lon Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to Professor Hart." Harvard Law Review 71, no. 4 (1958):
630-72.
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of major Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg. 24 His numerous publications devoted to the
interpretation of criminal responsibility for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against
humanity—the core international criminal law (ICL) charges at the creation of the modern ICL
“system” at Nuremberg—suggests the extent of Kelsen's concern for justice. Unlike John
Austin’s nineteenth century command theory, and Hart’s neo-positivist critique of Austin a
century later, Kelsen’s positive law approach provides comprehensive justification of
international law as a valid “system” of legal norms providing for collective and individual
responsibility.25 His early influence on the ICL system, for instance, has been documented with
respect to the inauguration of the quasi-constitutional IMT Charter.26 The exact route that Kelsen
took from exclusion within the confines of the American legal establishment to a leading, if
generally unacknowledged, role in outlining United Nations (UN) legal philosophy, as well as in
establishing international criminalization of heads-of-state and other state officials post-WWII,
can only be briefly retold.
US Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, chief US prosecutor at the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, stated in a July 5, 1945 memorandum addressed to
members within the Office of the US Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality—

See: Hans Kelsen, "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the
Punishment of War Criminals," California Law Review 31, no. 5 (December 1943): 530-71.; Hans Kelsen, Peace
through Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944).; Hans Kelsen, "Will the Judgment in the
Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law” in Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, ed. Guenael
Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 274-89.; Hans Kelsen. The Judge Advocate Journal 2, no. 3 No.
3 (Fall-Winter 1945): 8-13.; Hans Kelsen, “Collective and Individual Responsibility for Acts of State in
International Law,” Jewish Yearbook of International Law 226 (1948): 226-239.
25
See: John Austin. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954).; John Austin, Robert Campbell, and Sarah Austin. Lectures on Jurisprudence; Or,
The Philosophy of Positive Law (London: J. Murray, 1885).; Hart, HLA. Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1961).
26
Guénaël Mettraux, "Judicial Inheritance: The Value and Significance of the Nuremberg Trial to Contemporary
War Crimes Tribunals,” in Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, ed. Guénaël Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008), 599-617.
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Sidney Alderman, Francis Shea and Colonel Murray C. Bernays27—that “Hans Kelsen is worried
over the absence of any international law on the subject of individual responsibility. He thinks a
definite declaration is essential. I think it may be desirable.”28
In commenting on Jackson’s report to President Harry S. Truman29 in preparation for the
London IMT Charter conference, where Jackson served as chief-US delegate, Kelsen was
adamant that a distinction be made between newly authorized treaties retroactively determining
ICR and the assumption of an already-criminalized designation of responsibility in advance of
the August 8, 1945 ratification of the London Charter. To assume that the law had already been
created when only collective forms of responsibility applicable to states were part of the
international legal lexicon, Kelsen maintained, threatened the legitimacy of this newlyconstituted ICL authority. In distinguishing between what Jackson believed to be “desirable” and
Kelsen’s view of the “essential” effort to declare individual responsibility, Jackson frames the
debate over what is preferable or recommendable against what is vital or indispensable.
Before concluding the memo with the words, “I think it may be worth including to stop

The connection of Murray Bernays, Sigmund Freud’s nephew through marriage, to Kelsen, an old Viennese friend
of Freud’s, is yet to be explored. But as with other transatlantic connections, it is necessary to account for the small
circle of scholars working on war crimes issues from both sides of the Atlantic. “Murray Bernays, Lawyer, Dead;
Set Nuremberg Trials,” New York Times, September 22, 1970,
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/22/archives/murray-bernays-lawyer-dead-set-nuremberg-trials-format.html. The
subject heading of Bernays, July 6, 1945 memorandum to Justice Jackson read “Kelsen Recommendation for
Declaration of Individual Responsibility.” In referencing Jackson’s July 5 th response to Kelsen’s advice, Bernays
writes: “Professor Kelsen was formulating language in the abstract.” Bernays recommends renumbering paragraphs
in the U.S. 30 June Annex to read: “Individuals who have committed, instigated, been responsible for, or taken a
consenting part in acts in violation of International Law as declared by this instrument shall be subject to trial and
punishment thereof.” This he suggests could be “tie[d] in…under the general heading “Substantive Provisions for
Liability and Defense.” Clearly Kelsen had made a mark on the original “substantive” conception of individual
responsibility in international criminal law. Murray Bernays, “Memorandum to Mr. Justice Jackson: Kelsen
Recommendation for Declaration of Individual Responsibility,” July 6, 1945, email correspondence with Patrick
Kerwin, Manuscript Reference Librarian, Library of Congress, August 26, 2014.
28
Hans Kelsen, ‘Report’ untiled text by typewriter, ‘Robert Houghwout Jackson Papers in the Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. in Monica Garcia Salmones-Rovira, The Project of
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the argument about whether the law does so provide,”30 Jackson references Kelsen’s definition
that:
Persons who, acting in the service of any state (of one of the Axis powers) or on their
own initiative, have performed acts by which any rule of general or particular
international law forbidding the use of force, or any rule concerning warfare, or the
generally accepted rules of humanity have been violated, as well as persons who have
been members of voluntary organizations whose criminal character has been established
by the court, may be held individually responsible for these acts or for membership in
such organizations and brought to trial and punishment before the court. 31
The final text of the IMT Charter corresponds directly with Kelsen’s definition of
individual culpability in ICL. As international law scholar Mónica García-Salmones Rovira
indicates:
Kelsen’s hand is clearly visible in respect of the issue of ‘individual responsibility’. The
final text (Article 6) used a very similar formulation to that proposed by Kelsen in his
report, which Jackson later recommended. The legal point about the individual criminal
responsibility of members of the Nazi government appears sufficiently clear: that
‘persons’, who had committed any of the three crimes defined in the article (i.e., crimes
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity), as ‘individuals or as members of
organizations’ acting in the interests of a state (Kelsen suggested ‘in the service of any
state’) and within which countries, ‘Axis countries’ (Kelsen, ‘of any state (of one of the
Axis powers)’) will be held ‘individually responsible.” 32
Rovira writes that “[J]udging from the documents kept among Jackson’s papers from the
period before and immediately after WWII, it appears that the advice given by Hans Kelsen
caused individual criminal responsibility to become part of international law, and that, therefore,
it is thanks to him that international law could be efficiently employed during the Nuremberg
Trials.”33
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While Rovira's claims tend to be overstated, given Jackson's indebtedness to other leading
scholars of the day, including Kelsen's disciple, Hersch Lauterpacht, who, according to Jackson's
son, William, was instrumental in defining Article 6 of the IMT charter (i.e., the definitions of
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity),34Harvard criminologist Sheldon
Glueck, whose writings licensed a novel common law approach to ICL,35 or Jackson’s legal
advisor, Quincy Wright36, an adherent of the natural law tradition, she is nevertheless correct in
pointing to Kelsen's contributions as a spur towards greater positive law emphasis on individual
(fault-based) culpability within a sphere that had traditionally conceived of the state as the lone
subject of international law. Rovira states that due to his stature as “one of the world’s most
renowned legal theorists…particularly noted for his defence of the principle of individual
criminal responsibility in international law,” it only makes sense that “Jackson and, more
generally the American executive turned to him for advice from 1942 onwards…and specifically
asked him to advise on the preparation of the American draft for the London Charter.”37
Many of the most prominent scholars of public international law in the twentieth century,
including Lauterpacht, Josef Laurenz Kunz38 and Alfred Verdross3940 were disciples of Kelsen’s.
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Hans Morgenthau, author of the political realist classic Politics among Nations,41 received
substantial support from Kelsen on his 1934 habilitation dissertation.42 Morgenthau dedicated an
anthology of his writings to Kelsen, who he wrote “has taught us through his example how to
speak Truth to Power.”43 Another former student, political realist John Herz, who championed
the notion of the “security dilemma,”44 co-authored a critical introductory account of
international justice with Kelsen soon after the latter’s arrival in the United States.45 Former dean
of Harvard Law School Roscoe Pound stated that “Kelsen is the leading jurist of our time.”46
While HLA Hart, whose concept of the law has often been cited as having been influenced by

Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2009), Introduction. Kelsen's influence
on the theory of public international law is reflected in a 1998 issue of the European Journal of International Law
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Kelsen's early attack on the foundations of classical legal positivism, remarked that he is "the
most stimulating writer on analytical jurisprudence of our day."47
Kelsen’s integrity extends to his support of Carl Schmitt’s candidacy for a law faculty
position at the University of Cologne, despite Schmitt’s highly offensive previous attacks on
Kelsen, and Schmitt’s soon-to-be decision to remain the only member of the Cologne faculty not
to sign a letter in support of Kelsen, who had been targeted at the time of the Nazi seizure of
power. Both the debate between Kelsen and Schmitt over “who rules?” that embodied the
Weimar constitutional crisis, wherein Schmitt vested power in the executive branch, while
Kelsen argued for the final authority of a judiciary with the right of constitutional review, and the
general account of Schmitt’s offenses as “crown jurist of Nazism,” which warranted his
investigation for war crimes by US prosecutor Robert Kempner in 1947,48 indicates an
inextricable division between Schmitt’s and Kelsen’s distinct legal philosophies. The first
devised a legal philosophy whose purpose was particularly amenable to fascist governance; the
latter produced a legal philosophy that he called “science,” which correlated with democratic
“principles of tolerance”. Schmitt’s embrace of Kelsen’s prospectively-designated defense of the
acts of state doctrine (AoSD) as a weapon against allied prosecution, though certainly an act of
“bad faith,” points however to the stature that Kelsen had assumed in the legal philosophical
world in 1946 even amongst his foremost critics.
Kelsen's major professional achievements consisted of his role as legal advisor to the
Austro-Hungarian Minister of War during the First World War; authorship of the 1920 Austrian
Republican Constitution; professor of state and administrative law at the University of Vienna
47
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between 1919 and 1929; constitutional court judge in Vienna beginning in 1920 and ending in
1930; professor from 1930 to 1933 at the University of Cologne until his removal by the Nazis;
international law professor from 1934-1940 at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in
Geneva, Switzerland; keynote at the 1940 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectureship at Harvard
University (later published as Law and Peace in International Relations [1942]); an assignment
with the Office of Wartime Economic Affair’s Liberated Areas Division in Washington D.C. in
1944; legal advisor, albeit in an unofficial, if highly impactful, capacity, to delegates at the
United Nations conference in San Francisco that helped frame a new international system;
consultant to the US War Crimes Commission in 1946. His commentary on the new international
organization culminated in the 1950 publication, The Laws of the United Nations.
In 1952, Kelsen completed Principles of International Law, which drew on his many
years of research in the area of international law—and included sections devoted exclusively to
the application of criminal responsibility. His major publications on international criminal
responsibility, include “Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with
Particular Regard to Punishment of War Criminals (1943),” Peace Through Law (1944),
especially “Peace Guaranteed by Individual Responsibility for Violation of International Law
(Part II); "The Rule Against Ex Post Facto Law and the Prosecution of the Axis War Criminals
(1945)," “Will the Judgment In the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent In International
Law? (1947)," and "Collective and Individual Responsibility for Acts of State in International
Law (1948).” Few extant non-English publications attest to Kelsen’s interest in international
criminalization prior to his US-relocation after 1939.49 As a result, due to Kelsen’s virtual
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absence from contemporary American legal philosophical debate50 and the paucity of sustained
contemporary interest in Kelsen’s conception of ICR amongst German-language scholars, this
towering figure in the continental tradition has been otherwise neglected as seminal interlocutor
on the modern origin and dissemination of this term.
In an incident that took place at the German University at Prague in 1936, a group of
National Socialist students occupied a building where Kelsen was speaking and shouted: “Down
with the Jew, all non-Jews must leave the hall.” Soon after, Kelsen “received several anonymous
letters signed with the swastika, which threatened [his] life in case [he] did not give up [his]
work at the university.”51 At the Eichmann proceedings in Jerusalem in 1961, Robert Servatius,
Nazi SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Adolph Eichmann's defense counsel, who had drawn on pure
theory in defense of his client, noted that Kelsen “had suffered personally from National Socialist
persecution and had been compelled to emigrate to the United States. Therefore it would only be
human and absolutely understandable if...Kelsen would have tried to reject or to weaken the
validity of [the Acts of State] doctrine in international law. It bears witness to the human integrity
and the juristic impartiality of this scholar that, being under the influence of obvious and only too
understandable resentments, he has not succumbed to this temptation...”52
Much like a small but influential group of contemporary international legal scholars who
attribute Kelsen’s discussion of “fault-based” international criminal responsibility to a nineteenth
century “statist” logic, Servatius has completely misread Kelsen’s interest in furthering the
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adoption of models of criminalization that can account for the punishment of traditional acts of
state. Kelsen continues to be a point of reference for judges, prosecutors and defense counsel at
ICL trials. After a brief historical survey of the development of ICL after the First World War,
and general philosophical reflections on ICR within the taxonomy of guilt, section IV further
outlines the research problem, including tracking general questions and sub-questions addressed
within the context of each of the four major chapters, as well as reaffirming the value of this
study and research objectives.

III. The Philosophy of International Criminal Responsibility
“The essence of sovereignty,” noted former U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing in
1918, “[is] the absence of responsibility.”53
In response to the Paris Peace Conference to adjudicate the century’s first international
war crimes tribunal after World War I for the “crimes” of German Kaiser Wilhelm II, as well as
former Turkish Interior Minister Mehmed Talaat and Turkish Minister of War Enver Pasha,
Lansing maintained the incompatibility between sovereignty and responsibility. To be sovereign
is to never be judged accountable for actions perpetrated in defense of what Lansing believed to
be the highest right to order and protection.
Lansing, according to President Woodrow Wilson’s advisor Edward House, used
sovereignty as a way to excuse humanitarian abuses. 54 How can a state be sovereign, Lansing
insisted, at the same time that it is called upon to punish its officials under universal principles of
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justice? Logically, it is impossible to both be and not be sovereign. If Lansing were right in 1918
in his narrow configuration of the relationship between sovereignty and responsibility, ICL
perhaps would have remained still-born. Theorists and practitioners would have had a difficult
time defending the legitimacy of a supra-sovereign international order later-convened at the Paris
Peace Conference to find individuals criminally responsible for humanitarian violations, if the
traditional notion of sovereignty—and the sovereign state as the primary subject of international
law—were to dictate definitions of international criminal responsibility.55
ICL as an institution, therefore, starts with the creation of the IMT Charter at London.
Philosophical reflection on the degree to which the acts of state doctrine (AoSD) no longer
automatically avails state officials of immunity from core international crimes, however, begins
even earlier, around World War I.56 The text of the Report presented to the preliminary Peace
Conference by the Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War on March 29, 1919
distinguished “two classes of culpable acts: (a) Acts which provoked the world war and
accompanied its inception; (b) Violations of the laws and customs of war and the laws of
humanity.”57 The formulation ‘laws of humanity’ was probably not a reference to general
principles of law, per se, but [a] more nebulous idea of what ‘humanity’ required.”58 Such rules
were” too subjective to admit of criminal liability,” according to positive law skeptics. 59
While “naturalistic assertions of what ‘humanity’ wanted or needed” was contested by
US representatives during WWI, the Second World War established the precedent of the
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Nuremberg IMT, confirmed by President Truman’s October 27, 1946 description of the trial as
“the first international criminal assize in history.” The President remarked:
I have no hesitancy in declaring that the historic precedent set at Nuremberg abundantly
justifies the expenditure of effort, prodigious though it was. This precedent becomes
basic in international law in the future. The principles established and the results achieved
place International Law on the side of peace as against aggressive warfare.60
Three days later, Warren R. Austin, Chief Delegate of the United States, in his opening
address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, confirmed President Truman’s
commitment to international criminal adjudication from the perspective of the American chiefexecutive. Austin stated:
Besides being bound by the law of the United Nations Charter, twenty-three nations,
members of the Assembly, including the United States, Soviet Russia, the United
Kingdom and France, are also bound by the law of the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal. That makes planning or waging a war of aggression a crime against humanity
for which individuals as well as nations can be brought before the bar of international
justice, tried and punished.61

Rather than assuming, as representative ICL scholars and practitioners have,62 that
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Kelsen’s criticisms make him a positive law skeptic rather than a leading supporter of
prosecution of crimes of the magnitude of crimes against humanity, it is best to briefly note these
criticisms, including Kelsen’s skepticism of the moral formulation made in the Paris Peace
Conference report, as well as Kelsen’s worry over the description of Nuremberg as a
“precedential” ruling based on the presumption of “victor’s justice.”
Kelsen, as legal adviser to the last Minister of War of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was
privy to much of the decision-making process at the end of WWI. In a telling anecdote in his
autobiography, Kelsen writes:

I can still vividly remember one of my last conversations with the minister. I had been
summoned to the minister via phone in the middle of the night. He received me in his
dressing gown in his private office in the official residence he had in the building of the
Ministry of War. He handed me the text of a telegram that President Wilson had sent in
response to the offer of the Austro-Hungarian government to grant the nationalities of the
monarchy the right of self-determination, and he asked me to comment on Wilson’s
statement. While I was reading Wilson’s response, the minister put on his uniform jacket
and invited me to go into his office. On the way there we had to pass the ballroom that
was part of the minister’s residence. At that point the minister said to me that it was
embarrassing to live in such splendid chambers during such a terrible time. “Especially,
your excellency, if one knows that one is the last Minister of War of the monarchy.” “You
are crazy,” he responded, “how can you say something so awful!” To the very last
moment, the old officer, even though he had no illusions about the magnitude of the
military defeat, could not believe it possible that an empire of four hundred years could
simply vanish from the stage of history. When I took my leave in person a short time
later, he stood there in his office deathly pale. On the drive into the Ministry, the mob had
pelted his car with stones, a shard of glass had injured him on the cheek. He shook my
hand and said with emotion: “You were right. I am the last Minister of War of the
monarchy.63
Jochen von Bernstorff, a leading scholar of Kelsen’s public international law theory,
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writes that “Kelsen himself, through his position in the ministry, was directly involved in the
various plans to save, reform, and liquidate the Hapsburg monarchy. He composed an internal,
and in the end unsuccessful, memorandum intended to persuade the Emperor to transform the
monarchy into a federation of independent nation states on the basis of the right of self
determination of nations.”64
In “Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard
to the Punishment of War Criminals (1943),” a sustained argument for the legitimacy of war
crimes tribunals, Kelsen questioned the formulation of Article 227 of the Peace Treaty of
Versailles, which reads:

The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly
German Emperor, for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of
treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the
guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one
appointed by each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great
Britain, France, Italy and Japan.65
Kelsen writes that the formula used was inexact. “The true reason for the ex-Kaiser’s
demanded submission to a criminal court was that he was considered the main author of the war
and resorting to this war was considered a crime. Article 227 speaks of ‘an offence of
international morality’ in order to avoid speaking of a violation of international law.”66 Kelsen
argues that this is a “legal” offense based on two points, modified under the circumstances of
WWII. First, he endorses the position that wars of aggression are acts contrary to positive law.
Second, the retroactive nature of Article 227, legal according to the general principles of
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international law, licensed such prosecution.
The Paris Peace Treaty confirmed the doctrine of just war theory. “The principle of
bellum justum,” according to Kelsen, is considered by outstanding authors as a rule of positive
international law,”67 and since the Kaiser was “the main author of war,” he—and he alone—
could be held accountable. Neither was there any “reason to renounce a criminal charge made
against the persons morally responsible for the outbreak of World War II.”68In his 1943 article,
Kelsen, however, limits the scope of individual criminal prosecution for crimes of aggression.

In so far as this is also a question of constitutional law of the Axis Powers, the answer is
simplified by the fact that these States were under more or less dictatorial regimes, so that
the number of persons who has the legal power of leading their country into war is in
each of the Axis States very small. In Germany it is probably the Fuehrer alone; in Italy,
the Duce and the King; and in Japan, the Prime Minister and the Emperor. If the assertion
attributed to Louis VIV ‘l’Etat c’est moi’ is applicable to any dictatorship, the punishment
of a dictator amounts almost to a punishment of the State.69
Kelsen assumed the opposite position of the most famous of modern natural law theorists,
Hugo Grotius, who affirmed that heads-of-state were always immune from prosecution. And yet
Kelsen’s limitations reflect a purely legal emphasis on positive law technique, which always
means the valid transfer of authority from the home country to a jurisdictional court that has a
vested international interest in prosecuting the legal organ. Since in 1943 no official legal
document existed that indicated the willingness of parties to affirm humanitarian rather than
parochial values vis a vis international criminalization, Kelsen suggested a relatively
conservative approach to head-of-state prosecution. At the time of the London Agreement,
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however, as the previous section affirms, Kelsen expanded categories of criminalization to other
high-level officials within the normative legal hierarchy of delegation.
The point of departure for this dissertation, therefore, is a challenge posed to
contemporary ICL scholars, such as University of Padua international law scholar Andrea
Gattini, a leading expert on Kelsen’s contributions to the conception of ICR, who claims that the
author of pure theory was committed to a strict estimation of the acts of state doctrine, and thus
immunized state officials against a progressive cognition of ICR. Gattini writes that “Kelsen’s
scathing criticism of the Nuremberg trial as ‘victors’ justice’ was not only due to his
disappointment with the Trial’s shortcomings. The reasons can also be found in Kelsen’s
adherence to a traditional view of ‘act of State’, which had already been challenged at that time,
and, in the end, a nineteenth century state-centric conception of law.”70
Even in his earliest writings on ICL, Kelsen recognized that the Kaiser’s guilt could be
established according to positive legal rules, and that his trial was not based on an “offense of
morality” but rather valid international law. Thus, the acts of state doctrine did not even apply to
the Kaiser, according to Kelsen. Through a “sleight-of-hand” implicit to this test case, we begin
to piece together the true meaning of a general theory of legal responsibility in accordance with a
pure theoretical model. Kelsen writes:

But if a legal norm—such as a norm established by an international treaty—attaches
punishment to an offense of morality, a punishment to be inflicted upon the offender by a
court, the offense assumes ex post facto the character of a violation of law.71

See: Andrea Gattini, “Kelsen’s Contributions to International Law,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 2,
no. 3 (2004): 795.
71
Kelsen, 545.
70

25

As with the IMT at Nuremberg, Kelsen supports the Kaiser’s prosecution on retroactive
grounds through a legerdemain where the moral offense—mala in se—becomes the defining
factor in instituting a novel retroactive methodology.
In the last chapter of his 1905 doctoral thesis on Dante Alighieri’s Divine Comedy,72
Kelsen recognizes a counter-example to the theory of the "two swords doctrine" of Pope
Gelasius: Niccolò Machiavelli’s political realist advice for would-be dictators. For Kelsen,
Machiavelli represented an executive operating without effective legal restraints on responsible
conduct. The later Weimar constitutional debate between Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt over
guardianship of the constitution, briefly examined in chapter two, argues for the author of pure
theory’s commitment to the principle non sub homine sed sub lege (or “not under man, but under
law”). The extent to which Kelsen resolves the problem of sovereign authority in estimating the
meaning of ICR from the vantage point of a valid system of adjudication extending to the
“commander-in-chief” is the main theme of chapter two’s overarching analysis of the
relationship between legal, political and moral valuations of this critical term of cognition.
Questioning the general rejection of tu quoque defenses73 in later Nuremberg trials held
under Control Council Act, no. 10, Reinhard Merkl, a Nuremberg defense attorney and retired
professor of criminal law and philosophy of law at the University of Hamburg, writes of Kelsen
and victor’s justice:
If anything, the term ‘victors’ justice,’ hissed through clenched teeth for years after the
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Nuremberg Trial, has gained a certain justification from this circumstance. Hans Kelsen,
who perhaps understood more clearly than any of his contemporaries what was at stake,
demanded already in 1944 an independent, impartial, and genuinely international
criminal court that was to be established according to an international treaty which was to
be signed by all the involved parties, including the defeated: ‘Only if the victors subject
themselves to the same law which they seek to apply to the defeated, will the idea of
justice remain unscathed.’74
Merkel completes his assessment of the ideal of neutrality by stating that Kelsen’s
position “remained an unheeded and unthinkable warning.”75
But like Gattini, whose writings on Kelsen are the most pointed secondary Englishlanguage commentary on the author of pure theory’s description of ICR, Merkel undermines a
key, enduring fact: Kelsen ultimately approves, despite his well-known criticism, the conduct of
the IMT at Nuremberg. The philosophy of international criminal law attests to the multidisciplinary reading of liability for heads-of-state and other state officials. While neither
existentialists Karl Jaspers, nor his student Hannah Arendt, for example, is technically a legal
philosopher, each provides a general statement about the taxonomy of this highly irregular term.
Jaspers introduced four types of guilt: (a) criminal, (b) political, (c) moral, and (d) metaphysical.
The first resembled a “fault-based” description; the second represented “guilt” for offenses of a
collective nature applicable to all citizens of a state for the offenses of certain state officials; the
third encompasses a recognition that even when the law does not apply coercive measures, there
is still an internal responsibility to abide by a certain standard of behavior that the law may not
concern itself with; and the fourth, metaphysical ‘guilt’, applies to a general sense of
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responsibility for the humanitarian crimes committed anywhere even when individuals feel no
specific legal or moral compulsion and otherwise have retain no national allegiance.76 Arendt’s
famous court report that diagnosed the ‘banality of evil’ in a man considered to be one of the
architects of the genocide of European Jewry followed in the train of many earlier reflections on
the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunal by some of the world’s most eminent political and legal
theorists.77 After the Eichmann case, the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial followed with commentary.78
“This trial, which found considerable difficulty reconciling norms of individual responsibility
strongly embedded in German criminal law, led German criminal law theoreticians to attempt to
conceptuali[z]e…forms of responsibility that accurately portray the nature of mass crimes.”79
Alain Finkelkraut in France, covering the 1987 trial of Klaus Barbie, contested Arendt’s
“banality” thesis, whereas Argentinian philosopher and politician Carlos Santiago Nino
recommended an expressly naturalist approach to the trial of the junta.80
While the major dividing line in the early conception of ICR is between those ICL
commentators endorsing the natural law tradition, including, on the one hand, Quincy Wright,
legal advisor to US Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson, Lord Wright, President of the United
Nations War Crimes commission, and Hersch Lauterpacht, an advisor to the British government,
and on the other hand, legal positivists, including George Schwarzenberger, Manfred Lachs and
George Manner, more recent philosophical inquiries, including by adherents of critical legal
studies (CLS), feminism and third world (TWAIL) approaches have only had limited impact on
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the ICL discourse. “It is worth bearing in mind,” writes ICL scholar Robert Cryer, “that these
approaches tended to arise after international criminal law had established itself as an academic
enterprise in and of its own right as a subject worthy of study, i.e., in the 1990s.”81
In the Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, edited by first President of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) Antonio Cassese, Andrea Biachi in
“State Responsibility and Criminal Responsibility” writes:

Kelsen looked at this concept of ‘collective responsibility’, prevailing in international
law, as a typical manifestation of primitive societies. He envisaged a progressive shift
towards a fault-based individual responsibility, which over time would replace entirely
the causality-based collective responsibility of states. Kelsen’s speculation, strongly
influenced by the idea that the international legal order would gradually converge,
together with domestic legal systems, towards the organic unity of a universal legal
community, has proved to be wrong. Individual responsibility has certainly coupled state
responsibility but is far from replacing it.82
The notion that Kelsen’s conception of individual responsibility in ICL did not align with
a realistic assessment of states under ad hoc ICL conditions must be tested. Much like Shklar’s
position that Kelsen retained a “legalist” or rules-based ideological approach even to the study of
ICR, Bianchi assumes that Kelsen was incapable of defending a modern, dynamic conception of
individual criminal responsibility in a period of international fragmentation. This dissertation
holds that Kelsen’s conception of ICR is especially notable for its durability under ad hoc
conditions. A fault-based individual responsibility could develop, in accordance with a plausible
reading of Kelsen’s major works on ICR, through the application of a system of valid judicial
rulings.

81
82

Ibid., 259
Andrea Biachi,”State Responsibility and Criminal Liability of Individuals,” 17.

29

Case study analysis, therefore, is integral to understanding the role of judges in the
development of this concept.

IV. Outline

What is the source of ICR? What makes ICR valid? What is the main object of ICR—the
norm or the act? In establishing how these formal questions are answered at different periods of
ICL, the object of legal cognition is reconfigured to reflect a historically-resonant ICR discourse.
The ad hoc judge within the normative hierarchy assumes a major contributing role in the
development of this term. Under different historical circumstances key doctrinal features of the
law are emphasized. However, despite the title of this project—“Between Politics and Morality:
The Pure Theory of Law and the Changing Notion of International Criminal Responsibility”—
modifications registered here are not necessarily developed beyond a general recognition of new
patterns for thinking about this concept under historically-evolved circumstances.
The second chapter reconciles pure theory with political and moral sources of imputation
under the immunizing acts of state doctrine, on the one hand, and principles of civilization, on
the other, through the moralized claim of positive legal validity for ex post facto/retroactive
lawmaking. This chapter shows the way in which Kelsen reconciles non sub homine sed sub
lege/"not under man but under law” with a theory that otherwise legitimates the validity of
autocratic, even totalitarian rule. Kelsen reconciles the conception of judicial review, associated
with his position in the Weimar constitutional debate against the decisionism of Carl Schmitt, a
subject previously noted.
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Chapter two is not meant to be either a definitive account of Kelsen’s work on ICR, nor is
the pure theory of law in its conception of imputation, or the “de-personalized” or “depsychologized” notion of responsibility, the only theoretical model that can be used to assess the
degree to which cognition of ICR has evolved over time. The distinct advantage of this approach,
however, is that it presents a conception of ICR, which permits a strictly positive or human-made
assessment free of adulteration by “extra-legal” elements. Sociological, political, psychological
or moral conceptions of responsibility are set aside in comprehension of an autonomous legal
inquiry. Neutral or objective criterion bolstering the creation of a dynamic institution derived
from its own relatively predictable, hierarchically delegated, legitimating legal sources, thus,
animates the pure theoretical blueprint.
Yet despite the unity of cognition associated with a pure theoretical description of ICR,
Kelsen cannot so easily remove moral-normative reasoning from within the boundary of “law”.
Even as the structure of the legal order is shaped by authorized legal normative sources,
including state parties delegating authority to courts adjudicating core international crimes
through treaty law, the validation of the violation of the principle of legality when acts of state
amount to offenses of the magnitude of core international crimes, requires, Kelsen argues, the
attachment of retroactive sanctions to once-legal acts. By creating an order sourced in such
persistent indeterminacy, the author of pure theory forces readers to question whether the various
scholars who categorize the author of the pure theory of law as “conservative” in his support of
the AoSD are not in fact mistaken regarding the legacy of perhaps the most prominent jurist of
the twentieth century. The reader is asked both to follow Kelsen in his train of logic, which
describes the architecture of a “system” able to authorize the prosecution of state officials for
these crimes, and to join me in considering the implications of Kelsen’s “moral-turn.”
31

While this study concludes with an assessment of Kelsen’s position on the separation
between law and morality, or “separation thesis” (see: chapter 6), the reasons Kelsen marshals
for incorporating “principles of civilization” as the “principle of justice” or primary criterion for
assessing responsibility animates the rest of this study. The liminal point of Pure Theory—the
examination of imputation at the international level—produces a fascinating claim on legality,
one that has the potential to make sense of its current fragmented vision. While Kelsen often
affirms that behind law resides “the gorgon head of power,” such power can only be applied if
the offense normally protected under the AoSD is so immoral as to constitute an international
crime.
Contemporary international law scholar Reut Yael Paz, representative of the conventional
view, asserts that law and morality are two distinctive modes of inquiry for Kelsen:

[Kelsen’s] theory dismisses the law’s requirement to be just. Justice is a moral and/or
political question that should not be answered by the law. Ergo Kelsen’s genius lies in
enabling a totally new legal question; namely is law valid? In brief, law is not about
justice…It is instead all about the legal norm’s validity.83

Paz follows, as chapter two describes, the formal understanding of “science” as objectcreation from a mind-centered epistemology. Kelsen draws on both the philosophical position of
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)—and David Hume (1711-1776) before him—in asserting that “is”
and “ought” cognition must be distinguished. In the realm of “ought,” however, a distinction
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must be made between “the science of law” (jurisprudence) and “the science of morals” (ethics).
This particularly legal or juristic mode of inquiry provides the clearest designation of the positive
law criminalization of state officials for acts of state. Alternatively, jurisprudence must be
distinguished from actual rules of law. The first describes what “ought” to be; the second, what
“is”. That the judge at any level of the legal normative hierarchy produces a decision that
deviates from a strictly positive legal assessment of all the legal norms pertinent to the case at
hand does not mean that the decision is invalid. The Pure Theory of Law as a strictly positive or
human-made legal cognition must accept that, provided the rest of the hierarchy of normative
legal delegation authorizes the judge’s ruling, the judge’s ruling, no matter if it incorporates
extra-legal elements, is also legal. Kelsen therefore differentiates between a scientific conception
of a self-creating and dynamic social order based on coercion and judges who deviates from the
“scientific” frame of legal normativity. Although a judge’s decision may extend beyond the
“frame” of analysis specific to “science,” the decision, given the judges preeminent role in the
hierarchy of imputation, nevertheless remains “authentic”.84
The judge is law to the extent that, authorized to apply the function of judicial decisionmaking by those belonging to tribes, nations or the international community, the judge
transforms—at every stage—the nature of law. While she does not typically supersede the source
of her authority, which generally guides the judge’s interpretation of custom, statutes, treaties, et
al, including preconceived, prescribed, future-oriented or prospective rules of law that reflect the
core characteristic of “legalism” or the “ideology of rules,” she nevertheless may do so. Without
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judges there can be no such thing as ICR. Unlike exclusively political, moral or metaphysical
descriptions of ‘guilt’ in the sense ascribed by Jaspers, Kelsen’s designation of responsibility for
core international crimes relies on an exclusively individual assessment of liability.
This thesis, therefore, presents the judge as the foremost inventor of criminal
responsibility. In an international law setting, as Kelsen indicates, the judge may turn to
“principles of civilization” or not, though a valid source. At the liminal point—the study of
individual responsibility in international criminal law—the legal scholar must justify the course
of imputation, despite the prevailing state-centered (and, hence, politicized) view of the author of
pure theory’s conservatism on this subject. This dissertation argues for the centrality of the judge
as the maker of ICR. Not only, however, does the judge make this term, but she must, in turn,
presuppose a “natural person” with “agency,” two legal markers traditionally extinguished from
Kelsen’s pure theoretical conception of imputation. Here, as we will find, Kelsen is intent on
granting judges a central role in creating a moral subject, constituted by the “will” of the
“international community,” whose “consensus” upholds “principles of civilization” or
“principles of humanity.”
Time is the major component factor in the study of ICR. Without recognition of the role
time plays in constituting the individual moral agent from the perspective of a future
international communal consensus informing judgment, then Kelsen’s project would inevitably
fall apart. That pure theory has been designated formal, and its concept of imputation devoid of
substantive concern, is irreconcilable with the doctrinal flexibility that Kelsen insists upon in
relation to ICR. Kelsen’s progressive contributions to the changing notion of ICR as manifested
in three distinct stages of ICL insists upon history’s shaping force. New political, economic,
technological and other impactful changes, notwithstanding, the technique associated with a pure
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theoretical methodology must be understood to retain structural features that shape the legal
discourse at stages of ICL history.
Fundamental to the conception of ICR is the idea, according to Kelsen, that culpability is
predicated on the coercive nature of law. In a section of General Theory of Law and State
entitled “Legal Norm and Rule of Law in a Descriptive Sense,” Kelsen writes: “If ‘coercion’…is
an essential element of law, then the norms which form a legal order must be norms stipulating a
coercive act, i.e. a sanction.”85 Since international law is an order that sanctions criminal acts,
coercion constitutes a defining feature of the conception of criminal responsibility in this sphere.
ICR, therefore, corresponds to the development of humanitarian cognition of liability, including
state and collective forms of responsibility, on the one hand, and individual responsibility, on the
other. Chapter two consequently frames the debate over the validity of ICR, in order to bolster
the efficacy of an order devoted to sanctioning core international crimes.
Chapter three evaluates Kelsen's contributions to our understanding of the Nuremberg
proceedings. In contesting international law scholars Scott Shapiro and Oona Hathaway's recent
claim that Kelsen is responsible for helping to promote the enduring legacy of the Kellogg
Briand Pact,86 I take the position that Kelsen's recommendations to Jackson about the inclusion
of a definition of ("fault-based") individual responsibility prior to the London International
Military Tribunal conference was wedded to his distinct belief that this was something
completely new, a turn away from the traditional application of collective forms of
responsibility. Kelsen’s affirmation of a retroactive legal technique in violation of principles of
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legality applicable to all core international crimes, proves the limitations of Shapiro’s and
Hathaway’s strong claims for the merit of the Nuremberg trial as derivative of the international
effort to banish war through collective security agreements. However, the crimes against peace
charge was not validly or legitimately instituted because of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, Paris Pact
or General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (1928). The law
of Nuremberg was necessarily new, as Kelsen attests. Through his correspondence with Jackson
(see section II), it is clear that Kelsen’s finger was on the wording of the IMT charter, which
became a basis for later multilateral treaties designating substantive jurisdiction. In addition, this
chapter considers problems associated with the crimes against peace charge from a Kelsenian
perspective, focusing on problems associated with the just war theoretical framework.
Chapter four periodizes the second stage in the modern articulation of criminal
responsibility in ICL. In analyzing the Eichmann proceedings, the second case study investigates
ways in which formal descriptions of the rule of law were disposed of in a case that
chronologically follows the Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings. Since the 1961 trial bookends
cases against major Nazi officials and other axis officials for core international crimes, especially
crimes against humanity committed during the Second World War period, the proceedings are
valuable in determining the progress of ICR conceptualization from the time of the creation of
the modern ICL system with the introduction of a definition of individual responsibility at the
IMT conference at London in 1945. Amongst others, Eichmann’s stature in the hierarchy of
delegated authority was recognized early on by Jackson. In his closing address before the IMT,
Jackson claimed that:
Adolf Eichmann, the sinister figure who had charge of the extermination program, has
estimated that the anti-Jewish activities resulted in the killing of six million Jews. Of
these, four million were killed in extermination institutions, and two million were killed
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by Einsatzgruppen, mobile units of the Security Police and SD which pursued Jews in the
ghettos…and slaughtered them by gas wagons, by mass shooting in anti-tank ditches, and
by every device which Nazi ingenuity could conceive. So thorough and uncompromising
was this program that the Jews of Europe as a race no longer exist, thus fulfilling the
diabolic “prophecy" of Adolf Hitler at the beginning of the war.87

Jackson recognized Eichmann’s role as a chief architect of the Nazi genocide against the
Jews. In this respect, the Jerusalem trial of Eichmann is often said to play the role of an appendix
to the Nuremberg IMT. Dieter Wisliceny, SS- (Captain), responsible for the ghettoization and
extermination of Jews in the Nazi campaign focused on Greece, Hungary and Slovakia, testified
before the IMT on January 3, 1946, stating that:
Eichmann told me that the words "final solution" meant the biological extermination of
the Jewish race... I was so much impressed with this document which gave Eichmann
authority to kill millions of people that I said at the time: "May God forbid that our
enemies should ever do anything similar to the German people". He replied: "Don't be
sentimental – this is a Führer order".88

The changing notion of international criminal responsibility cannot be separated from this
historic trial. Although other cases that occurred during the Cold War period (1945-1989), such
as the Auschwitz Trial (1964), or the case against Klaus Barbie (1987), represented key points in
the jurisprudence of ICL, the Eichmann case—amongst Cold War cases—produced a series of
especially important legal philosophical appeals to the notion of agency under superior orders.
In focusing once again on the core challenge presented by Kelsen—application of the
acts of state doctrine under ad hoc conditions—what is revealed is the extent to which the author

Robert H. Jackson, “Closing Arguments for the Conviction of Nazi War Criminals,” Robert H. Jackson Center,
https:/-/www.roberthjackson.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/Closing_Argument_for_Conviction_of_Nazi_War_Criminals.pdf
88
Stuart Stein, "Affidavit of Dieter Wisliceny," Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume VIII (Washington:
USGPO, 1946) 606–619.
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of pure theory’s conception remains applicable to the effort to establish the legitimacy of the trial
in a way that paralleled Arendt’s work. While Arendt, given her later writings on the operations
of judgment, remains far more receptive to the possibility that conscience is nevertheless
cultivable under superior orders, her “banality” thesis shares space with Kelsen’s pure theoretical
embrace of relatively determined human behaviors under the law.89 Even if doctrinally barring
such psychological considerations, from the vantage point of strictly positive legal cognition,
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Seyla Benhabib notes that “…although Arendt, like Kelsen, was a critic of national sovereignty, she remained
skeptical that international institutions established in the wake of World War II, such as the United Nations, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), or even legal instruments such as the Geneva Conventions on the
Status of Refugees, could ever satisfactorily resolve the[] paradoxes of the modern nation-state. Kelsen and Hersch
Lauterpacht, by contrast, as international jurists, insisted that unless the rights enumerated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights were protected by an International Human Rights Court, they would remain
ineffectual. For Kelsen, in particular, sovereignty was not the actual or mystical expression of the will of a people, of
an actual demos, but rather a Grundnorm of the international system of states, which accepted that national law
would be based upon the authority of some institution or instance recognized as the final arbiter…. What is the
source of the authority of law: human will or reason? Or some more fundamental order that precedes human acts of
law-giving? Does the law express principles of human justice, or is the law grounded in some other order that
precedes but nevertheless contains human justice? And if the law derives its authority from an act of will that is not
bound by reason but expresses the decision of a mythical lawgiver or a collectivity called the nation, then how can
the rights of the individual be secured? It is doubtful whether Kelsen himself could successfully resolve the
‘decisionist’ challenge posed by Carl Schmitt. Rather, Kelsen admits that the Grundnorm of the law must itself be
posited and cannot be further justified; at its limits law encounters the political.” Seyla Benhabib, Exile,
Statelessness and Migration: Playing Chess with History from Hannah Arendt to Isaiah Berlin (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2018), 20, 22-23.
This long quote from Benhabib establishes the significant role that Kelsen is beginning to play amongst a
leading U.S. public intellectual and political scholar of modern German history, whose writings on Carl Schmitt
dominates her analysis of the Weimar constitutional crisis. On Benhabib’s commentary on Schmitt, see generally:
Seyla Benhabib, ”Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Kant: Sovereignty and International Law,” Political Theory 40, no. 6
(2012): 688-713; Seyla Benhabib, “Defending a Cosmopolitanism without Illusions. Reply to My Critics,” Critical
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17, no. 6 (2014): 697-715. We will again encounter
Benhabib’s writings in chapter four on the Eichmann trial and Kelsen’s and Arendt’s corresponding description of
agency under the acts of state doctrine (AoSD). Since, according to Kelsen, the “international community” through
“consensus” determines “principles of civilization” as historically-dependent markers on the beltway to a more
refined notion of international criminal responsibility, Benhabib’s claim that “at its limits law encounters the
political” must be interrogated. In focusing on the record or chronicle of ICL cases from 1945-present, judgement
for heads-of-state and other high-ranking officials, especially, indicates that while the rights of individuals may not
always be protected, especially under autocratic rule, Benhabib is wrong to endorse the dominance of the political.
From the perspective of a burgeoning international criminal legal order, even one whose judges and prosecutors
have been threatened with arrest by the Trump administration, the authority of “law” supersedes decisionism, as the
leader who once-ordered with seeming impunity acts amounting to crime against humanity and genocide, has
become a ready subject—if ex post facto—of prosecution for core international crimes. That Kelsen was a leading
advocate of “consensus” forms the final estimation of Kelsen’s progressive legacy as a challenging critic of state
sovereignty, who, as Benhabib correctly notes, endorsed the positive law legitimacy of international human rights
enforcement mechanisms (see: chapter six).
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coercive powers, according to Kelsen, shape judgment. Although fear and other psychological
components are formally excluded from pure theoretical legal conceptualization, Kelsen
nevertheless recognizes that the technique of law is efficacious or effective in regulating
behavior. Consequently, one must infer that the law plays a role in psychologically modifying
behaviors that might otherwise be different if no coercive sanction were in place. As a result,
Kelsen’s conception of freedom, discussed with respect to the archetypal case of the bureaucratic
“desk murder,” presents a limited—reductionist or causal—view of human behavior. Within the
scope of the pure theoretical conception of ICR, Eichmann is nevertheless assumed to possess
the ability to decide between acts of state that are moral or immoral, and thus legal or illegal,
dependent on the time and jurisdiction under which liability is assessed.
Emphasizing the place of Kelsen’s “moral-turn,” this chapter finds agreement with
international legal scholar Noora Arajärvi, who claims that Kelsen made a significant impact on
the conception of ICR at the Eichmann trial through the “sleight-of-hand” of retroactive
lawmaking.90 While the Jerusalem trial retained firmer prospective legal ground than the
Nuremberg proceedings, from a Kelsenian perspective, the defendant, given the proliferation of
multilateral treaties, especially the 1945 United Nations Charter, the UN-sponsored International
Law Commission’s 1947 Nuremberg Principles, the 1948 Genocide Convention, and the 1949
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, was provided
fairer warning than in earlier trials. But none of these major international documents represented
prospective laws for Eichmann. On what legal basis then, can we best envision ICR under
superior orders and the Fuhrer or Leader Principle?
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Noora Arajarvi, The Changing Nature of Customary International Law (New York: Routledge, 2014).
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The last case study on ICTY proceedings against Duško Tadić, inter alia, introduces a
description of judicial interpretation that deviates from Kelsen’s perceived “formalism.” The
ICTY was chosen as a representative tribunal, due to its emphasis placed on customary
international law, the fundamental source of international law, according to Kelsen. Custom,
typically unwritten, registers the practice of states through the acts of state officials. The AoSD
as immunizing doctrine, however, is now subordinated to more methodologically-inventive
developments affirmed by ICL judges in the post-Cold War period. The ICTY constitutes an ad
hoc jurisdictional order where judges assume roles as interpreters of new humanitarian law
informed by the efforts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), amongst other subjects of
international legal discourse. The accumulation of “precedential” or other court decisions, as
well as a general recognition by the “international community” that certain acts, even if in
accordance with rules of a specific national legal order are prohibited by jus cogens or
peremptory international norms, points to a deeper recognition of the effort to institute more
sophisticated justifications for “fault-based” proceedings in the post-Cold War era. While earlier
tribunals point to the impact Kelsen made on the early period of this modern institution,
especially from 1945 to 1947, Kelsen’s legacy of progressive investment in the development of a
conception fitting for international prosecution, is further defined in this period with the
expansive articulation of new humanitarian efforts to reduce the role of the immunizing state.
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“If international law is in some ways at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps
even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law....”91

Chapter 2
The Mirror of Legal Science: Moral and Political Conceptions of Individual Criminal
Responsibility under International Law92

I. Introduction

According to international law scholar Jochen von Bernstorff, Hans Kelsen, author of the
Pure Theory of Law, aimed “(1) to establish a non-political method for the field of international

Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War,” British Yearbook of International Law 29
(1952): 382. Lauterpacht, a leading expert of international law at the time of the Second World War and a student of
Kelsen’s, whose definition of “crimes against humanity” entered into the ICL lexicon through the IMT Charter,
recognizes morality as the source of international law. Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International
Law” in The British Yearbook of International Law, ed. Hersch Lauterpacht (London: Oxford University Press,
1946), 1-53. The degree to which Kelsen subscribes to Lauterpacht’s non-essential theory of natural law is explored
in later chapters. On Lauterpacht’s international law theory, see: Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of
Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960—Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 353-412, and Wolfgang Friedmann, Legal Theory (London: Stevens and Sons,
1953), 124.
92
This phrase is taken from the title of Kelsen’s skilled description of legal justice based on relative ontology. Hans
Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1957). Kelsen’s position on the principle of tolerance—introduced in Part IV—is based on Kelsen’s
commentary in What is Justice? While Kelsen is generally consistent with respect to the separation of law from
morality, and thus tolerance remains an unnecessary moral ideal constituting a valid legal conception, the purpose of
this interrogation of Kelsenian doctrinal requirements in cognition of ICR is nevertheless to point to the implied
moral source of this term. Furthermore, it is a contestable proposition anyway, since, as Andrea Gattini correctly
points out, Kelsen’s What is Justice? does not necessarily assume an amoral position with regard to the principle of
tolerance. Gattini states that Kelsen, in order to be true to the relativist standard of “legal science,” must not take a
position on the rightness or wrongness in supporting the principle or standard of tolerance. Furthermore, Gattini
insists that Kelsen reveres intellectual and public freedoms, and regards democracy as the only social order in which
to protect these necessary values. Andrea Gattini, “Kelsen’s Contribution to International Criminal Law,” Journal of
International Criminal Justice 2, no. 4 (September 2004): 795–809; Andrea Gattini, “Kelsen, Hans,” in The Oxford
Companion to International Criminal Justice, ed. Antonio Cassese (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 401403.
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law, and (2) to promote the political project, which originated in the inter-war period, of a
thoroughly legalized and institutionalized world order.” 93
Notwithstanding Kelsen’s progressive contributions to the legal architecture of a
federated world state and the establishment of a permanent and compulsory international court94,
Bernstorff’s first point of analysis is critical to the estimation of Kelsen’s impact on the changing
notion of international criminal responsibility (ICR). This chapter identifies how “non-political”
doctrines of the pure theory of law (PTL), including the separation of norms from social facts
(“the normativity thesis”) and law from morality (“the separation thesis”) are contravened by
Kelsen in an effort to define ICR under ad hoc conditions.

93 Jochen Von Bernstorff, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen: Believing in Universal Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
94
Prior to the end of the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations (UN), Hans Kelsen invented a
rival institutional design—the Permanent League for the Maintenance of Peace (PLMP). Central to the PLMP was a
permanent and compulsory international court adjudicating cases against states and individuals, fifty-five years in
advance of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (1998). On Kelsen’s blueprint for the PLMP,
see: Hans Kelsen, Peace through Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944). Although resembling
Kelsen’s design, the structural advances of the International Criminal Court (ICC) do not demonstrate the scope of
ICR, which presumably would be resolved under an efficaciously centralized, federated, permanent and compulsory
legal order. Provisions related to the principle of legality rule against ex post facto laws, including Articles 22-24 of
the ICC Statute, neither encompasses a monopoly on authorized force in the ICL sphere, nor shapes our
understanding of the latitude by which culpability traditionally is determined under ad hoc conditions. The degree to
which retroactivity remains relevant to the discussion of international criminal prosecution in the era of the ICC will
be evaluated in the conclusion, Chapter Six. The ICC—it should be noted—encompasses a jurisdictional
advancement but not the final determination on the scope of ICR interpretation. “Article 22 Nullum crimen sine lege
1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the
time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly
construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of
the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 3. This article shall not affect the characterization of any
conduct as criminal under international law independently of this Statute; Article 23 Nulla poena sine lege A person
convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute; Article 24 Non-retroactivity ratione
personae 1.No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of
the Statute; 2. In the event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final judgement, the law more
favourable to the person be investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply.” For an extended discussion on the
legal interpretation of these articles, see: William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: Commentary on
the Rome Statute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 539-550.
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Kelsen classifies international criminal law (ICL) as a valid legal order instituting justice for
crimes of the magnitude of core international crimes, including crimes against peace (CAP) or
crimes of aggression, war crimes (WC), crimes against humanity (CAH), and genocide (GEN).95
While the acts of state doctrine (AoSD) traditionally immunizes legal organs or officials
performing duties on behalf of national legal orders, retroactive licensing of core international
crimes, according to Kelsen, are based on “principles of justice” that reflect a necessary
movement in the evolution of law to a stage of international juridical sovereignty.96
The jurisprudential conception of sovereignty associated with John Austin’s command theory
presents the dominant positive law view prior to the London Conference and the ratification of
the International Military Tribunal (IMT) charter at London on August 8 1945.97 The
transformation of the AoSD—and with its sovereign immunity—through Article 7, affirms
international juridical sovereignty over the acts of all state officials, including heads-of-state.
Article 7 reads:

The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or
mitigating punishment.98
The introductory chapter affirmed Kelsen’s support of retroactive lawmaking for crimes against peace, war crimes
and crimes against humanity. With the promulgation of the Genocide Convention on December 9, 1948, the
international community affirmed through multilateral treaty the jus cogens status of this offense. But while
genocide encompassed a customary offense, the severity of which placed it under the rubric of crimes against
humanity, Kelsen makes scant mention of it in his writings. By deduction, we can assume that if Kelsen had
assumed an advisory role as he did at the time of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT), he would
have made similar recommendations for the retroactive licensing of genocide cases. See: “Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; December 9, 1948,” The Avalon Project: Documents
in Law, History and Diplomacy, accessed on July 3, 2018, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/genocide.asp.
For reference to Kelsen’s brief commentary on genocide, see: Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New
York: Rinehart & Company, 1952), 334.
96
Hans Kelsen, “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law?” The
International Law Quarterly 1, No. 2 (Summer, 1947):165.
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For the most representative description of Austin’s position on the relationship between sovereignty, command
and duty, see: John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: John Murray, 1861); John Austin,
Lectures on Jurisprudence, Or, the Philosophy of Positive Law (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1875).
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While the conversion of morality into a source of legality under ad hoc ICL conditions
is, with few exceptions, considered an aberration by Kelsen scholars, the author of Pure Theory’s
reconciliation of the principle non sub homine sed sub lege or “not under man, but under law”
requires such doctrinal deviation.99 Kelsen writes:

Even if [international] atrocities are covered by municipal law, or have the character of
acts of State and hence do not constitute individual criminal responsibility, they are
certainly open violations of the principles of morality generally recognized by civilized
peoples and hence, were at least, morally not innocent or indifferent when they were
committed…There can be little doubt that, according to the public opinion of the civilized
world, it is more important to bring the war criminals to justice than to respect, in their
trial, the rule against ex post facto law.100 (my emphasis)

Andrea Gattini in “Kelsen’s Contributions to International Criminal Law,” one of the few
sustained interrogations of Kelsen’s position on ICR, neglects to sufficiently address the reality
of the author of Pure Theory’s “moral-turn”.101 While he writes that, “in my view, it is through
his personal perspective on justice and morality that Kelsen, although critical of the Nuremberg
Tribunal, eventually came to terms with international criminal law….and international criminal

Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, accessed on July 20, 2018, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp.
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Kelsen’s conceptions of validity, sovereignty and agency in relation to ICR, however, also implicates a “relativist”
ontology of international law associated with classical and neo-legal positivist traditions. Kelsen demonstrates that at
the highest level of imputation, moral cognition must be resorted to through the legerdemain of ex post facto
lawmaking based on “civilizational” criterion of ICR. Kelsen’s endorsement of the retroactive capacity of the
accused to choose between immoral legal and morally illegal acts, as well as recognition of international judicial
independence, including non-formal retroactive application of moral criterion in the vein of the Free Law
Movement, disproves Shklar’s fierce polemic against “the homeless ghost” of Pure Theory. Judith Shklar, Legalism:
Law, Morals and Political Trials (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 34. Since Kelsen formulates
the most significant methodological answer to the structural problem of applying only prospective legal norms in
imputing international responsibility, his philosophy remains the primary object of discussion.
100
Kelsen, “The Rule against Ex Post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War Criminals,” 10-11.
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Andrea Gattini, “Kelsen’s Contribution to International
Criminal Law,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 2, no. 4 (September 2004): 795–809
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justice,102” he neglects to consider how a retroactive methodology conforms to the ex post facto
logic of ad hoc tribunals. This chapter is an effort to respond to those scholars like Gattini who
associate Kelsen with a predominantly state-centered, if at times morally-syncretic, conception
of ICR.

Part II begins with a general overview of Kelsen's jurisprudential contributions from the
perspective of a reviled “formalism”. Unlike Benthams’s imperatival approach, which rejected
the imposition of penalties for sovereign officials;103 Austin’s command theory, which in
addition to obligating obedience discounted international law “as being at most a set of principles
of morality or etiquette that lack binding force,”104 or HLA Hart's neo-positivist105 concept of
law based on a rule of recognition whose scope of validity is specific to domestic law,106

Ibid., 796.
Jeremy Bentham, who first introduced the term “international” with respect to “jurisprudence” in 1789, replacing
the traditional terminology ius gentium or law of nations, writes that “The word international, it must be
acknowledged, is a new one; though, it is hoped, sufficiently analogous and intelligible. It is calculated to express, in
a more significant way, the branch of law which goes under the name of law of nations: an appellation so
uncharacteristic that, were it not for the force of custom, it would seem rather to refer to internal jurisprudence.”
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart
(London: Athlone Press, 1970), 296. By “internal jurisprudence” he means that “law of nations” does not designate
space outside the domestic law of diverse nations (i.e., between nations). Although Bentham deserves credit for
instigating theoretical inquiry into the utilitarian or greatest happiness principle applied to the international sphere,
his imperatival theory affirms sovereign-centered conceptions associated with Austin’s command theory. The will of
the sovereign is the foundation of law and “cannot be illegal”. Jeremy Bentham, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch
of Jurisprudence, ed. P. Schofield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 38. Bentham’s recognition of the legal
limitation of the sovereign that requires “the whole political community…to be in a disposition to pay obedience,”
notwithstanding, reaffirms a Hobbesian notion of sovereignty as a monopoly of power within a given territory,
wherein a sovereign is immunized as his authority is always “legal”. Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the
Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1977), 18, and Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1661] 1965), 133.
104
See: Stephen C. McCaffrey, Understanding International Law. (Newark, NJ: Matthew Bender, 2006).; Austin,
John, Robert Campbell, and Sarah Austin. Lectures on Jurisprudence; Or, The Philosophy of Positive Law (London:
J. Murray, 1885), 188-190.
105
See: Anthony D’Amato, "The Neo-Positivist Concept of International Law," American Journal of International
Law 59, no. 2 (1965): 321-24.; Mehrdad Payandeh, "The Concept of International Law in the Jurisprudence of
H.L.A. Hart," The European Journal of International Law 21, no. 4 (2010):95.
106
Hart asserts that“…to say that a given rule is valid is to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the ruleof
recognition and so as a rule of the system. We can indeed simply say that the statement that a particular rule is valid
means that it satisfies all the criteria provided by the rule of recognition.” The rule of recognition is based on a
convention made within a given system, by which Hart means a domestic order. For example, the rule of recognition
in the United States is that a bill must be passed by the legislature and assented to by the President. Congress—or
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Kelsen's theoretical approach is doctrinally plausible as a positive law justification of war crimes
prosecution. In order to accomplish doctrinal purity, however, Kelsen must obscure the core
value of his contribution to the study of ICR: the introduction of the temporally-unbound method
of retroactive prosecution in violation of the principle of legality. Kelsen must endorse a moral
criterion, which he calls “principles of civilization” that judges must draw on to determine
whether a certain act—once legal—is later fit for prosecution.

As the third component of the dialectic triad of ICR, which incorporates a legal (Part II)
and political (Part III) perspective, moral principles applied retroactively to aberrant acts of state
(Part IV) demonstrate the invalidity of a strictly positive law cognition of responsibility based on
the separation of law from morality. Part II introduces a conception of imputation or the “depersonalized” or “de-psychologized” form of responsibility that aligns with Immanuel Kant’s a
priori transcendental methodology. Although the principle of legality of delicts and sanctions, as
well as its corollary the principle of non-retroactivity, corresponds with a pure theoretical
commitment to the prospective delegation of hierarchically-administered legal norms, the
prosecution of humanitarian offenses, as “acts which were illegal though not criminal at the time
they were committed,”107 assumes higher ordinal value. These offenses, Kelsen writes, were
“certainly… morally most objectionable.”108 Ex post facto lawmaking based on a moral criterion
of justice, therefore, takes supreme authority, according to Kelsen, in the designation of
individual responsibility for core international crimes (see: Part IV).

the rule makers—recognize this as the legitimate process for law creation. H. L. A. Hart, Concept of Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994), 103.
107
Hans Kelsen, “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law?,” The
International Law Quarterly 1, no. 2 (Summer, 1947): 153-171 in Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, ed. Guenael
Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 284.
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Even if the pure theory of law could be used to validate autocratic rule (Part III),
retroactive sanctions applied to acts that were not “indifferent in itself,”109 according to Kelsen,
is what legitimately prevents Hitler—and those Nazis “obligated” to act in accordance with the
grundnorm or basic norm of the Fuhrer Principle—from claiming post-war immunity. Kelsen’s
retroactive defense of humanitarian prosecution, in consequence, is what insures doctrinal
commitment to international juridical sovereignty.110 That the conception of law must be
reconfigured to incorporate a moral mandate does not preclude recognition that law, not
“persons” or “facts,” is sovereign.
In emphasizing the centrality of moral normativity to cognition of ICR, however,
Kelsen’s retroactive methodology neither upholds a pure theoretical description of imputation as
“de-psychologized” (Part II), nor protects high-level state officials from prosecution through
command-centered jurisprudence (Part III). After briefly outlining legal positivist and natural
law approaches to the principle of legality, Part IV argues against the consistency of Kelsen’s
positive law justification of this irregular method.

Ibid., 8.
Kelsen’s justification of the IMT, as argued in chapter three, requires an initial transgression of “the separation
thesis”. As case studies on the Jerusalem trial of Adolph Eichmann (chapter four) and post-Cold War trials before
the ICTY (chapter five) demonstrate, Kelsen’s licensing of ex post facto lawmaking approximates purity by
transfiguration of illegal acts into criminalizable ones with penalties imputed to individuals. The testament to the
illegality of the acts is demonstrated by international court decisions. The precedent of Nuremberg was expressed in
its continued resonance, albeit interrupted, in the period between the end of the Second World War trials and the UN
Security Council-sponsored ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTY). In contrast, Kelsen
justifies prosecuting all core international crimes at the IMT, including crimes against peace (CAP) and crimes
against humanity (CAH), despite these charges retaining questionable pedigrees. Given state violations of the
Kellogg–Briand Pact (or Pact of Paris, officially General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of
National Policy), collective security arrangements were in desuetude or a state of disuse. Even the claimed
“illegality” of aggressive warmaking, according to Kelsen, was therefore contestable. By deduction, CAH, which
had never been made illegal either by a multi-lateral treaty agreement, nor in accordance with customary
international law (CIL), was purely retroactive, requiring a moral “sleight-of-hand” based on “civilizational”
standards in justification of its usage.
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Part IV provides a general framework for future case studies built on a refutation of those
scholars who wrongly claim that Kelsen endorses the amoral positive law prescription “you
ought to commit genocide,”111 and likewise would “embrace an extermination camp operated
according to such norms.”112 Kelsen’s normative commitment to “principles of morality
generally recognized…according to the public opinion of the civilized world”113 negates an
alternative commitment to prospective positive legality founded on neutral cognition of humanmade acts, a hallmark of positive analytical jurisprudence.
The morality of criminalizing officials traditionally immunized under the AoSD,
illustrates the conflict between principles of justice. Part IV asks that Kelsen’s description of ICR
be understood as a modification of an otherwise unified neo-Kantian epistemological cognition
of imputation. The “exception” that Kelsen introduces is necessary to hold accountable any
individual committing immoral acts in an official capacity. “What someone did in the past,”
writes Kelsen, “we may evaluate according to a (legal) norm, which assumed validity only after
it had been done.”114 Whether it is possible to justify international prosecution from the vantage
point of positive law for cases in which state officials were not apprised of the illegality of an act
in advance of its commission, structures the following argument.
By incorporating social facts, legal positivism typically emphasizes law’s political
dimension by “recogniz[ing] political rulers as the only source of valid law and adopt[ing] the
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will of the political ruler as its validity standard.”115 Legal positivists Jeremy Bentham116, John
Austin117 and H.L.A. Hart118 all share the belief that “persons,” not “norms,” ought to define the
validity standard of any legal regime. While Kelsen agrees that autocratic rulers, for example,
assume a legally authorized position of power (see: section III), he excludes the possibility that
sovereign leader(s) are entitled to immunity from ICL prosecution under a state-centered
conception of legality.
More expansive than the psychological delineation between “command” and
“obedience,” Kelsen proposes a purely normative designation of imputation that is neither reliant
on “morality” nor “social facts”. Unlike John Austin’s conception of duty in The Province of
Jurisprudence Determined (1832), where a “future-oriented” conception is inherent to the factual
relationship between commander and commanded, Kelsen de-links from the fact of obligation,
conceptualizing responsibility even for those who may not have directly committed an offense.
Since a command implies that individuals must obey at a later point in time, the concept of
retroactivity is necessarily excluded from classical legal positivist cognition.

While Austin does not deny the legitimacy of discretionary action by a sovereign, the
following account endorses the position of leading North American Kelsenian Stanley Paulson,
whose article “Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg” (1975) argues that traditional positive
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law defenses based on the principle of legality rule against ex post facto laws are rooted in the
Austinian proposition that those commanded can logically only obey future orders.119 Carl
Schmitt, “Nazi crown jurist”,120 interrogated for eighteen months after the war as a potential
defendant in the subsequent Nuremberg Trials under American auspices, presents a description
of national law deviating from Paulson’s view of Austin as endorsing a “future-oriented,”
presumably non-discretionary or non-retroactive position.
This chapter frames case studies (chapters 3-5) on Kelsen’s contributions to the changing
notion of ICR. Kelsen’s strictly positive legal conception of ICR (Part II), which validates
political regimes headed by autocratic heads-of-state (Part III), nevertheless licenses retroactive
lawmaking for those officials responsible for core international crimes (Part IV).
II. Overview of the Pure Theoretical Conception of International Criminal Responsibility
a. “Pure” Epistemology: Neo-Kantian Expression of Valid Legal Normativity
Kelsen writes:
The pure theory of law is a theory of positive law. It is a theory of positive law in general,
not of a specific legal order. It is a general theory of law, not an interpretation of specific
national or international legal norms; but it offers a theory of interpretation.

As a theory, its exclusive purpose is to know and to describe its object. The theory
attempts to answer the question what and how the law is, not how it ought to be. It is a
science of law (jurisprudence), not legal politics.
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It is called a “pure” theory of law, because it only describes the law and attempts to
eliminate from the object of this description everything that is not strictly law: Its aim is
to free the science of law from alien elements. This is the methodological basis of the
theory.121

In his search for a universal definition of law based on a strictly positive or human-made
legal description, Kelsen draws on the epistemological rather than ethical writings of philosopher
Immanuel Kant122. Like Kant’s transcendental or critical idealist methodology, Kelsen’s pure
theoretical approach affirms concepts structuring the perception of legal reality. Whereas the
study of causality in the natural scientific realm is distinguishable from normative cognition in
the social scientific sphere, for Kelsen each possesses a similar function: the a priori
conceptualization of objects of understanding free of “alien elements” or categories extraneous to
a particular disciplinary understanding. The specific effort to create a valid, objective and unified
description of normativity in the legal sphere in the mode of transcendental idealism thus
animates Kelsen’s methodological goal.
While I do not wish to press Kantian elements too far, given that Kelsen's relationship to
a transcendental idealist epistemology has been the subject of an intractable debate between legal
scholars,123 for present purposes I draw on Kelsen's attempt to describe “legal science” as a
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science of norms, in order to provide a framework of Kant-inspired fundamental concepts,
including that of imputation or responsibility. Kelsen writes:

It is…true that, according to Kant’s epistemology, the science of law as cognition of the
law, like any cognition, has constitutive character—it ‘creates’ its object insofar as it
comprehends the object as a meaningful whole. Just as the chaos of sensual perceptions
becomes a cosmos, that is, ‘nature’ as a unified system, through the cognition of natural
science, so the multitude of general and individual legal norms, created by the legal
organs, becomes a unitary system, a legal ‘order,’ through the science of law. But this
‘creation’ has a purely epistemological character. It is fundamentally different from the
creation of objects by human labor or the creation of law by the legal authority.124

Materials or objects of reality, according to Kant, are molded by the senses under forms of
thought. “We can have a priori knowledge by means of the categories, only if the categories are
due to the nature of the mind and are imposed by the mind on the objects which it knows.”125
These pure concepts of understanding (Verstand) condition the possibility of objects. The
transcendental categories of cognition in The Critique of Pure Reason, including “quantity,”
“quality,” “relation,” and “modality” can be compared to “imputation” (Zurechnung), which
structures understanding of primary legal datum. The “delict” or offense is conditioned by
“sanctions” or coercive measures, which comprise two component parts necessary for cognition
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of the distinctive category—or legal normative concept—of imputation.126 The relationship
between these datum—based on a conception of “ought” (Sollen) propositions (i.e., “if one
murders, then one ought to be punished”) creates an ordering of coercive norms. The order that is
created is based on pure cognition of the relationship between delicts and sanctions; the
introduction of extraneous categories, on the other hand, does not comprehend law.
Kelsen distinguishes an “ought” (Sollen) that describes “a legal proposition” (Rechtssatz)
from “an ethical proposition (Satz der Ethik).127 While a “law of law” (Rechtsgesetz) is
distinguished from a “law of morality” (Moralgezetz), the study of legal or moral norms can be
divided from the natural scientific study of physical connections or causal relationships under a
“law of nature” (Naturgesetz), which are “is” or “factual,” rather than “ought” propositions.
While the ordinary meaning of normativity is prescriptive, Kelsen introduces imputation
designated by legal norms in a descriptive sense. A “science of law” is meant to reflect “the
material produced by the legal authority in the law-making procedure, in the form of statements
to the effect that ‘if such and such conditions are fulfilled, then such and such a sanction shall
follow.’”128
“Imputation means ‘every connection of a human behavior with the condition under
which it is commanded or prohibited in the norm.’”129 A priori cognition of the relationship
between delicts and sanctions as applied to “legal persons” as objects of imputation correspond
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with Kelsen’s view of normative delegation under the acts of state doctrine (AoSD). An “organ
of the State” as an “organ of the law,” or a “legal person,” fulfills a norm-creating or normapplying function determined by the legal order. Legal protection against prosecution of state
officials defines a view of imputation in international law between the anarchy of international
relations, whereby no state can adjudge the collective illegality of any other state, and the
identity of the international legal order as commonly imputing responsibility to individuals for
acts of state. The transformation of ICR, and with it the conception of the AoSD under
international law into an efficacious jurisdictional sphere prosecuting individual for acts that
were legal under national laws, requires justified validity claims.
From the perspective of a “science of law,” however, the state official is merely the point
of imputation of a “bundle of legal norms.”130 Jurisprudence as a distinctive field of legal
cognition, therefore, derives the concept of imputation from a unity, which encompasses the “depersonalized” or “de-psychologized” description of responsibility as relations between legal
norms. Psychological states, including motivations caused by fear of coercive action, must never
enter into a strictly positive analysis of normative validity. In an effort to establish the legal
validity of ICR, Kelsen introduces a purely normative legal technique that excludes the reasons
or intentions of individuals for choosing a particular course of action.
Like sociologist Georg Simmel (1858-1918), who responded to Kant’s declaration that
additional categories could exist by introducing the innate form of “ought” (Sollen), Kelsen
transforms this new “ought” category into the basis for conceptualizing imputation. But while his
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relativist epistemology strictly adheres to Kant’s methodological framework, Kelsen nevertheless
deviates from Kant’s approach with respect to moral philosophy. He writes:

The struggle which this philosophical genius, supported by science, waged against
metaphysics, which earned him the title of the “all-destroyer,” was not actually pushed by
him to the ultimate conclusion….The role which the “the-thing-in-itself” plays in his
system reveals a good deal of metaphysical transcendence…So it happens that Kant,
whose philosophy of transcendental logic was preeminently destined to provide the
groundwork for a positivistic legal and political doctrine, stayed, as a legal philosopher,
in the rut of the natural-law doctrine. Indeed, his Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics
can be regarded as the most perfect expression of the classical doctrine of natural law as
it evolved in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries on the basis of Protestant
Christianity.131

Chapter four analyzes the AoSD in relation to the question of human agency by
demonstrating the movement from a moral relativist conception of pure legal normativity to a
discussion of the intrinsic moral criterion used to determine ICR. Kant’s ethically informed legal
argument is introduced in order to conceptualize the degree to which Kelsen accepts the prospect
of “free will” linked to moral choice under superior orders. 132 While, Kelsen does not reduce his
conception of human behavior to causally determined lines, or “the idea that every event is
necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with [fixed] laws of nature.”133134
based on,
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From his morally-inspired conception of ICR based on retroactive lawmaking, which
accounts for “civilizational” standards that deviate from national law extant at the time of the
commission of an international crime, one may infer that Kelsen recognizes the possibility of
acting in accordance with a “higher principle of justice”.135 While the focus of Part IV of this
chapter is on Kelsen’s “moral-turn,” reaffirming the limitations of a morally relativist conception
of imputation under the strictest positive law conditions, an interrogation of the fundamental
datum of ICR must not exclude a purely normative reflection of the legal scope of cognition.
In addition to constituting law as a uniquely autonomous sphere of understanding
separate from the realm of moral cognition, Kelsen separates normative analysis from the study
of social facts, which he argues must not factor into a positive understanding of law.136 This neoKantian concern is therefore different than the traditional definition of legal positivism. For
instance, according to a traditional definition, “legal positivism is the thesis that the existence
and content of law depends on social facts and not on its merits...According to positivism, law is
a matter of what has been posited (ordered, decided, practiced, tolerated, etc.); as we might say
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in a more modern idiom, positivism is the view that law is a social construction.”137 The overlap
between “the social fact thesis” of legal positivism and Kelsen's “pure” determination of law's
positivity is explored in further detail in Part III on the political conception of ICR associated
with sovereign or statist claims to immunity.
b. Norms, Basic Norms and the Structure of the International Law
Even a “legal person” or “legal subject,” according to Kelsen, is merely a “depsychologized” bundle of norms, the point of imputation at which duties and rights are directed.
Kelsen writes that “the legal person is not a separate entity besides ‘its’ duties and rights, but
only their personified unity—or since duties and rights are legal norms—the personified unity of
a set of legal norms.”138 The physiological and psychological human being associated with the
general conception of “natural person” is thus contrasted with the artificial construct called
“legal person” or “juristic person”. A human being or the personified “state” can each be
imputed legal responsibility, since both are technically, according to Kelsen, “legal persons”. But
even this terminology is a duplication of the relationship between “legal persons” as purely
normative associations.
A self-enclosed legal system is constituted by both “legal norms” and “legal facts”, says
Kelsen. While a legal norm constitutes a rule, Kelsen defines it more specifically as “the
meaning of an act of will.”139 A legal norm is created or posited by an individual or group of
individuals and directs its attention towards the behavior of another individual or group of
individuals. A legislative act, for instance, is a “fact” of human will; it creates the norm. But the
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act itself only receives its “meaning” through the prescription, permission or authorization
granted by the norm.
The act of will that creates the norm is differentiated from the norm itself, which
conforms to the logical principle that no descriptive or “is” statement can be derived from a
prescriptive or normative “ought” statement. Likewise, what “ought” to be cannot be derived
from what “is”. Although individuals may decide to disregard legal norms, making a particular
norm inefficacious, the norm, if generally effective, is considered valid in regulating behavior.
Responsibility for international crimes, for Kelsen, is not derived from a social fact or
psychological components, but from the statement that one ought, for instance, to obey an
authorized norm.140 This point is critical in distinguishing Kelsen’s from Austin’s description of
duty and responsibility, which will be discussed in the next section.
Each legal norm is “built” upon a hierarchy of legal normative delegation. All the
combined general and individual legal norms amount to a unified order, or legal “system”. Legal
“organs”, such as judicial bodies, derive their legitimacy from prior norm-conferring sources,
such as legislative enactments, which in turn derive their legitimacy from even higher normative
sources in a chain extending back to a grundnorm, or basic norm. Even if several constitutions
exist, an original—or first—constitution is considered the primary justification for a legal order.
Its validity is based on the basic norm that “the original constitution is to be obeyed.”141 The US
Constitution and the customary norms that comprise the British common law system are
examples of a grundnorm. While the reasoning is circular, the grundnorm must be presupposed,
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according to Kelsen, to insure a unified conception of a legal order where “ought” is never
derived from “is” but only from valid, higher “ought” statements grounded in a presupposed
basic norm.
Kelsen grounds the conception of international law in a basic norm superior to the basic
norm of all independent states, thus affirming the importance of cognition of a unified
international legal order where domestic law retains a subordinate role in the hierarchy of norms.
What, then, is the grundnorm of international law? For Kelsen, this is the customary rule that
“states ought to behave as they have customarily behaved.”142 This gives license to the next
stage, which is formed by norms created by international treaties based on the Latin dictum pacta
sund servanda (lit: “agreements must be kept”).143
As in municipal law, freedom of contract exists on the international plane. Legal organs
(or state officials) may sign treaties subordinating their lower legal normative order (domestic or
municipal) to a higher one (international). This has the capacity to enable the transformation of
state organs into subjects of a higher legal order with the implication that protections afforded
under the AoSD remain subject to the will of future governments. Once a relatively decentralized international legal order is formed, according to Kelsen, it moves towards ever
greater degrees of centralization144.
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The sovereign value of international law resolves the dilemma over standards of validity
between different temporal periods in recognizing normative legal growth patterns. According to
Kelsen, the unity of the international legal system reflects the structural evolution from the
predominant nineteenth century conception of imputation associated with statist, state-centered
or political notions of sovereignty to the development in the twentieth century of a purely
normative conception of international law with the creation of multilateral treaties licensing the
prosecution of international crimes committed by state officials. Treaties imputing individual
responsibility, even for acts not yet regulated by international law (i.e., retroactive treaty norms),
create the standard of validity for the study of ICR.
Through greater concentration of coercive power, Kelsen believed that international law
would begin to resemble national law with the establishment of a permanent court to both
adjudicate disputes between states, and to try individuals for international offenses. An
international court would be the first—and most significant—contribution to the establishment of
a federalized world state. Admittedly, a civitas maxima like that advocated by eighteenth century
philosopher Christian Wolff, might never be created. Nevertheless, Kelsen’s introduction of the
concept of ICR was initially premised on the idea that only a world court as a precursor to a
world state could adequately insure unbiased judgment.
Likening international law to law practiced before the birth of the modern centralized
state, Kelsen saw what he called the “primitive” nature of international law as merely a stage on
the beltway towards ever greater concentration of powers. As in the tribal period of human

https://www.univie.ac.at/kelsen/files/peacethroughlaw_1.pdf; Judith von Schmädel, “Kelsen's Peace through Law
and its Reception by his Contemporaries,” Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics 39 (Feb. 2011): 71-83,
https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/19009/1/HJlaw0390000710.pdf.

60

development where retribution against an offender's family through “blood-feud” or “vendetta”
preceded the creation of neutral and independent courts to adjudicate individual culpability,
Kelsen believed that in the “modern” era the establishment of a permanent court with coercive
sanctioning powers would eventually supersede the “primitive” application of international
justice through collective security arrangements and ad hoc jurisdictional authority.145
A permanent judicial body comprised of representatives of different states would
determine which states had committed international offenses by, for example, resorting to wars
in violation of multilateral collective security agreements. This would replace the ad hoc
determination of crimes against peace (CAP), for example, which, as chapter three concludes,
creates a bias in favor of what Kelsen recognized to be “imperial” interests. Once this structural
reformation took place, the accusation of “victors' justice” would be excised from international
discourse. Centralization of the international system through the implementation of a neutral,
compulsory international court would staunch criticisms like those lodged at the victorious
powers after the Second World War when nations that conducted the trial of major war criminals
at Nuremberg, including the United States, Great Britain, France and the former USSR, were
accused of conducting “a sham trial for the sake of vengeance”.146
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Kelsen writes in Peace through Law that:

It is quite possible that the idea of a universal World Federal State will be realized, but
only after a long and slow development equalizing the cultural differences between the
nations of the world, especially if this development is furthered by conscious political and
educational work in the ideological field... The constitution of a World State with a world
government and a world parliament, however, although international law as the contents
of an international treaty, is at the same time national law, since it is the basis of the law
of the World State.147

Kelsen’s preference was clearly for a world state spearheaded by national legal orders
that subsumed law to higher world bodies through international treaties. His political desire was
to create a “World State with a world government and a world parliament,”148 which could
legitimately hold accountable state officials in accordance with a legal structure that paralleled
codified national legal orders. His political project therefore aimed to create new international
institutions, such as a permanent compulsory international court through treaties subordinating
state authority.
However, in granting states the right to protect citizens from international prosecution in
the belief that eventually, through delegation of authority to neutral international bodies, a higher
law would transform acts of state into prosecutable offenses, Kelsen minimizes the real prospect
that a civitas maxima might never come about. Structural impediments to the application of
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international legal norms, resulting from lack of a neutral world body, necessitated a theory of
positive law that could also justify ad hoc jurisdictional authority over humanitarian prosecution.
Part IV returns to the subject of valid ad hoc prosecution under international law.
c. Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law
“[T]he science of law describes its object by propositions in which the delict is connected
with the sanction by the copula 'ought',” writes Kelsen.149 He designates this relationship
“imputation.” “The statement that an individual is zurechnungsfaehig (“responsible”) means that
a sanction can be inflicted upon him if he commits a delict. The statement that an individual is
unzurechnungsfaehif (“irresponsible”)—because, for instance, he is a child or insane—means
that a sanction cannot be inflicted upon him if he commits a delict.”150
The criminal law element of mens rea (Latin for “guilty mind”) used to determine
whether an accused is capable of distinguishing between legality and illegality corresponds with
the differentiation Kelsen makes between categories of individuals. In this sense, “responsible”
and “irresponsible” does not correspond to the intention of a particular act but rather to the
category of “legal persons”. Children and the mentally insane, according to Kelsen, since they do
not possess sufficient rational judgment, cannot possess mens rea, and therefore cannot be
denominated “legal persons”.151 The Pure Theory of Law only requires that a norm be imputed to
an individual capable of distinguishing legal from illegal acts in general. Those designated by
international treaties as “legal persons” subject to prosecution are not required, according to
Kelsen, to have known about the actual offense, only to know that in the instance for which a
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subordinate violated international humanitarian laws that the act committed would have
constituted an offense.152 Therefore, the only formal requirement is that an international treaty
stipulates those “legal persons” subject to prosecution.
To apply, for instance, collective responsibility or absolute liability for crimes against
peace to all citizens of a national legal order precludes the criterion of mens rea entirely. Those
who had nothing to do with the decision to go to war are still to be held legally responsible for
acts of state committed by officials in an administrative capacity. Even when the mens rea
requirement is construed in terms of the capability of adhering to a legal norm, a distinction must
be made between individual and collective responsibility. While the first category requires the
ability to distinguish legal from illegal acts, the second does not. Children and the mentally
insane, lacking the rational wherewithal to consistently make decisions in conformity with legal
norms, however, may still be held responsible. Much like members of a corporation held liable
for the delinquencies of specific employees, all citizens are collectively held responsible for the
actions of state officials that would otherwise have constituted individual responsibility. As
typically construed, mens rea, therefore, is not a necessary element of the collective description
of ICR. The “legal person” in such cases is the personified “state”. Kelsen writes:

The statement that according to international law the State is responsible for its acts
means that the subjects of the State are collectively responsible for the acts of the organs
of the State; and the statement that international law imposes duties on States and not on
individuals means, in the first place, that the specific sanctions of international law,
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reprisals and war, are applied in recognition of collective, not individual,
responsibility.153

The primary sanctions of international law—war and reprisals— are applicable as
collective punishment against all subjects of a state for offenses committed by state officials.
Kelsen’s interest in maintaining a valid conception of an international legal order that shares the
same formal requirements as national law consequently provokes serious inquiry as to the
appropriateness of such a comparison. If in most instances “subjects of the State are collectively
responsible for the acts of the organs of the State,” then international law admittedly is more
similar to “primitive” law, which emphasizes “blood revenge”. Kelsen’s effort to establish the
legal grounds in which to impute individual responsibility for core international crimes must
therefore be understood as an attempt to incorporate forms of responsibility traditionally found
under national law into the international sphere.
d. The Problem of Psychological “Command” to the Theoretical Conception of ICR
Before turning in Part III to an interrogation of the politicization implied by Kelsen’s
validation of autocratic rule, and Part IV to the author of the Pure Theory of Law’s most
important contribution to the study of ICR—ad hoc licensing of retroactive lawmaking
predicated on a moral criterion of responsibility—it is first necessary to understand how
Kelsen’s strictly positive legal normative conception of ICR is differentiated from a
psychologized understanding of this term. Here, Austin’s theory of sovereign, command and
duty is most instructive.
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In his article “Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg” (1975), contemporary North
American Kelsenian Stanley Paulson analyzes the relationship between Austin’s command
theoretical doctrine and defenses based on the acts of state doctrine, superior orders and
retroactive laws. Although Paulson mentions Kelsen as accepting the legitimacy of the
Nuremberg judgment based on the ex post facto prosecution of acts of state of the magnitude of
core international crimes, he neglects to interrogate this point for its doctrinal contradictions.154
Rather, Paulson focuses entirely on Austin’s psychologized reading of responsibility as the main
justification used by Nazi defendants at Nuremberg. Disregarding both the use of Pure Theory by
ICL practitioners to clarify points of jurisprudence, and the doctrinal implications of Kelsen’s
transgression of the “separation thesis,” Paulson reduces his examination of legal positivism,
more generally, to only the clearest example of immunizing positive law doctrine: the theory of
sovereign command.
Since command theory implies a psychological rendering of responsibility reduced to a
conception of duty or direct obligation under the threat of coercion, Austin’s conception does not
correspond to the categories of responsibility imputed to individuals, who may not have been
directly liable for the commission of an act. While norm application only refers to two people in
the Austinian account (i.e., the commander and commanded), for Kelsen duty and responsibility
may, though need not, coincide. A third and fourth “legal person” may be imputed responsibility
for acts of other legal organs obligated to uphold the law. The distinction between duty or
obligation, on the one hand, and responsibility, on the other, therefore corresponds with an
artificial designation based on the juristic assignment of “legal persons”.
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Kelsen describes “legal persons” in a “de-personalized” or “de-psychologized” fashion,
not as someone that ‘has’ legal duties and rights, not as in the primitive mythological or
animistic way of thinking of “an invisible spirit who is the master of the object, who ‘has’ the
object in the same way as the substance has ‘its’ qualities, the grammatical subject its
predicates.”155 Rather, Kelsen wishes to distinguish between Austin’s way of conceiving of duty
as a factual relationship between “legal persons” possessing natural qualities, and Kelsen’s
wholly normative analysis. “The legal person,” Kelsen writes, “is the legal substance to which
duties and rights belong as legal qualities. The idea that the person ‘has’ duties and rights
involves the relation of substance and quality. In reality, however, the legal person is not a
separate entity beside ‘its’ duties and rights, but only the personified unity or—since duties and
rights are legal norms—the personified unity of a set of legal norms.”156
Paulson’s discussion enforces the point that Austin’s theory must be accounted for in
terms of the “factual” nature of the relationship between “legal persons”. Austin describes the
power relation that psychologically motivates obedience through fear of sanction in terms of
“superiority,” which represents “might,” or else “the power of affecting others with evil or pain,
and of forcing them, through fear of that evil, to fashion their conduct to one’s wishes.”157
Hobbes’ account of the state of nature and the resolution of anarchy in civil society under the
sovereign Leviathan158 resembles the central psychology of fear and self-preservation
instrumental to the analysis of coercive social relations (i.e., law) in Austin’s writings. Only if a
ruler has the capacity to induce fear is a subject considered obligated to obey the command.
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Kelsen, on the other hand, counters the actuality of power relations by freeing the imposition of
sanctions from a direct assessment of psychological motivations.
That “coercion” as “the practice of persuading someone to do something by using force
or threats,”159 entails a future-oriented notion of legality, deserves further investigation. Part III
introduces the psychologically coercive conception of duty associated with Austin’s commandcentered approach alongside Kelsen’s pure theoretical licensing of autocracy, only to dismantle
in Part IV the notion of future-oriented “human-made” claims to sovereignty through the use of
retroactive imputation against state officials for core international crimes.

III: The Political Construction of ICR: Statism and the Prospect of Immunity
a. Validating the “Uncommanded Commander
Having worked to demonstrate why the Pure Theory of Law” is critical to a strictly legal
conception of International Criminal Responsibility (ICR), Part III turns to an exploration of
political challenges to a “pure” cognition of ICR. International adjudication for ruling officials
remains philosophically tested in Kelsen’s legal theory by what “Nazi crown jurist” Carl Schmitt
claims is the “helpless formalism”160 of pure theory based on a scientific or value-free notion of
authority. Schmitt writes that Kelsen’s legal theoretical attempt to subject the state to liberal or
individualistic values allows “legislative officials” the right to “empower themselves for
anything if…given the form of a statute.”161 Under a decentralized international legal authority,
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in consequence, the rule of law would seem to “exercise[] no meaningful constraint on the state”
and its leaders.162
Schmitt’s sociology of law especially endorses the position that the existential moment
generated by the emergency situation requires a sovereign distinction between friend and foe.163
Schmitt writes:

All law is "situational law." The sovereign produces and guarantees the situation in its
totality. He has the monopoly over this last decision. Therein resides the essence of the
state's sovereignty, which must be juristically defined correctly, not as the monopoly to
coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide. The exception reveals most dearly the
essence of the state's authority. The decision parts here from the legal norm, and (to
formulate it paradoxically) authority proves that to produce law it need not be based on
law.164

Like Austin, whose notion of the “uncommanded commander” insures authority without
simultaneously obligating “sovereign” officials, Schmitt correctly diagnoses the potential for
arbitrary rule, which he deems applicable to Kelsen’s neutral structuring of legal orders. Kelsen
writes:

“Even in a[n] [autocratic State], there are many “tyrants,” many people who impose their
will upon others. But only one is essential to the existence of the State. Who? The one
who commands “in the name of the State.” How then do we distinguish between
commands “in the name of the State” and other commands? Hardly otherwise than by
means of the legal order which constitutes the State…The ruler of a State is that
individual who exercises a function determined by this order. It is hardly possible to
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define the concept of a ruler functioning as “organ of the State” without presupposing the
legal order constituting the community we call State. The concept of a “ruler of the State”
thus implies the idea of a valid legal order.”165

Even as Kelsen licenses autocratic rule in accordance with a legal rather than political
notion of authorization, discretionary command by a ruler bears a similar function to that
determined by prospective notions of legality: the ordering of social relations. The moral quality
of a regime is clearly not a problem for the validation of a regime, according to Kelsen. “Many
‘tyrants’…impose their will upon others” under autocracy.166 No operative difference
consequently exists between the concept of a ruler functioning as a delegated “organ of the
State,” on the one hand, and as the embodiment of prerogative sovereign power or dictat, on the
other. For Schmitt, however, “the political is not simply distinct from the legal but prior to it in
that no system of norms can be developed or applied without a moment of decision that exceeds
the regulation of those norms. Thus the state as the political actor cannot be reduced to a legal
system.”167
Although Kelsen endorses autocracy as a valid form of governance subject to pure
jurisprudential cognition, the path to validity requires legal authorization of delegated
responsibilities. Kelsen’s support of international legal norms sanctioning the conduct of
autocrats, therefore, precludes the notion of a “sovereign” ruler in the sense that Schmitt
describes. Perfectly compatible with a pure conception of imputation (even under democratic
conditions), the state of emergency, Kelsen implies, is regulated by (a) principles of tolerance
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prohibiting persecution of vulnerable populations, and (b) the prospect of imposing international
punishment on rulers for violation of principle of tolerance. The moral principle or standard by
which Kelsen retroactively imputes responsibility for core international crimes, as Part IV
indicates, is “civilizational,” protective of the right to be free of persecution.
But retroactive freedom from persecution cannot guarantee protection from actual
persecution under a despot. Only the despot’s future criminal status can create a retributive, as
opposed to deterrent sense of justice, insuring victims—and their allies—that civilizational
standards promoted by a plurality of “humanity” does not permit crimes against humanity,
genocide, et al, even if that means negation of the principle of legality rule against ex post facto
laws. Notwithstanding Kelsen’s realism with regard to the international community’s lack of
police enforcement powers, he places faith in the legitimizing process of treaties ratifying foreign
prosecution of acts of state. Although later deemed core international crimes, acts of state, are
typically protected by sovereign right derived from the personified “state,” which is the national
legal order, or unified object of cognition of imputation. The “state,” albeit the primary “legal
person” or “subject” of imputation in international law, however, does not encompass all forms
of “persons”. Nevertheless, if there is to be efficacy in the prosecution of individuals in
international law, statist demonstrations of immunity must be theoretically disposed of. This
includes the endorsement of the validity and efficacy of a despotic, if “legal,” order.
Kelsen’s theoretical consideration of efficacy or the effectiveness of states or national
legal orders relates to his position that as long as a certain societal population generally adheres
to the pronouncements of its leaders, even those acting in a tyrannical fashion by persecuting
oppositional and minority factions, the “state” may be described as a valid authority. This creates
problems not only for the direct prosecution of that individual but for all those within the
71

hierarchy of power over which he rules. Since subordinate legal organs can claim that each
adheres to valid legal norms originating in the presupposed grundnorm or basic norm of an
autocrat, a system of immunity is constituted through doctrinal means.
Such a view, however, neglects to consider implications to the principle non sub homine
sed sub lege (“not under man but under law”), a principle of Pure Theory integral to the
conception of an impersonal norm regulating human behavior in a society.168 The primacy of law
over man, or normativity over facticity, renders the Fuhrer (or Leader) Principle, for instance,
void. Insofar as Hitler cannot claim in the Austinian sense that he has a right as “uncommanded
commander” to total immunity, he remains subject to punishment under international law. As
such, Part III delineates the threat to the principle non sub homine sed sub lege, a perennial
challenge to the prospect of war crimes adjudication. Through the assertion of an even more
foundational principle of justice championed by Kelsen—ex post facto lawmaking in cases
where state officials acting immorally are to be held responsible for offenses committed in
conformity with state law, Part IV rebuts political claims introduced in Part III, including the
categorical immunization of heads-of-state. But to reach this goal it is first necessary to examine
problems associated with the idea that Kelsen maintains an ineluctable commitment to the
legitimacy of any authority that maintains efficacy, even under autocratic rule.
b. Efficacy
Legal philosopher Andrei Marmor describes Kelsen's notion of efficacy as follows:
A norm is efficacious if it is actually (generally) followed by the relevant population.
Thus, “a norm is considered to be legally valid”, Kelsen writes, “on the condition that it
belongs to a system of norms, to an order which, on the whole, is efficacious”.169 So the
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relationship here is this: efficacy is not a condition of legal validity of individual norms.
Any given norm can be legally valid even if nobody follows it...However, a norm can
only be legally valid if it belongs to a system, a legal order that is by and large actually
practiced by a certain population. And thus the idea of legal validity, as Kelsen admits, is
closely tied to this reality of a social practice; a legal system exists, as it were, only as a
social reality, a reality that consists in the fact that people actually follow certain
norms.170

Efficacy implies the protection of state officials from international prosecution under the
supremacy of state authority. If a population decides that it no longer wishes to abide by the
rules of its legal order, then the system of legal norms is no longer valid. Insofar as this is the
case, then the domestic order in which norms exist are either replaced by another system of
norms constituting the government of a state, or else anarchy ensues for a period before a new
legal order replaces the vacuum that arises when a population disregards the law. Yet as long as
laws of the legal order are generally obeyed, even if those laws emanate from an “uncommanded
commander” who assumes the authority of the grundnorm, then the order is considered valid in
accordance with a pure theoretical account.
But as legal scholar Michael Green asserts, once law is reduced to “factual” statements—
efficacy or the “will of men”—then there is little difference between Kelsen's and Hart's
approach to law. To fall back on “social facts,” as Hart does in order to demonstrate law's
validity, Green asserts, undermines Kelsen's belief in a “transcendental-logical
presupposition,”171 or condition of knowledge associated with any autonomous system. At all
levels, including the international, the cognition of imputation must be unimpeded by ideological
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interests. To endorse an autocratic order only on structural grounds as valid because it is
efficacious, presupposes that “the human being appears in the legal order,” not “as the
personified bundle of legal norms, establishing duties and rights, that is counted as a
‘person’,”172 but as an actor free of normative restraint.
Kelsen writes that “human behavior is enacted, provided, or prescribed by a rule of law
without any psychic act of will. Law might be termed a ‘depsychologized’ command.”173 Even
when law is obeyed by citizens out of fear or some other psychological influence, Kelsen refuses
to consider this an object of normative jurisprudence174. Rather, to go beyond the cognition of
human behavior in terms of a “personified bundle of legal norms” is to practice “sociological
jurisprudence.”175 The former is concerned with the validity of law; the latter, with efficacy. As
Kelsen often asserts, “what must be avoided under all circumstances is the confounding—as
frequent as it is misleading—of cognition directed toward a legal ‘ought’, with cognition directed
toward an actual ‘is’.”176
If Kelsen does indeed, as Marmor suggests, validate the law in terms of efficacy, then
how different in the end is Kelsen’s legal philosophy from the “social fact thesis,” which asserts
that “it is a necessary truth that legal validity is ultimately a function of certain kinds of social
facts”? (see: Part II) Green is right to suggest that if Kelsen actually endorses efficacy, then the
whole enterprise of international law is potentially at stake, since international law develops
through an accretion of treaties and customary norms based on transcendental presuppositions,
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which, in pyramidal fashion, allows states to subsume their laws to higher international legal
norms (“the primacy thesis”). This is especially problematic with regard to the study of ICR,
since any legal order—especially an autocracy—can act to protect state officials from
international prosecution by claiming that social facts affirm the validity of that particular social
order, and that any claim to regulate the behavior of officials threatens the effectiveness of the
order.
Like Marmor, Wolfgang Friedmann asserts that Kelsen’s statement that “the efficacy of
the total legal order is a necessary condition for the validity of every single norm of the order”177
implies that Kelsen does not clearly state what constitutes minimal adherence. He argues that
Kelsen does not specify the point at which, for example, the laws of the German Republic were
replaced by those of the Nazi legal order. Did Nazi law replace that of the German Republic in
1933 with Hitler’s ascension to power? Did German Republican law continue to exist between
1933 and 1945? How about after 1945? Would the Czarist constitution after 1917 or the German
Republican constitution after 1933 be considered valid? Without a legal process abrogating laws
of the previous legal order (i.e., Czarist and Weimar Republican), what formal or normative
criterion can Kelsen turn to in order to indicate the validity of the basic norm of each national
legal order?
Friedmann’s criticism of Kelsen’s inability to clearly identify the relationship between
efficacy and validity bears on the theoretical discussion of ICR in relation to command and
obedience. The prospect of state officials claiming immunity for core international crimes when
a regime under autocratic rule licenses errant legal behavior ought to at least signify the time in
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which that order is valid. Beyond temporal ambiguity in designating when a regime is
efficacious, Friedman further criticizes Kelsen’s relativism with regard to his inability to
distinguish whether a grundnorm is “good” or “bad”. A valid legal order, according to Kelsen, is
predicated exclusively on cognition of the relationship between higher and lower legal norms.
But establishing a designation of validity between structurally incompatible forms of governance
neglects to account for substantive moral claims. “That Parliament is sovereign in England,
writes Friedmann, “is a fundamental norm, no more logically deducible than that the command
of the Fuhrer was the supreme legal authority in Nazi Germany or that native tribes obey a witch
doctor.”178
c. The Fuhrer Principle
In the Nazi hierarchy, the Fuhrer Principle granted Hitler the right to administer authority
as “uncommanded commander”. At the pinnacle of the Nazi regime, “all members swore an oath
of ‘eternal allegiance’ to [Hitler].”179 Hermann Jahreiss, IMT defence counsel for Nazi Alfred
Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command during World War II,
describes Hitler's position vis a vis superior orders: “The functionaries,” Jahreiss said, “had
neither the right nor the duty to examine the orders of the monocrat to determine their legality.
For them these orders could never be illegal at all.”180 In his closing address, Jahreiss referenced
the following statement made by Kelsen:
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The number of persons who ha[ve] the legal power of leading their country into war is in
each of the Axis States is very small. In Germany it is probably the Fuehrer alone.181

Legal scholar Yoram Dinstein argues that “unquestionably, according to the AoSD, the
Head of State, not less than any other organ of the State, is immune from prosecution before a
foreign court for acts committed by him in that capacity.”182 He quotes Kelsen from various
sources to this effect,183 affirming that the author of pure theory could never have endorsed
Hitler’s prosecution under the AoSD.
Robert Jackson, however, presents a scenario in which all Nazis, including Hitler, could
claim immunity through various defense mechanisms, including the AoSD. For example, A
could claim he is not legally responsible for an act because B is superior. Since B ordered A to
perform the act, B is responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior where a party is
liable vicariously for acts of their agents. But if B is the head-of-state, he cannot use the defense
of superior orders, even as he is able to impute his act to the state under the AoSD. Jackson
considers such a circumstance patently absurd, since nobody could then be held responsible.184
This is the basic pattern of thinking associated with classical legal positivist command theory,
and sociological approaches at the time, like Schmitt’s, that retained a state-centered conception
of law.
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Kelsen’s position in General Theory of Law and State that the Nazi regime was indeed
legitimate like any other coercive legal system,185 accounts for the possibility that the same
decisionism that Schmitt advocated under the state of emergency (German: Ausnahmezustand), in
which a sovereign could suspend the law for the sake of the public good, could indeed be
reconciled with Kelsen’s aforementioned statement regarding unconditional obedience to a leader
in wartime. Even though Hitler’s absolute leadership, according to Kelsen, amounted to a
‘gangster’s-state’,186 and Kelsen’s preference was certainly for democracy, he does not clearly
reject the validity claims of autocracy.187 Nevertheless, as Francois Rigaux insists, “a veil of
legality was intended to cover up the anarchical character of the power to defeat any norm through
an individual decision.”188 The Nazi regime was therefore a ‘prerogative’ rather than ‘normative’
state.189 Rigaux states that:

Indeed, positing an individual decision above any rule, the Fuhrerprinzip subverted the
Kelsenian hierarchy between the rule and particular acts or decisions which had to
conform to a superior rule right up to the ultimate subordination of the Grundnorm.190
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The unity of the legal order, Rigaux contends, requires that the law follow a clear
procedural path with the delegation of legal norms from one level to another. 191 This insures that
those in command are obligated to adhere to higher legal norms. But in spite of Rigaux’s necessary
clarification, he does not sufficiently counter Kelsen’s endorsement of a prerogative state or
autocratic rule, since a higher legal norm can license any type of legal order, even one where the
prerogative decision under the Fuhrer Principle transforms the arbitrary decrees of the highest
leader into the grundnorm. The only way out of this impasse is to find a legal means by which to
hold an autocrat like Hitler accountable even when his words constitute the highest law under a
certain juridical order.
e. Non Sub Homine Sed Sub Lege
Before turning in Part IV to an examination of the retroactive methodology used to insure
the culpability of seemingly “prerogative” decision-makers under higher laws adjudicating core
international crimes, this section clarifies Kelsen’s position in relation to the principle non sub
homine sed sub lege. The debate between Kelsen and Schmitt192 over judicial review attests to
Kelsen’s commitment to liberal practice, which conforms to the belief that all laws, even those
promulgated by autocrats, ought to be regulated by constitutional authority, in accordance with
the aforementioned principle. Despite the fact that autocrats, by definition, are prone to arbitrary
decision-making, Kelsen’s advocacy of the rule of law regulating the behavior of all individuals

For a more detailed discussion of Kelsen’s general theoretical framework, see chapter two.
See: Charles E. Frye, “Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political,” The Journal of Politics 28, no. 4 (Nov. 1966):
818-830, Cambridge University Press; Peter M.R. Stirk, Carl Schmitt, Crown Jurist of the Third Reich: On
Preemptive War, Military Occupation, and World Empire (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press. 2005).
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under democratic forms of governance,193 cannot be disassociated from his embrace of judicial
review as a means of preventing discretionary authority.
Whereas Schmitt rejected judicial review on the grounds that “liberal
constitutionalism...abstract[ed] from the substantive and pre-legal political identity of a people
that can alone provide constitutional legitimacy and...distinguish between friend and enemy,”194
Kelsen assumed that an executive branch with unrestricted powers of emergency undermined a
liberal commitment to the neutralization of conflict. Since modern societies are comprised of
multi-ethnic, religious and racial orders, the idea of granting authority to a leader representing
the “political identity of a people” created the ever-present threat of violence, and by extension,
the structural underpinnings of genocide.
For Schmitt, the enemy is “existentially something different and alien, so that in the
extreme case conflicts with him are possible.”195 The state of exception is the moment when the
rule of law is suspended by an authoritative figure freed of legal restraint, acting in a decisive
manner against enemies. Dictatorial violence approved by the constitution, Schmitt asserts,
resolves democratic conflict, even if at the expense of minority protections. In contrast, a
constitutionally-sanctioned court with the power of judicial review has the capacity to insure
greater social harmony, as an independent judiciary acts as a check on societies represented by
demagogic rule.

See: Hans Kelsen and Nadia Urbinati, The Essence and Value of Democracy. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,
2013); Hans Kelsen, “The Foundation of Democracy,” Ethics 66, no. 1 (1955): 1-101.
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Judicial review is antithetical to laws like Article 48, the emergency decree of July 20,
1932 initiated by the conservative federal government of Franz von Pappen and signed by
President Paul von Hindenberg, used to license the usurpation of executive authority. After the
Reichstag fire of February 27, 1933, Hilter, as the new German chancellor, claimed authority to
curtail constitutional rights. While Kelsen’s commentary on judicial review does not preclude his
support of efficacy as a means of assessing the validity of an autocratic regime like Hitler’s, nor
does it prove that the Fuhrer Principle, for example, does not conform to the concept of the
grundnorm, it confirms Kelsen’s preference for the juridical regulation of societies. As such, the
prospect of holding accountable strong leaders is maximized through a structural choice liberal
in orientation. Even if a national legal order that institutes robust powers of judicial review, by
definition, is irreconcilable with autocratic rule, as Kelsen cautions, the distinction between
autocratic and democratic forms of governance are only ideal types in the Weberian sense. 196
Democracies, though traditionally less militant, can also produce war criminals.
In reference to problems associated with Austin’s identity of the commanding and
commanded (see: Part II), Kelsen affirms that democratic laws could not exist if conceived of
merely as “commands”. Kelsen writes:

If we compare [a democratic form of governance] to commands, we must by abstraction
eliminate the fact that these ‘commands’ are issued by those at whom they are directed.
One can characterize democratic laws as “commands” only if one ignores the relationship
between the individuals issuing the command and the individuals at whom the command
is directed, if one assumes only a relationship between the latter and the “command”
considered as impersonal, anonymous authority. That is, the authority of the law, above
See: See: Hans Kelsen and Nadia Urbinati, The Essence and Value of Democracy. (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2013); Hans Kelsen, “The Foundation of Democracy,” Ethics 66, no. 1 (1955): 1-101 and Max Weber,
trans. Hans Gerth, “The Three Types of Legitimate Rule,” Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions 4, no. 1:
1-11.
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the individual persons who are commanded and who command. This idea that the binding
force emanates, not from any commanding human being, but from the impersonal
anonymous “command” as such, is expressed in the famous words non sub homine sed
sub lege. If a relation of superiority and inferiority is included in the concept of
command, then the rules of law are commands only if we consider the individual bound
by them as subject to the rule. An impersonal and anonymous “command”—that is the
norm.197

Kelsen affirms that with respect to democracy, a distinction must be made between a
psychologized and de-psychologized notion of “norm” as distinguished from “command”. The
principle non sub homine sed sub lege, however, can only be characterized in normative terms, if
a further distinction is made between autocracy and democracy, Kelsen’s two-fold, as opposed to
Aristotle’s three-fold, description of forms of regime-types.198 Kelsen’s dichotomization of types
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Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 36.
Aristotle bases his classification of states on two principles. These include both the number of individuals
exercising sovereignty or supreme power and whether the goal is to serve self-interest or social welfare. Rule by
one, few or many describes the numerological three-fold classification. Each category corresponds with either
normal forms of governance, including monarchy, aristocracy and polity, which may be perverted into tyranny
oligarchy or democracy. The category—democracy—belongs to the rule of the masses or “the crowd”. For Kelsen,
in contrast, there is only a two-fold distinction: autocracy and democracy. Whereas autocracy violates the principle
of tolerance under structural organizational conditions, creating a constitutional crisis and a general undermining of
faith in a rule of prospective law beneficial to all citizens, democracy, which is generally based on principles of
legality, especially due process and the rule of law forbidding ex post facto lawmaking, insures tolerance through
contestation of powers. Democracy produces a space in which, through vote and public assembly, contestation of
power reaffirms the prospect that a minority may one day assume majoritarian status. As a result, communal
benefits, which entail generally equal protections to all citizens through a structuring of governance that provides for
an equal status in voting and assembly, produce the greatest prospect for tolerance. Since the “principle of tolerance”
instantiates “the principle of civilization” (the positivized translation of “the principle of humanity”), only a
democracy can fulfill this general goal. Autocracy exists where majority and minority rights are potentially
compromised, even to the point of extinction (i.e., the Shoah), due especially to sovereign rule by discretionary
authority (“the uncommanded commander”). We cannot know if Kelsen recognized that the international criminal
form of social order or governance derived (or delegated) from states committed to a “civilized” standard of conduct
prohibiting crimes against humanity, genocide, et al meant that the democratic process necessarily occurs at the level
of international juridical authority. Through bilateral and multi-lateral treaties, states authorized the trial of war
criminals based on moral principles. Since the principle of tolerance guides the determination of responsibility,
which is defined ex post facto for state officials who committed prospectively legal offenses amounting to crimes
against humanity, genocide, et al, merely implies that a “moral-turn” is necessary to prevent the sovereignty of rulers
transgressive of the principle of tolerance. See: Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, ed. and trans. Ernest Barker
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958); Hans Kelsen, “The Foundation of Democracy,” Ethics 66, no. 1 (1955): 1101.
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of governance only substantiates the purity of law on one end of the spectrum. Democracy
conforms to “the ‘command’ considered as impersonal, anonymous authority.” But how can
Kelsen maintain such a distinction in describing autocratic rule, which must subvert a
commitment to the principle non sub homine sed sub lege? How can he claim to remain depsychologized in cognition, when autocratic rule implies an un-commanded, discretionary
commander?
The only way to resolve the problem of authority under a pure theoretical approach is to
recognize the possibility that even if Kelsen’s description of law initially finds common ground
with Austin’s command theory, Kelsen is nevertheless able to maintain the principle non sub
homine sed sub lege under international law. Once an autocratic head-of-state is recognized as
having performed acts for which he is “morally responsible,” including core international crimes,
and a state is authorized to transfer powers to a jurisdictional authority instituting ICL, he may
then be subject to prosecution, since his past commands are no longer sovereign. To do so,
however, Kelsen recommends the transgression of his own doctrinal commitment to the
separation of law from morality. Part IV—on the use of ex post facto methodology in relation to
humanitarian criminal prosecution—demonstrates how a normative conception of authority can
be retained, albeit at the expense of a pure doctrinal commitment to “the separation thesis”.
IV. The Moral Construction of ICR: Ex Post Facto Lawmaking and the “Higher” Principle
of Justice
a. The Rule against Ex Post Facto Law: Positive or Natural?
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This irregular methodological choice, a moral “sleight-of-hand” utilized at the ICL level,
is distinguished from cognition of discretionary “commands” under domestic conditions. Acts
warranting prosecution of core international crimes represent the abolition of the principle of
legality rule against ex post facto laws in accordance with certain “civilizational" prerequisites.
Retroactive lawmaking in the international sphere for offenses that were not “indifferent in
itself” (i.e., violent or harmful), according to Kelsen, are essential to prosecution of core
international crimes.199
Kelsen writes:
Justice required the punishment of these men, in spite of the fact that under positive law
they were not punishable at the time they performed the acts made punishable with
retroactive force. In case two postulates of justice are in conflict with each other, the
higher one prevails; and to punish those who were morally responsible for the
international crimes of the [S]econd World War may certainly be considered as more
important than to comply with the rather relative rule against ex post facto laws, open to
so many exceptions.200

The difference between the use of retroactive legislation by ICL practitioners, on the one
hand, and autocrats, on the other, is predicated on the way each makes use of the same technique.
Retroactivity used to promote the human rights of victims of crimes against humanity and
genocide is unlike retroactivity utilized for the purpose of repressing minority populations and
other vulnerable religious, ethnic, racial, gender and class groups under autocracies, including
fascist and totalitarian regimes. While one can imagine scenarios in which the prosecution of

Hans Kelsen, “The Rule against Ex Post Facto Laws,” 8.
Hans Kelsen, “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law?” The
International Law Quarterly 1, no. 2 (Summer, 1947), 153, 164-65.
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core international crimes is politicized, there is a difference in kind between offenses committed
at the behest of an autocrat with the intention of protecting parochial norms, even if it means
persecuting minorities, and the general consensus of the international community that genocide
is a peremptory norm in which no deviation is permitted. Kelsen must therefore violate his
commitment to the separation of law from morality or “the separation thesis,” in order to
construct a methodology that can hold Hitler accountable for “commands” that, at the time of
their promulgation, in accordance with Austin’s command theory, were free of imputation from
any higher international law.
Before addressing the philosophical implications of Kelsen’s rationale for holding state
officials retroactively accountable for acts of state, it is necessary to first define the parameters of
the principle of legality expressed through the Latin phrase nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena
sine lege, meaning "no crime or punishment without a law."201 Since Kelsen emphasizes the
“positivity” of cognition of ex post facto laws, it is first necessary to situate the debate between
positive and natural lawyers on the question of retroactive application in the international sphere.
The next section considers how Kelsen validates retroactivity through a legal positivist frame of
reference before turning in Part IV, Section C, to the central place of moral normativity as the
basis for justifying international prosecution.
Although a basic maxim of continental European legal thought,202 the Anglo-American
common law traditions203 likewise embrace the prohibition of retroactive lawmaking associated

See: Beth Van Schaack, “Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and Morals” (2007),
Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-47 in Georgetown Law Journal 97 (2008),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1056562.
202
The French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), the French Code (1810), the Bavarian Code (1813), the
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principle of non-retroactivity.
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with the principle of legality, either through the custom-dominated criminal laws of Great
Britain, or else the increasingly codified norms of American criminal law.204 Under the U. S.
Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 prohibits Congress from passing ex post facto laws,
and Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 prohibits states from passing retroactive laws.205 Before the
Fourteenth Amendment206, this was one of the few restrictions imposed by the US Constitution
on both powers of federal and state governments. In international affairs, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the

law in England. The development of parliamentary rule in England “transformed what might only in a very vague
style be termed nulla poena into some real approximation to the rule.” Jerome Hall “Nulla Poena Sine Lege,” The
Yale Law School Journal 47, no. 2 (December 1937): 167-168. The English jurist Jeremy Bentham, who founded the
classical legal positivist tradition alongside Austin, writes of the rule against ex post facto lawmaking: "This is one
of the noblest characteristics of the English tribunals: they have generally followed the declared will of the legislator
with scrupulous fidelity, or have directed themselves as far as possible by previous judgments . . . This rigid
observance of the laws may have had some inconveniences in an incomplete system, but it is the true spirit of liberty
which inspires the English with so much horror for what is called an ex post facto law." Jeremy Bentham, The Works
of Jeremy Bentham (London, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1838), 326, quoted in Jerome Hall, Nulla Poene Sine Lege,
The Yale Law School Journal 47, no. 2 (December 1937):171 and Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law
(Clark, N.J.: The Lawbook Exchange, 2005), 59.
204
John Routledge, delegate to the 1787 Philadelphia Convention, chairman of The Committee of Detail responsible
for drafting a text reflecting agreement by the Convention, first Governor of South Carolina and second Chief
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, remarked that Sir Edward Coke’s (1552-1634) Institutes was "almost the
foundations of our law." Gerald P. Bodet, "Sir Edward Coke's Third Institutes: A Primer for Treason Defendants,".
The University of Toronto 20, no. 4 (1970): 469–77, doi:10.2307/824886. ISSN 0042-0220; Edward Coke, Institutes
of the Laws of England: Concerning High Treason and other Pleas of the Crown and Criminal Causes (London: E.
and R. Brooke, 1797),
https://books.google.com/books?id=dhjuAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=coke+institutes&hl=en&sa=X&ve
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10, Clause 1 specifies that “No state shall...pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility.” “U.S. Constitution: Article I,” The Avalon Project: Documents
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European Convention on Human Rights, the Geneva Convention and Rome Statute, inter alia,
affirm this principle.207
“[C]riminal law by integrating the rules of the principle of legality within itself,”
according to contemporary positive international law scholar Dov Jacobs,208 “has actually
explicitly integrated some of the basic tenets of positivism in its daily functioning.” The debate

“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty
be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to
the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall
benefit thereby.” “UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 15(1),” The United
Nations, accessed July 10, 2018, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668english.pdf.; “No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a
heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.”; “UN
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) Article 11(2),” The United Nations, accessed July 10, 2018,
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.; “No punishment without law: “No one shall be held
guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under
national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one
that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.” “European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) Article 7,” European Union, accessed July 10, 2018,
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.; “No one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international
law to which he was subject at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that
which was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of the offence,
provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.” “Geneva
Convention Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, art. 75(4)(c)(1977), International Committee of
the Red Cross, accessed July 10, 2018, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0321.pdf.; “No one
shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal
offence, under the law, at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which
was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of the offence,
provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.” “Additional
Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, art. 6(2)(c)(1977),” International Committee of the Red Cross,
accessed July 10, 2018, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750096?OpenDocument.; “Article 22
Nullum crimen sine lege 1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in
question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 2. The definition of a
crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be
interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 3. This article shall not affect the
characterization of any conduct as criminal under international law independently of this Statute. Article 23 Nulla
poena sine lege A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute. Article 24
Non-retroactivity ratione personae 1. No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior
to the entry into force of the Statute. 2. In the event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final
judgement, the law more favourable to the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply.” “Rome
Statute of The International Criminal Court (1998),” International Criminal Court, accessed July 10, 2018,
http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm.
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between legal positivists and natural lawyers is “resolved in favour of positivism,” and a “jurist
necessarily needs to be a positivist if he wants to study criminal law.”209 In upholding the
principle of legality in the international sphere, Jacobs asserts, ICL practitioners maintain a
positive law orientation.
Legal positivist Kenneth Gallant in his comprehensive survey of the principles of legality
as applied to international law lists a set of eight positive law criterions. Jacobs’ summarizes the
rules comprising Gallant’s survey as follows:
1. No act that was not criminal under a law applicable to the actor (pursuant to a
previously promulgated statute) at the time of the act may be punished as a crime; 2. No
act may be punished by a penalty that was not authorized by a law applicable to the actor
(pursuant to a previously promulgated statute) at the time of the act; 3. No act may be
punished by a court whose jurisdiction was not established at the time of the act; 4. No
act may be punished on the basis of lesser or different evidence from that which could
have been used at the time of the act; 5. No act may be punished except by a law that is
sufficiently clear to provide notice that the act was prohibited at the time it was
committed; 6. Interpretation and application of the law should be done on the basis of
consistent principles; 7. Punishment is personal to the wrongdoer. Collective punishments
may not be imposed for individual crime; 8. Everything not prohibited by law is
permitted. 210

Gallant emphasizes other purposes of legality beyond foreseeability, including constraint
on arbitrary governance and the legitimization of constitutional democratic as opposed to
autocratic regimes.211 ICL as a particular demonstration of criminal law based on the principle of

Dov Jacobs, “Positivism and International Criminal Law: The Principle of Legality as a Rule of Conflict of
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legality may also be motivated by the goals of deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation and
incapacitation.212 Restorative justice, restitution and reconciliation—and for our purposes—
accountability, are also reasons for which legality is sought after.213 While the demand of
foreseeability with its correlate purpose of deterrence is the preeminent characteristic of the
legality principle, Gallant recognizes the indeterminacy of language, which necessarily implies
law’s unforseeability.214
Like Gallant, Lon Fuller, representing a secular or procedural version of natural law
theory, describes the principle of legality as follows: (1) that decisions not be decided on an ad
hoc basis (or that rules should be existent or “there”), (2) that rules be publicized widely rather
than selectively, (3) that prospective or future-oriented rather than retrospective legislation
insures integrity of rules, which guides action, (4) that rules be stated with clarity and be
detailed, (5) that law in all its forms (i.e., family law, criminal law, etc) be consistent with one
another, (6) that law must be possible to obey, (7) that rules be constant and enduring, and (8)
that rules be applied and administered as stated.215
To assert that natural law theory precludes the doctrinal possibility of deviation from
principles of legality, as Kelsen does (Part IV, Section B), is to associate natural law theory
exclusively with a procedural version of natural law, rather than a conceptual natural law notion
that emphasizes substantive moral constraints on the content of law.216 Lord Wright, a
prominent natural lawyer at the time of the Nuremberg proceedings, following a procedural
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version of natural law writes that “[t]he period of [international law] growth generally coincides
with the period of world upheavals. The pressure of necessity stimulates the impact of natural
law and of moral ideas and converts them into rules of law deliberately and overtly recognized
by the consensus of civilized mankind.”217 According to William Blackstone, who Kelsen
associated with the former tradition, "This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind…is of
course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at
all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid
derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original."218
While Kelsen points to Blackstone’s seemingly explicitly statement regarding the rule against ex
post facto lawmaking, he also recognizes Blackstone’s recognition that this applies to laws
“indifferent in itself,” not to criminal offenses.219If criminal offenses under conditions presented
by national law do not necessarily benefit from the requirement that all prosecution be based on
prospective laws, Blackstone certainly would not have accepted a strict imposition of the
principle of legality for crimes against humanity and genocide.

Lord Wright, "War Crimes Under International Law," Law Quarterly Review 62 (1946), 51.
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume 1 (New York: E. Duyckinck, G. Long,
Collins & Co, 1827), 27. Kelsen in “The Rule Against Ex post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War
Criminals” claimed that Blackstone represented a natural law tradition opposed to retroactive lawmaking. The aforementioned quotation emphasizes substantive, rather than procedural, claims of natural law. This signifies a
distinction between a “law of nature…coeval with mankind…[and] binding over all the globe,” on the one hand,
contrasted with procedural natural law that bears a resemblance to the correlative sovereign-positivist alignment that
preferences the rule of the national legal order above that of international law. Part III described the claim that
Kelsen was “statist” in his orientation in subscribing to a belief in the validity of all legal orders based on a
presupposed, authoritative grundnorm, which potentially encompassed the Fuhrer Principle. Part IV denies this
prospect, reconciling non sub homine sed sub lege (or “not under man, but under law”) with the ex post facto
prosecution of war criminals, including heads-of-state. In this respect, Kelsen certainly deviates from a traditional
positive law alignment with a state-centered theory of criminal responsibility. As the next section makes clear, the
substantive (moral) criterion that Kelsen requires for retroactive lawmaking for core international crimes, mirrors
Blackstone’s description of laws binding throughout the world, obligating individuals to uphold moral principles,
even if acts of state. Hans Kelsen, “The Rule Against Ex Post Facto Laws,” 8.
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Fuller’s procedural conception of natural law, in contrast, emphasizes law’s essential
function in modifying behavior, in accordance with prospective legal norms of a specific national
legal order. Fuller implicitly excludes international law as a system responsive retrospectively.
The object, writes Fuller, is to achieve “[social] order through subjecting people's conduct to the
guidance of general rules by which they may themselves orient their behavior."220 His allegory of
King Rex, who in order to gain assent from those ruled needed to prove that the legal order that
he presided over provided procedural benefits to those who would authorize his rule, testifies to
Fuller’s focused concern with prior warning through generalizable rules that could be known, et
al. Fuller’s principles, therefore, operates internally, not as moral ideals in the sense described by
Blackstone and Wright. While Kelsen, like Fuller, claims that ex post facto lawmaking is an
exception, the legal positivist (Kelsen), not the natural law theorist (Fuller), produces a novel
justification for retroactive lawmaking for a broad range of humanitarian offenses.
In the classic 1958 Harvard Law Review debate between HLA Hart and Fuller, both
conclude that, while not ideal, in certain cases ex post facto lawmaking ought to be allowed. In
Legalism, Judith Shklar insists that though differing over the meaning of the moral ideal of
“fidelity to law,” both are nevertheless in agreement that retroactive judicial decisions ought to
be averted. Questioning the distinction that Hart and Fuller make between ex post facto
legislation and retroactive judicial decision-making, Shklar writes:

One of the subjects of disagreement (between Hart and Fuller) was the right policy of
courts in regard to a woman who had denounced her husband to the Nazis and so caused
See: The fable of King Rex in The Morality of Law where Fuller describes the component part of law’s “inner
morality” by showing what a good intentioned ruler might be resolved to include in the conception of law to make it
palatable to the ruled. Legitimacy, as Fuller shows, would include all the elements of the principles of law, including
generality, publicity, non-retroactivity, et al. Failure to observe these requirements would delegitimize a legal
system. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 33-39.
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his death. Both Professors Hart and Fuller agreed that retroactive judicial decisions are,
on the whole, undesirable, though both seemed to feel that if a retroactive statute had
been passed by the Bonn parliament, this would have been far less disturbing. It is, of
course, true that almost any new law upsets someone’s expectations based on existing
rules, but it is difficult to see why legislative retroactivity is any better than judicial,
unless one has a strong prior notion as to the ends and functions of the law courts.221

In neglecting to distinguish between retroactive judicial decisions and retroactive
legislation in determining ICR, Shklar ignores the role of states, which Kelsen recognizes as
essential to validating this form of responsibility. As traditional subjects of international law,
states (through their organs) are tasked with ratifying treaties. Once transfer of authority takes
place, the procedure endorsed by courts adjudicating core international crimes depends on a
lawful conception. To assume, as Shklar does, that there is no difference between retroactive
judicial and legislative pronouncements ignores the role of states in authorizing the process of
war crimes adjudication. Legislation that formally licenses the jurisdictional right to try the
accused, though retrospective, provides security of expectation for states that the authority under
which judicial decisions take place is indeed authorized by parties to a dispute.
The application of ex post facto lawmaking, however, only makes sense if a moral
criterion is also agreed upon. 222 Although a relativist ontological position cannot resolve the
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Does “primitive” tribal consciousness like the fascist distinction between “friend” and “foe” used to justify
“organic” forms of twentieth century totalitarianism, not dictate the level by which international law should adjudge
the capacity for responsibility? Kelsen argues that it is not consciousness or psychology, but the degree of the
offense inherent in acts of state, which makes retroactive imputation valid. How can an international legal norm
retrospectively adjudicating core international crimes be based on a purely legal, rather than a moral standard?
A moral standard implicates more than the “community” (i.e., a “tribe,” a “state,” etc). When acts of state
are immunized or shielded from prosecution, the “individual” is collectivized—part of a web of amoral (i.e., legal)
ordering. Whether the “legal person” who committed the act belongs to “primitive” or “civilized” culture, for
Kelsen, matters no more than the ethnic, racial, religious or other spiritualized qualities of the accused. Kelsen does
not require an assessment of personal psychology or consciousness, only an analysis in the spirit of Austin’s
analytical approach, of positive legal norms. “The bundle of legal norms” that signifies “legal persons” and
associated “responsibilities” are the methodological abstraction that create the object of jurisprudential cognition.
Kelsen’s introduction of a “civilized” moral standard by which ICL judges assess whether an act ought to
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problem presented by “bad” laws, a commitment to standards of human conduct can.223 By
retroactively agreeing as signatories to an ICL treaty that a particular offense is immoral, parties
to a conflict rectify an injustice caused by wrongly-conceived prospective laws. In chapter five,
the “purposive” interpretive methodology introduced in the post-Cold War era is examined in an
effort to clarify the application of retroactive judicial decision-making based on moral criterion.

be made illegal retroactively does not, however, apply to the perpetrator’s capacity to know the difference between
right and wrong, only whether the act amounted to a violation of crimes of the magnitude of crimes against
humanity, genocide, et al. In assessing the capacity of state officials from less “civilized” cultures to understand the
illegality of core international crimes, one creates an infinite psychological regression. By “civilized,” Kelsen
imparts a two-fold meaning linked to (1) structural or organizational features of a national legal order or personified
“state”, and (2) levels of consciousness. The introduction of individual responsibility as a form of imputation bridges
(1) and (2). “Primitive” de-centralized social orders based on collective forms of liability and an animistic view of
social and natural reality forge a consciousness different from that which came with early forms of individual
adjudication, and, subsequently, with the individuation of consciousness associated with a causal conception of
reality. That “civilizational” standards are introduced by Kelsen to claim priority for the status quo of imperial
powers in adjudging the distinction between just and unjust wars, and punishment for crimes against peace
perpetrated by revolutionary anti-colonial forces, reaffirms the fact that “civilization” also has the capacity to be
unbiased.
“Civilization” can also be used to destroy the concept of a tolerant organization of humans—or “humanity”
through colonial wars. The utilitarian challenge is always a question of greatest peace. For what is more
pleasurable—in the aggregate— than peace or security from fear of harm—for both colonizer and colonized? None
of this is to suggest that Kelsen does not distinguish between relative capacities of the accused. The power
differential between the colonizer and colonized creates an inherent bias. Kelsen’s blueprint for (relative) world
peace, therefore, in order to be most effective, necessitates a neutral legal normative ordering for colonizer and
colonized to be judged equally with respect to the commission of core international crimes.
It is necessary to recognize the limits of a deterministic—or causal—conception of individual responsibility
under the law in evaluating the capacity to choose between immorally legal acts and morally illegal ones (see:
chapter four). Those Germans integrated into the Hegelian universal of the Fuehrerstaat where Hitler “represent[ed]
that rational will, [and] must alone be judge” were to be treated no differently than those belonging to a liberal
republican order of governance under international criminal adjudication. Responsibility’s “depersonalization”
requires that no distinction be made as to the performance of acts, only the relationship between the norms
authorizing or prohibiting certain behaviors. The delict or offense in violation of international law is what
constitutes the condition for the imposition of a sanction, not the personality or psychology of the individual who
must answer to the charges. From the perspective of the “science of law,” neither the natural person, nor the cause of
his actions, matter to the question of imputation. As conditioning element of the sanction, the delict is typically
described by a legal rule in advance. In the study of ICR, and the particular notion of responsibility described here,
imputation can no longer be “de-psychologized,” especially—and perhaps ironically—because Kelsen introduces a
retroactive methodology. The methodology itself presumes a psychological ability to decide between moral and
legal norms.
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But the imprint made in early stages of ICR with demonstration of the validity of retroactive
legislation, from the ratification of the London Agreement (1945) to the creation of the ICTY
(1994), reveals a unified trajectory. First comes the subordination of states to the ICL regime
through retroactive legislation based on a moral (arguably naturalist) identification of
criminality; next, the introduction of a refined interpretive methodology that recognizes judicial
independence; and, last, retroactive judicial decisions granted license to freely decide penumbra
cases.224
Shklar, however, never even evaluates Kelsen’s contravention of the “separation thesis”
in the context of war crimes prosecution. This is noteworthy considering that the second part of
Legalism concerns the limits of an “ideology of rules” as pertains to international criminal trials.
As the apotheosis of a purely normative jurisprudential method of cognition free of “alien

The impressive work of Aharon Barak, former chief justice of Israel’s Supreme Court and a leading innovator in
the area of purposive lawmaking, inspires chapter five’s analysis of Kelsen’s contributions to ICL decision-making
based on principles, not norms. Canadian Supreme Court Justice Rosalie Abella in a speech given on April 9, 2018
at Hebrew University, credits Barak with upholding an independent judiciary in Israel against “public opinion, in its
splendid indeterminacy, [which] is a fluctuating, idiosyncratic behemoth, incapable of being cross-examined about
the basis for its opinion and susceptible to wild mood swings.” Rosalie Abella, “Without An Independent Judiciary,
Israel’s Cherished Democracy Will Be At Risk,” The Times of Israel, April 19, 2018,
https://www.timesofisrael.com/without-an-independent-judiciary-israels-cherished-democracy-will-be-at-risk/.
Although this dissertation does not comment on the threat of majoritarian sentiment, the neutral composition of a
permanent and compulsory court adjudicating international cases presumes independence from the political will of
either state officials or citizens intent on undermining the legitimacy of international criminal jurisdiction. Despite
Judith Shklar’s conflation of Kelsen’s “formal” cognition of law and judicial construction, the author of the Pure
Theory of Law grants ICL judges especially broad discretion, resulting from structural fluidity of a sphere of
lawmaking that has not yet attained the degree of centrality found under national legal orders (or personified
“states”). Shklar writes, “Formalism, on the level of history, is thus also an effort to say ‘is’ about a legal system
where ‘ought to be’ would be more appropriate. It is necessary to emphasize this because it makes so much of its
own ‘purity’ and freedom from morals and political ideology…[] the creators of the theory of ‘legal science,’
especially Kelsen and his followers,…are again and again said to be distinguished by a perfect remoteness from
‘external’ influences.” Judith Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, [1964] 1986). 35-36. For now, the distinction between retroactive legislation and retroactive judicial
decision-making must be made. Shklar is twice-wrong in her diagnosis, as she ignores Kelsen’s anti-formal
contributions to the changing notion of ICR through both retroactive legislation and judicial decision-making. The
latter will be explored in-depth in Chapter Five.
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elements,” especially political terminology like “states,” Kelsen remains a primary object of
Shklar’s polemic against legalism.
Shklar’s failure to factor in what must be considered the critical element of Kelsen’s
retroactive methodology, a “higher principle of justice,”225 aligns with Kelsen’s own obfuscating
relativist or amoral claim to structural completeness in conformity with positive lawmaking.
Shklar, therefore, neglects to consider the implications of Kelsen’s “moral-turn” likely because
Kelsen himself obscures the places in which his theory contravenes its purity.
The next section addresses these structural claims bracketing the moral foundation of
Kelsen’s cognition of ICR. Kelsen argues that legal positivism alone licenses ex post facto
lawmaking. His position that “according to the public opinion of the civilized world it is more
important to bring the war criminals to justice than to respect, in their trial, the rule against ex
post facto law”226 is set aside for the moment. Part IV, Section B, therefore, reaffirms the “pure”
or “neutral” conception of imputation found in Part II, while the final section—Part IV, Section
C—demonstrates the limits of a traditional positive law conception.
b. Pure Theoretical Licensing of Ex Post Facto Lawmaking
In “The Rule against Ex Post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War
Criminals,” Kelsen differentiates between legal positivist and natural law approaches to
retroactive lawmaking for humanitarian offenses. His doctrinal endorsement of ex post facto
lawmaking along positive legal lines, plausible from the perspective of structural completeness,
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recognizes the principle of legality as a principle of justice derived from natural law.227 Kelsen
writes:

…[T]he rule of law as formulated by legal positivism refers to the conduct of, at least,
two individuals; the organ authorized to execute a sanction and the subject against whom,
on behalf of his illegal conduct, the sanction is directed. The rule of law as formulated by
the natural law doctrine refers only to one individual: to the subject whose legal conduct
is prescribed by the rule. This rule of law cannot be retroactive; but the rule of law
providing sanctions can: not, of course, with respect to the action of the organ, the
execution of the sanction; this action can be prescribed only for the future; but with
respect to the conduct of the subject which is the condition of the sanction. A rule of law
can attach a sanction to be executed in the future, that is to say after the rule has been
enacted, to human conduct which has been performed in the past, that is to say before the
rule was enacted…The postulate not to enact retroactive laws cannot be derived from the
nature of law in the sense of legal positivism, as it can be derived from the nature of law
in the sense of natural law doctrine. Within the system of legal positivism the rule against
retroactive legislation is not an absolute principle as the corresponding rule of the
natural law doctrine is, expressing a logical necessity. (my emphasis)228

Unlike legal positivism, which refers to the conduct of two individuals—officials
responsible for applying coercive measures to offenses designated by legal norms and

Stanley Paulson, the foremost contemporary North American Kelsenian, in “Classical Legal Positivism at
Nuremberg,” presents Kelsen’s application of retroactive lawmaking as the reason that Kelsen cannot be classified
as immunizing Nazi defendants, as per the argument of IMT defense counsel Hermann Jahreiss. Paulson writes:
“Associate defense counsel Jahreiss cited Kelsen’s paper (Hans Kelsen, “Collective and Individual Responsibility in
International Law with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals,” California Law Review 31 (1943):
530, 533) as authority for the position that ‘in questions of breach of the peace, the liability of individuals to
punishment does not exist according to the general international law at present valid.’”17 IMT 478. Kelsen however
was not in sympathy with Jahreiss’s defense. Anticipating the prosecution of Axis war criminals, Kelsen had argued
that in their case the enactment of rules to establish individual criminal liability retroactively would be justified on
moral grounds.” Stanley Paulson, “Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, no. 2
(Winter, 1975): 140. See also: Hans Kelsen, Peace Through Law (Chapel Hill, 1944), 87-88 and Hans Kelsen, “The
Rule against Ex Post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War Criminals,” Judge Advocate Journal 2
(1945): 8-12.
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individuals sanctioned for deviating from legal norms—natural law, Kelsen writes, stipulates
only the individual whose behavior is regulated by prescribed rules.229 Kelsen claims that the
natural law doctrine emphasizes the “logical necessity” of the rule against ex post facto laws,
since “to regulate human conduct which has taken place in the past is impossible,” and therefore
only future, not past conduct, can be prescribed.230
The same holds true, however, for Austin’s command theory. Contrary to the claim that
legal positivism permits the enactment of measures to be applied to acts performed before the
rule was enacted, Kelsen ignores the power relations inherent to classical legal positivism’s
command doctrine.231 Austin, for example, presupposes an “obligation [which] regards the
future. An obligation to a past act, or an obligation to a past forbearance, is a contradiction in
terms.”232 When a past action is sanctioned after-the-fact, no possibility of compliance exists.
The command doctrine requires that those in a subordinate role in a hierarchy emanating from
the sovereign comply with directives. Compliance entails a future-oriented application of legal
norms, since duty-bound obedience to an imperatival pronouncement implies the capacity to
follow commands. Compliance with a directive to perform a past act is nonsensical.
Sanctions are essential to the legal positivist description of law. A specific organ is
designated by the community to execute coercive actions. While the norm is prescribed, it is the
organ, not the individual accused of committing an act whose conduct is “undesirable” that
makes something illegal. According to Kelsen, there is no reason, even if “such
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retroactivity….may not be morally or politically desirable,”233 that the prescription cannot be
introduced through the valid delegation of sanctions by an order. This includes one constituted
by parties to a conflict that ratify an international treaty to past acts, which were not sanctioned at
the time of the alleged offense.
“Retroactive laws,” Kelsen asserts, “are held to be unjust because it hurts our feelings of
justice to inflict upon an individual a sanction which he did not foresee…”234 But if a law repeals
another law that disadvantaged a subject or provides a lighter sanction to a previous law, it is not
retroactivity, but “the fact that the individual had no chance to avoid a sanction or a more severe
sanction provided by a subsequent law.”235 Likewise, notification or publicizing the law, a core
tenet of the principle of legality, implies that the law must be known in advance in order to be
applicable. This principle of justice associated with the rule against ex post facto legislation, is
“not less generally recognized” than the counter-principle “that ignorance of law is no
excuse.”236
Once the law is applied it is up to the individual to become knowledgeable of a potential
sanction. If ignorance of the law were to become a defense, then those accused of illegalities
could in all cases claim immunity. Such would lead to an interminable psychologization of the
intent of the delinquent. Consequently, “the rule against against retroactive legislation is the
result of the necessary restriction of the rule against the application of laws unknown to the
subject.” There is no impunity for those who could possibly know. The principle that laws must
be known by an individual to be applicable is not only restricted by the rule that ignorance of the
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law is no excuse, however, but also by omission of a sanction that is “considered as a violation of
morality or another higher rule, although not illegal.”237 Here, as the next section demonstrates,
Kelsen introduces a moral criterion for retroactive lawmaking through “sleight-of-hand.” He
uses, for example, the theft of electricity, where no punishment is provided in advance. Although
the legislator may not have anticipated that electrical power would be stolen, the enactment of a
law punishing this act would nevertheless be just.238
Although Kelsen’s structural account remedies gaps in Austin’s conception of nonretroactivity, it is questionable whether a legal positivist approach can ever license contravention
of the principle of legality. “In the opposite case—that is, if Kelsen had not identified the
principle of legality as a principle of justice derived from natural law,” writes legal philosopher
Sévane Garibian[,] “his line of reasoning would have run as follows: (1) the principle of legality
falls within the province of positive law; (2) the Nuremberg Tribunal consequently found itself
confronting a conflict between two principles of different provenance (the principle of legality,
which falls under international positive law vs. the principle of justice or morality, which falls
under natural law); and (3) since, from the standpoint of positive law, morality does not exist, or,
more precisely, does not count in a system of valid norms, the IMT judges would have had no
choice but not to condemn the accused out of respect for legality.”239
Garibian’s recognition of Kelsen’s influence on the changing notion of ICR through
justification of ex post facto lawmaking, however, generally concedes the positivity of Kelsen’s
contributions. There is much to be said for Garibian’s acknowledgment of what she refers to as
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“a legality restricted by the superior principle of morality.”240 But Garibian’s choice to elude a
further examination of the peculiar “moral-turn” attached to Kelsen’s violation of the “separation
thesis” produces the general sense that the author of Pure Theory remained true to positive law
principles. A similar problem is introduced by Andrea Gattini, who believes that Kelsen’s
conservative endorsement of the acts of state doctrine (AoSD) denied the value of Kelsen’s
moral application of retroactive lawmaking.241
The next section interrogates the implications of Kelsen’s violation of the separation of
law from morality. Part III described the Fuhrer Principle, for instance, as immunizing Hitler
from any higher laws, and a fortiori lending protection to all state officials under Nazi rule. To
free Kelsen of the accusation that he endorses a version of Austin’s command theory, which
precludes prosecution of core international crimes, it is therefore necessary to introduce a
“moral” source determining international imputation. Once a state official is transferred to an
authority like that at Nuremberg, the principle non sub homine sed sub lege (“not under man but
under law”) is returned to its rightful place as an operative force dictating the validity of law as a
normative, albeit morally-structured, rules-based conception.
c. The Moral Authority of Law

The problem of metaphysical absolutism remains a significant challenge for ontological
skeptics like Kelsen. He correctly acknowledges the many ways in which natural law has been
used to justify conflicting ideological positions, writing that “since humanity is divided into
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many nations, classes, religions, professions and so on, often at variance with one another, there
are a great many very different ideas of justice; too many for one to be able to speak simply of
'justice'.”242 His decision to reject “justice” as a moral idea conforms to his realistic assessment
of the nature of opposing “ideological” factions within any centralized, “modern” or “civilized,”
social order. Kelsen writes: “[This] goes hand in hand with the tendency to withdraw the
problem of justice from the insecure realm of subjective judgments of value, and to establish it
on the secure ground of a given social order.”243 Kelsen associates “subjective judgments of
value...with a wish or a feeling of the judging subject,”244 including “the tendency of ideological
groups or interests to justify or absolutize their beliefs.”245
Kelsen's criticisms of the natural law doctrine are consequently based on an overarching
concern with establishing the peace of a given social order through a technique that “seeks to
achieve a compromise between opposing interests.”246 Metaphysical dualism as a “subjective
judgment[] of value” only confuses matters. To assume an imperfect positive law and a perfect
natural law that is absolutely just is akin to the classic division between reality and Platonic
idealism247 where “the world is divided into two different spheres: one is the visible world
perceptible without senses, that which we call reality; the other is the invisible world of ideas.
Everything in this visible world has its ideal pattern or archetype in the other, invisible world.”248
The “imperfect copies” or “shadows” in Plato's philosophy or any other metaphysical
interpretation of reality, says Kelsen, are only a “reduplication of the world,” which undermines
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the effort of positive law to create a true estimation of formal delegated powers.249 Natural law
doctrine, insofar as it encourages an ideal description of a world that can only be known in an
empirical sense, is based on a “wish or feeling of the judging subject.”
Natural law, Kelsen writes, may be invoked by liberals or conservatives; capitalists who
advocate private property or communists who recognize only public property; materialists or
idealists.250 The subjectivity of the natural law doctrine, Kelsen believes, could only mean that
the person invoking natural law has an ideological agenda that he prefers to dress in the trappings
of absolute right. However, as Kelsen's contemporary, Gustav Radbruch, a German legal
philosopher who prior to Hitler’s ascension to power held a positive law viewpoint similar to
Kelsen's conceded after the war, some laws indeed transgress “higher” moral principles.
Radbruch's shift to a concept of natural law through his “jurisprudence of values” attests
to this fact.251As in the exchange between Hart and Fuller where Hart argued for the validity of
the Nazi regime, despite acknowledgment of its predations, against Fuller's contention that the
regime was manifestly illegal because of its immoral actions, “Radbruch contested the purely
formalistic (“value-free”) view of legal validity as expressed by the founders of positivist legal
philosophy—notably Hans Kelsen.”252 The “Radbruch Formula” stated that “when statutory
rules reach a level of extreme injustice, so that the contradiction between positive law and justice
becomes intolerable, they cease to be law.”253
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There is no mala in se or conduct which is evil in itself, according to Kelsen, only mala
prohibita or evils prohibited by the norms of a positive social order.254 Aristotle in the
Nicomachean Ethics distinguishes between the “natural” and “legal,” which corresponds with the
division between mala in se and mala prohibita. “The natural: that which everywhere has the
same force and does not exist by people’s thinking this or that; the legal: that which is originally
indifferent, but when it has been laid down, is not indifferent.”255 In contrast, Kelsen writes that
“before the sanction is provided…the behavior is no malum in a legal sense, no delict…This is
nothing but the consequence of the principles generally accepted in the theory of criminal law:
nulla poena sine lege, nullum crimen sine lege—no sanction without a legal norm providing this
sanction, no delict without a legal norm determining that delict.”256
Kelsen, however, contradicts this statement in licensing retroactivity for prosecution of
core international crimes. Here, Kelsen finds agreement with Radbruch in distinguishing
“higher” and “lower” conceptions of justice. Kelsen writes in “The Rule against Ex Post Facto
Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War Criminals” (1945) that “even if the atrocities are
covered by municipal law, or have the character of acts of State and hence do not constitute
individual criminal responsibility, they are certainly open violations of the principle of morality
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generally recognized by civilized peoples and hence were, at least, morally not innocent or
indifferent when they were committed.”257
Like Aristotle’s notion of “the legal [as] that which is originally indifferent,” and
Blackstone’s claim that retroactive lawmaking is an “unreasonable method” only when an
offense is “indifferent in itself,”258 Kelsen emphasizes the moral criterion in stating that since
the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis “were, at least, morally not innocent or indifferent when
they were committed,” they made the major Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg ideal candidates
for prosecution.
Beginning with “Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with
Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals” (1943), Kelsen writes:
The principle forbidding the enactment of norms with retroactive force as a rule of
positive national law is not without many exceptions. Its basis is the moral idea that it is
not just to make an individual responsible for an act if he, when performing the act, did
not and could not know that his act constituted a wrong. If, however, the act was at the
moment of its performance morally, although not legally wrong, a law attaching ex post
facto a sanction to the act is retroactive only from a legal, not from a moral point of
view….Morally they were responsible for the violation of international law at the
moment when they performed the acts constituting a wrong not only from a moral but
also from a legal point of view. The treaty only transforms their moral into a legal
responsibility.259(my emphasis)

The metamorphosis from a moral to legal conception of liability occurs at the liminal
point when acts performed by state officials are so egregious as to warrant coercive measures.
Although unnecessary as a deterrent for individuals for whom a sanction is proposed ex post
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facto, the application of retroactive laws does not mean that prosecution, according to Kelsen,
lacks a deterrent effect for future war criminals. Officials may begin to realize, writes Kelsen,
that “the violation of international law at the moment when they performed the acts constitute a
wrong not only from a moral but also from a legal point of view.”260
In Peace Through Law (1944), where Kelsen advocates for the creation of a permanent
and compulsory international court adjudicating core international crimes, he writes that “an
international treaty authorizing a court to punish individuals for acts they have performed as acts
of their State constitutes a norm of international criminal law with retroactive force, if the acts at
the moment when they were committed were not crimes for which the individual perpetrators
were responsible.” 261 An international treaty may be introduced “authorizing a court to punish
the persons morally responsible for the Second World War.”262 While the phrase “persons
morally responsible for the Second World War” can be interpreted in the narrow sense of those
responsible for crimes against peace or crimes of aggression, the broader interpretation
encompassing prosecution of those responsible also for crimes against humanity during the
Second World War is reconcilable with Kelsen’s recommendations to Jackson in his
correspondence prior to the International Military Tribunal conference at London held between
June 22 and August 2, 1945. (see: chapter one)
Kelsen then reaffirms the same phraseology from the previous year, writing in Peace
Through Law that “If…the act was at the moment of its performance morally, although not
legally wrong, a law attaching ex post facto a sanction to the act is retroactive only from a legal
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not from a moral point of view…The treaty only transforms their moral into a legal
responsibility.”263 Likewise, in “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a
Precedent in International Law? (1947),” Kelsen further asserts the validity of retroactive
prosecution on moral grounds. Although claiming that a retroactive law should “provid[e]
individual punishment for acts which were illegal though not criminal at the time they were
committed,”264 Garibian points out that crimes against humanity, which was certainly not illegal
prior to the ratification of the London agreement, was nevertheless prosecutable. A broad
interpretation of retroactivity that encompasses “crimes” that were not even “illegal” must mean
that what was not illegal is not necessary to denominate criminality. Only the immorality of an
act mattered. A prior notion of illegality was not relevant to the determination of legality at
Nuremberg.
Kelsen writes:
Individual criminal responsibility represents certainly a higher degree of justice than
collective responsibility, the typical technique of primitive law. Since the internationally
illegal acts for which the London Agreement established individual criminal
responsibility were certainly also morally most objectionable, and the persons who
committed these acts were certainly aware of their immoral character, the retroactivity of
the law applied to them can hardly be considered as absolutely incompatible with
justice.”265 (my emphasis)

We know from the introductory chapter that Kelsen’s recommendation to Jackson was to
transfigure collective responsibility into individual criminal responsibility through the London
Agreement, and that this extended to all core international crimes ratified ex post facto, including
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crimes against humanity, which had no pedigree of illegality. We must consequently recognize
Kelsen’s prioritization of immoral acts, which “the persons who committed” were “certainly
aware of.” Notice or forewarning in the sense of “illegality” was not essential. By “morally most
objectionable,” he means that “the retroactivity of the law applied to [those individually
responsible] can hardly be considered as absolutely incompatible with justice.”266 Although
based on a circular logic, Kelsen’s invention of an agent who is “certainly aware” of the
immorality of an act of state, creates the condition for legal imputation. (The question of agency
and free will is a subject of discussion in chapter four on the trial of Adolph Eichmann in
Jerusalem).
While Kelsen’s relativist ontology as described in his 1952 Berkeley lecture “What is
Justice?”267 affirms the impossibility of deciding on any absolute standard of justice, democracy
rather than autocracy is still the form of governance Kelsen believes most suitable to realizing
the goal of justice in the sense of insuring peace or social stability, protecting freedom of
expression and upholding the principle of tolerance. Kelsen’s major English-language forays into
democratic theory—the publication of his book The Essence and Value of Democracy (year of
publication) and his 100-page article in the October 1955 issue of Ethics, and "Foundations of
Democracy”—demonstrate his preference for democracy. While a coercive action is a valid
object of legal cognition, whether democratic or autocratic, the structural logic of pure theory
must disregard “facticity” based on the discretionary powers of autocrats as immunizing of acts
committed by the putative “sovereign” commander. The principle non sub homine sed sub lege
Ibid.
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(“Not under man, but under law”) otherwise is contravened, insofar as an autocrat can decide to
make arbitrary rules immunizing all state officials, including himself, for humanitarian
violations.
The distinction that criminologist Jerome Hall makes between democratic and autocratic
approaches to the principle of legality is instructive. He writes:

For the abolition of nulla poena provides a sieve through which can flow not only
humanity and science but also repression and stupidity. Dictatorship will not brook
interference by law (unless in particular instances the goal can be achieved nonetheless);
the wise and humane community seeks the freedom to utilize its resources to aid the
weak and the maladjusted. Only by careful study of the actual results of the abandonment
of law can one arrive at a valid judgment. (Hall Nulla Poena Sine Lege/1937)

While democracy can certainly be unwise and inhumane, democracy, not autocracy, is
the best assurance of the principle of tolerance. Without general adherence to this principle, no
protection against the suspension of rights, foremost, the implicit right within any democracy to
live free of the threat of annihilation, can be assured. With protections for those most vulnerable
to the predations of regimes responsible for aggressive wars, war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide, ICL abolishes the rule against ex post facto laws to “aid the weak and
maladjusted.”
“In the remote past,” writes Kelsen in General Theory of Law and State (1945), “it was a
religious duty to sacrifice human beings to the gods, and slavery was a legal institution. Today
we say that these human sacrifices were crimes and that slavery, as a legal institution, was
immoral. We apply moral norms valid in our time to these facts, though the norms which forbid
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human sacrifices and slavery came into existence long after the facts occurred that we judge
now, according to these new norms, as crimes and immoral.268
Like Hall, Kelsen recognizes that retroactivity can apply to immoral acts, such as human
sacrifices and slavery, but may also apply to circumstances where a legal system promotes statesponsored murder. “A special example,” writes Kelsen, “is the German law by which certain
murders, committed by order of the head of the State June 30, 1934, were retroactively divested
of their character of delicts.”269 Human sacrifice and slavery, however, could be deemed not only
immoral but criminal, with the application of “moral norms valid in our times to these
facts.”270New norms are therefore transformed into criminalizable sanctions. Imputation, which
would have been forbidden when the offense occurred, assumes a punishable form free of any
future-oriented notion of “coercion”.
The artificial or human-made creation of the object of legal imputation out of a
normative, albeit retroactive, conception of the immorality of a past action that at the time was
perfectly legal, can be employed, says Kelsen, to criminalize past action. Even as Hitler’s
mission to destroy European Jewry was protected by German law through discretionary
provisions, the author of pure theory recognizes that “it would also have been possible
retroactively to give the character of sanctions to these acts of murder.”271
V. Conclusion
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The classical legal positivist idea of an “uncommanded commander,” free of legal
limitation in exercise of powers, sovereign and therefore “above the law,” is confirmed by
Austin’s statement that “subjects must be in the habit of obeying [the commander] because of his
coercive power to impose sanction.”272 The will of the ruler is the standard of validity. While
Hart’s Concept of Law, a sociological critique of Austin's “command theory,” has achieved
superior status in Anglo-American jurisprudential circles, Kelsen’s analysis of Austin’s
conception of “duty” or “obligation” is certainly of greater value to international legal
scholarship. Despite Austin’s inability to account for sources of law separate from the “state,”
including indigenous laws, normative functions that are not “commands,” and legal
responsibilities of states, “the theory persists as a conceptual picture of law, ‘accepted,’ as
Ronald Dworkin puts it, ‘in one form or another by most working and academic lawyers who
hold views on jurisprudence.’”273
The designation of the concept “duty” to a psychological compulsion to act in accordance
with fear-inducing commands (Austin) must be distinguished from the “de-psychologized”
notion of responsibility derived from a purely theoretical legal cognition of the “impersonal”
sanction (Kelsen). Even though Hart encourages a robust debate about the grounds for validity of
a unified national legal order, since Austin’s description of sovereignty introduces a direct line of
criticism of the legitimacy of international prosecution, the latter is chosen as representative of
legal positivism. While Austin did not actually say anything specifically applicable to the
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subject,274 he is the seminal interlocutor in the study of ICR from the perspective of positive
law’s political dimension. His description of sovereign command provides theoretical
justification for immunizing ICL defenses based on acts of state and superior orders (see:
Chapter Four).
On the question of authority, Austin is in agreement with social contractarian Thomas
Hobbes, whose Leviathan describes an ontologically relativist conception of political society
where self-preservationist human inclinations dominate. In international relations theory,
political realism endorses Hobbes’ skeptical view of natural law theory, which denies a divine,
moral or reasonable source of authority. Like the tradition of political realism, Austin’s
command theory introduces the prospect that the source of legitimacy, not only is power, but
power devoid of any legal normative regulation.
“Non sub homine sed sub lege ("Not under man but under the law") is a well-known
principle of democracy,” Kelsen writes. “It is a principle of any legal order.”275 To subscribe to
this principle, according to Kelsen, sovereignty must be re-conceptualized as the “depersonalized” or “de-psychologized” unity of legal norms regulating behavior in any social
order. Kelsen resolved the conflict that arises with the introduction of sovereign claims by
identifying a pure path to the conception of international criminal responsibility. At the same
time, contrary to Gattini’s claims, Kelsen’s project is an effort to demonstrate the impossibility
of creating a system of rules regulating the behavior of state officials for humanitarian crimes
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without turning to a dynamic moral source. In defining ICR from a moral vantage point, Kelsen
saves law from the idea that the sovereign, at the highest level of international adjudication, is
immune from prosecution.
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Chapter 3
Beyond Just War Theory and Crimes against Peace as the “Class A” Charge: The Pure
Theoretical Validation of Retroactive Prosecution at Nuremberg

I. Introduction
In his opening address at the Nuremberg proceedings, Supreme Court Justice Robert H.
Jackson, in his role as lead US prosecutor for the International Military Tribunal (IMT), stated
that:
Any resort to war—to any kind of a war—is a resort to means that are inherently
criminal. War inevitably is a course of killings, assaults, deprivations of liberty, and
destruction of property. An honestly defensive war is, of course, legal and saves those
lawfully conducting it from criminality. But inherently criminal acts cannot be defended
by showing that those who committed them were engaged in a war, when war itself is
illegal. The very minimum legal consequence of the treaties making aggressive wars
illegal is to strip those who incite or wage them of every defense the law ever gave, and
to leave war-makers subject to judgment by the usually accepted principles of the law of
crimes.276

Although Jackson’s philosophical justification for criminalizing aggressive war was largely
influenced by Hans Kelsen’s former student, University of Cambridge Professor Hersch
Lauterpacht277, Kelsen’s theoretical contributions to Jackson’s argument were nevertheless
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significant.278 This chapter is an effort to reframe the dialogue between Kelsen, the international
criminal law (ICL) theorist, and Jackson, the practitioner. While it does not purport to establish a
causal linkage between Jackson’s and Kelsen’s estimation of crimes against peace (CAP), a
revisionist account identifies a common purpose with respect to criminalizing aggressive wars.
Defined in Article 6(a) of the IMT Charter, the subject matter jurisdiction of crimes
against peace (CAP) is:
planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.279

In December 1940, Lauterpacht consulted with then-US Attorney General Jackson on the
legality of President Roosevelt’s vow to provide allied powers with “all assistance short of
war.”280 He authored a memorandum on neutrality that claimed that the prohibition of war as a
method for enforcing legal rights, in accordance with the multilateral Kellogg-Briand Pact or
Paris Peace Pact, officially designated the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an
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Instrument of National Policy (1928) 281, allowed neutral states to distinguish between aggressors
and harmed nations.282
The main provisions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact reads:

ARTICLE I:
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that
they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it,
as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.
ARTICLE II:
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts
of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall
never be sought except by pacific means.283
On March 27, 1941, in his Havana speech before the Inter-American Bar Association,
Jackson borrowed from Lauterpacht’s memo, referring to the outlawry of war and the creation of
an international regime intent on establishing peace between nations.284 Lauterpacht, therefore, is
rightly credited with providing a leading argument against isolationist skepticism.
But while he directly inspired Jackson’s effort to establish that neutrality does not depend on
impartiality, and later lent assistance in preparing the order of charges for the July 1945 IMT
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conference at London285, Kelsen’s contributions, underestimated,286 and even regarded as
immaterial,287 are perhaps of greater consequence. In addition to corresponding with Jackson
over the distinction between collective and individual forms of liability,288 Kelsen’s views on
retroactive lawmaking, vital to the application of the crimes against peace charge at Nuremberg,
provides an under-reported exchange that fundamentally alters our understanding of the
changing notion of international criminal responsibility. 289 (For a detailed discussion of Kelsen’s
contested positive law justification of ex post facto lawmaking, see: chapter two).
In preparation for the London conference, which established a quasi-constitutional290
framework for ICL with the ratification of the IMT charter, Jackson, acting as chief negotiator
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for the Truman administration, circulated a memorandum to staff attorneys291. The message
reads:
Hans Kelsen is worried over the absence of any international law on the subject of individual
responsibility. He thinks a definite declaration is essential. I think it may be desirable. The
language he suggests is as follows:
“Persons who, acting in the service of any state (of one of the Axis powers) or on their own
initiative, have performed acts by which any rule of general or particular international law
forbidding the use of force, or any rule concerning warfare, or the generally accepted rules of
humanity have been violated, as well as persons who have been members of voluntary
organizations whose criminal character has been established by the court, may be held
individually responsible for these acts or for membership in such organizations and brought
to trial and punishment before the court.”
I think it may be worth including to stop the argument about whether the law does so
provide.292

As a consultant in the Judge Advocate General’s office under the direction of General John
Weir, Kelsen made a critical contribution in recognizing an error in a document about to be
introduced at London. The draft reads: “The Tribunal shall be bound by this declaration of the
Signatories that the following acts are criminal violations of International Law.”293
To suggest that the domestic law principle of individual responsibility was comparable to
modes of punishment in the international sphere, Kelsen asserted, was an error in construction.
Acts cannot be “criminal violations of International Law,” since there was no individual in the
Francis M. Shays, Sidney Alderman and Colonel Murray Bernays. Shapiro and Hathaway in the Internationalists
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international sphere who could be punished for war offenses. This meant that only collective
responsibility could be imputed. Because no treaty had yet stipulated criminality, retroactively
administered law would first need to create a legal subject that could be held criminally
accountable. Kelsen even drafted the language that would become Article Six of the IMT charter,
recommending that those who violated “international law…may be held individually responsible
for these acts,”294which aligned with the charter statement that “the following acts, or any of
them are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be
individual responsibility…”295 (my emphasis)
“Kelsen conceded,” according to international law theorists Oona Hathaway and Scott
Shapiro, “that this provision would create new law….In that sense, the law would be ex post
facto. But, Kelsen pointed out, this retroactivity, would be innocuous. For retroactive legislation
is unjust when it surprises defendants, but here there would be no element of unfair surprise.”296
Hathaway and Shapiro, however, misinterpret the rationale behind Kelsen’s inclusion of
retroactive lawmaking. While correctly diagnosing Kelsen’s determination that if all Germans
were liable for crimes against peace, then certainly imputing individual responsibility would be a
more moral outcome, since the nation would not have to answer to the crimes of a few, the
authors, nevertheless, incorrectly claim that the reason ex post facto legislation was justified was
that Nazis would have known that the Kellogg-Briand Pact was already-illegal.297 But if the main
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reason Kelsen justified retroactive lawmaking was that a multilateral peace treaty denunciating
war stipulated illegality, and hence collective responsibility, why did he extend retroactive
prosecution to the other two core international charges—war crimes and crimes against
humanity—the latter of which had no similar normative pedigree?298 Through retroactive legal
construction incorporating a criterion of “moral responsibility,” where “persons who committed
these acts were certainly aware of their immoral character,”299 Kelsen exhibits a methodological
approach suitable, not only to the prosecution of crimes against peace, the “class A” or supreme
international charge, but to the other two core international charges, as well. As with subsequent
case studies, this chapter builds on the argument laid out in the Literature Review (chapter two),
where “syncretic” or “alien” elements, including morality and politics, infiltrate Kelsen’s
ostensibly “pure” conception of ICR.
Before turning to the chapter outline, it is necessary to underscore that though
representatives from each of the allied countries, including the United Kingdom, United States,
France and the USSR emphasized varying degrees of culpability for aggressive war300, Jackson's
was arguably the most strident defense along positive legal lines. Jackson stated that:
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[T]he way Germany treats its inhabitants…is not our affair any more than it is the affair
of some other government to interpose itself in our problems. The reason that this
program of extermination of Jews and destruction of the rights of minorities becomes an
international concern is this: it was a part of a plan for making an illegal war. 301

Above all, Jackson desired to prove that the commencement of aggressive war was the
supreme international offense, of which axis officials alone were to be held responsible. Even if
allied powers committed traditional war crimes under Article 6(a), including “murder, illtreatment or deportation to slave labor…or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the
seas, killing of hostages…wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity,”302, Jackson only affirmed the right to prosecute other
international crimes based on an initial determination of aggressive war making.303 By first
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insisting that the other side had contravened collective security agreements, Jackson’s intention
was to validate allied prosecution on positive legal grounds, while simultaneously immunizing
allied offenses.
Unlike the crimes against peace charge, crimes against humanity possessed an even more
tenuous positive law foundation, as the term “humanity” remains foreign to classical legal
positivist vernacular.304 Article 6(c) or crimes against humanity is defined as:

murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political,
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country
where perpetrated.305
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reprinted in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 41, at 328, 331, doc. XLIV in Beth Van Schaack, "The Definition of
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Jackson minimized the crimes against humanity charge relative to crimes against peace,
due to a traditional belief that a country’s internal affairs were not subject to outside interference.
When Andre Gros, the French representative at the London conference, insisted that Article 6 (a)
could be used for that purpose, Jackson argued that crimes against peace created a sovereign
barrier against humanitarian intervention.306 Since Jackson had no intention of allowing other
nations to interfere in Jim Crow policies of racial discrimination, he was especially adamant to
prove that Nazi wars were unjust or illegal, and therefore warranted the allied right of ad hoc
prosecution.307
Jackson consequently affirms three inter-dependent propositions in making his case: (a)
that violations of just war theory through aggressive warfare incurs the collective responsibility
of axis powers, (b) that Nazi officials are subject to individual criminal responsibility for the
commission of unjust wars, and (c) that the allies at Nuremberg operated a neutral court.
Although Kelsen agreed with Jackson with respect to the first two constituent elements, parting
ways as a leading critic of “victor’s justice,” he nevertheless insisted that (b) was not dependent
on (a). And even though critical of ad hoc jurisdictional authority, he remained confident of the
validity of the judgment at Nuremberg (c).
This chapter is divided into three parts. Part II situates Kelsen’s and Jackson’s statements
on bellum justum within the orbit of a moral, if politicized, theory of international law. Despite
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the impartiality each invests in the abstract claims of just war theory, their views on the subject
demonstrate partisanship towards imperial interests prior to the post-colonial effort to assure selfdetermination in the aftermath of the Second World War. The status quo logic embedded in
Kelsen’s theoretical construct, and Jackson’s declarations, confirm such partiality. In addition to
revealing problems inherent in the justificatory grounds for imputing responsibility based on the
theory of bellum justum, this section draws a further correspondence by introducing a phrase that
each adopts to signal supremacy: “Christian civilization”. Exploring the paradox in criminalizing
those possessing “primitive” rather than “civilized” consciousness, this section points to reasons
why Kelsen’s anthropological view of stages of societal evolution may have contributed to his
hesitance to ground international prosecution on the distinction between just (legal) and unjust
(illegal) actions.
Part III explores Kelsen’s well-known criticism of the Nuremberg tribunal predicated on the
claims of “victor’s justice,” 308 while simultaneously questioning these evaluations given
Kelsen’s overarching endorsement of the integrity of the trial. While sharing a preference for a
permanent and compulsory court to adjudicate war crimes proceedings, Kelsen’s departure from
Jackson’s support of a tribunal controlled by the victorious allied powers must not be interpreted
as a rejection of the proceedings. If Kelsen is content to endorse collective responsibility under
just war theory, notwithstanding a lack of impartial juridical authority to determine if the action
was indeed just, why would he hesitate to endorse ad hoc prosecution? This section suggests that
Kelsen’s denunciation of “victor’s justice” is irrelevant. Despite scattershot criticism of
jurisdictional authority at Nuremberg, his choice to de-link bellum justum theory from the
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prosecution of individuals for crimes against peace may be regarded as a further
acknowledgement by this foremost international publicist that a more convincing methodology
would be necessary to provide the legal authority for international criminal prosecution.
Having demonstrated the reasons for (a) Kelsen’s hesitance to endorse the theory of bellum
justum as the basis for prosecuting individuals (contra Jackson), and (b) his acknowledgement of
the validity of ad hoc trials, Part IV evaluates why Kelsen recommended that Jackson endorse
retroactive lawmaking. In addition to demonstrating correspondence between the court’s
decision and Kelsen’s ex post facto approach, this section shows how Jackson was forced to
concede the priority of Kelsen’s methodology.
Retroactive lawmaking based on the criterion of “moral responsibility” as the methodological
basis for designating international culpability, however, creates an antinomy for a philosopher
whose legal doctrine is based on the separation of law from morality (see: Chapter Two). The
shift from a positive law emphasis on “justice as peace” to a general recognition of justice as an
inherently moral element recognizable as part of the criterion of retroactive lawmaking confirms
Kelsen’s cardinal concern for the protection of victims of human rights atrocities. By de-linking
from the theory of bellum justum and the criminalization of aggressive war as stipulated in prior
international agreements, Kelsen’s retroactive endorsement proved of enduring value with the
advent of a crimes against humanity-centered ICL discipline.
II. Just War Theory—Law or Morality?
At the inaugural 1940-41 Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures at Harvard Law School, which
became the basis for his book Law and Peace in International Relations309, Kelsen stated that
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“whether or not international law can be considered as true law depends upon whether it is
possible to interpret international law in the sense of the theory of bellum justum.”310
Collective responsibility or absolute liability resulting from just wars, according to
Kelsen, resemble tribal forms of justice for the murder of kinfolk.311 In the primitive analogy, the
relatives of the person killed, in an entirely decentralized manner, since there is no court, nor
centralized administrative authority, initiates a vendetta or “blood feud.” An individual whose
father has been murdered, for example, can exact revenge, but only as an organ of the
community.312 To kill under different circumstances would make the act illegal. “The relatives of
the murdered person, the mourners, must themselves decide whether an avenging action should
be undertaken, and if so, against whom they should proceed.”313
In the international realm, states similarly interpret the legality of the social order based
on the right of self-help. A state’s sphere of interest is protected through the mechanism of
sanction—war—insuring a measure of security against the threat of violence. “If any state is at
liberty to resort to war against any other state,”314 international law’s “law-ness” would be
jeopardized. War is therefore “in principle forbidden, being permitted only as a sanction, that, is
as a reaction against a delict.”315 While wars conducted without the benefit of a neutral body to
arbitrate matters may appear unjust, the very act of presenting reasons for attacking another
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nation, writes Kelsen, is an evolutionary advancement over the state of anarchy or bellum
omnium contra omnes, the “war of all against all.”316
The justification of war creates an antinomy for a philosopher whose ontologically
relativist theory is predicated on the separation of law from morality (see: chapter two).317
Reticent to admit its moral underpinnings, Kelsen claims that bellum justum theory can be found
in “highly important” positive international law documents, including the Treaty of Versailles
(1919)318, the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919)319 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact
(1928)320. But even without these documents, Kelsen affirms that national and international
public opinion customarily “disapproves of war and permits it only exceptionally as a means to
realize a good and just cause.”321 He asserts that:
Even if such justification is of moral rather than strictly legal significance it is of great
importance; for, in the last analysis, international morality is the soil which fosters the
growth of international law. It is international morality which determines the general
direction of the development of international law. Whatever is considered ‘just’ in the
sense of international morality has at least a tendency of becoming ‘law’.322323
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Kelsen quotes Coleman Phillipson’s The International Law and Custom of Ancient
Greece and Rome: “No war was undertaken without the belligerents alleging a definite cause
considered by them as a valid and sufficient justification thereof.”324 Marcus Tullio Cicero (106
BC-43 BC) remarks: “Wars undertaken without reason are unjust wars, for except for the
purpose of avenging or repulsing an enemy, no just war can be waged.”325 Christian writers, such
as Saint Augustine (354-430)326 and Isidoro de Sevilla (560-636)327, influenced by Cicero’s just
war theory, in turn inspired Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) to write on the subject in the Summa
Theologiae. 328 Spanish writer Alberico Gentili (1552-1608)329 and Dutch international law
scholar Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) formally introduced just war theory into the canon of modern
public international law.330
Until the end of the eighteenth century, determining a “just cause” was, according to
Kelsen, a prerequisite for war-making.331 Only during the nineteenth century, writes Kelsen, was
war conceived as a reflection of a state manifesting its sovereignty. “Undoubtedly, any norm
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which forbids a state to resort to war against another state, save as a reaction against a wrong
suffered by it, is contrary to the idea of the sovereignty of a state.”332 But is Kelsen’s historical
description accurate?
Grotius, “The Father of International Law," for instance, was far from the anti-war
thinker he has been made out to be. Unlike Salmon O. Levinson (1865-1941) and James T.
Shotwell (1874-1965)333, prominent Americans who lobbied members of the Hoover and
Roosevelt administrations before the passage of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in an effort to outlaw
aggressive war, Grotius exemplified what critics have described as the program of an
“interventionist.”334 Grotius, writes Hathaway and Shapiro, “argued that war was a legitimate
method for enforcing rights in the absence of a world government…and constructed an
intellectual foundation for a legal order built on war.”335
Rather than “internationalists,” who believe that the best way to resolve conflicts between
states is through international institutions, interventionists like Grotius granted states primacy.
Even as he indicated principles prohibiting the killing of women, children, prisoners of war and
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slaves, he also affirmed in The Law of War and Peace (1625) that “might makes right,” since “it
is evident that the sources from which wars arise are as numerous as those from which lawsuits
spring.”336 While just wars, according to Kelsen and Jackson, are considered a mandatory legal
sanction granted the discretion of members of the international community, if they are (a) an act
of defense, including a reprisal, retaliation or reparation, and (b) applied by those states victims
of aggression or states seeking to assist the victims of such injustice,337 Grotius described just
wars in a more circumscribed fashion.
Hathaway and Shapiro write that “for Grotius…war is a morally acceptable way to
prevent or remedy the violation of rights,”338 including the rights of individuals, states, native
peoples and trading companies. ‘War’ is an “armed execution against an armed adversary…A
war is said to be ‘just’ if it consists in the execution of a right, and ‘unjust’ if it consists in the
execution of an injury.”339 But an unjust war is not subject to coercion through licensed
collective security action, as it is in Kelsen’s theoretical construct. If the stronger side wins,
according to Grotius, then the legal claim belongs to the victor, not the aggrieved. Parties to a
dispute were considered sovereign with no higher authority required to resolve conflicts. States,
therefore, could use any means necessary to gain advantage without recourse.
To claim that an international society not only exists but that just wars are objectively
determinable when states decide to attack one another, writes the English School’s Hedley Bull
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in “Hans Kelsen and International Law,” “strains against the facts.”340 Even if Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter grants the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) the authority to
determine the existence of an international offense341, replacing right by duty, organizational
deficiencies associated with limitations imposed by the veto powers of the five permanent
members of the Council demonstrate the endurance of “self-help”.342 Bull writes:
It is not the case that there is normally agreement in international society as to which side
in an international armed conflict represents the law-breaker and which the law-enforcer.
There is commonly disagreement on this matter, or there is agreement that the conflict
should be regarded as a political one in which each side is asserting its interests, and its
rights as it sees them, and neither can be said to represent international society as a
whole. Kelsen’s doctrine excludes the category of wars that are neither delicts nor
sanctions, the category in which neither side has a just cause, and the category in which
both have just causes.”343

Notwithstanding Bull’s compelling criticism, which shares with political realism an
emphasis on “interests…and rights as it sees them”344, pointing to the tendency of states to
rationalize the justness of their cause, Kelsen draws on historical sources, including declarations
of war and treaties between states to maintain that state representatives agree that acts are to be
“permitted only as a reaction against a wrong suffered.”345 The technical condition of
international law means that “the only possible reaction that can be provided by general
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international law against an unpermitted war is war itself, a kind of ‘counter-war’ against the
state which resorted to war in disregard of international law.”346 While acknowledging that it is
“logically impracticable to prove the thesis of the bellum justum theory,”347 since it is of equal
formal value to its opposite interpretation where war may be fought “against any other state on
any ground without violating international law,”348 Kelsen nevertheless makes a political choice
with moral resonance. The problem in making such a choice, as it relates to a status quo logic
that benefits the most powerful and putatively most ‘civilized’ nations under imperialist
conditions, will be examined later in this section.
Like Kelsen, Jackson agreed that “aggressive wars are civil wars against the international
community.”349350 In his March 1941 Havana Speech at the First Conference of the InterAmerican Bar Association, Jackson could not deny the moral characteristics associated with just
war theory, even as he attempted to reinforce the positive validity of the trial. The Lend-Lease
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Act,351 passed at the time of Jackson’s address352 was based on the premise that comprehensive
aid to one belligerent party—in this case the United States to the United Kingdom in the Second
World War— was neither an act of war, nor “incompatible with the obligations which
international law imposes upon a state, not a belligerent in the war.”353 Jackson asserted that the
nineteenth century doctrine of impartial neutrality associated with The Hague Conventions had
been transformed by the events of the Second World War, and that that doctrine wrongly
assumed that since there was “no legal duty to any other nation…all wars are legal and all wars
must be regarded as just.”354 English positive international law scholar William Edward Hall
concurred. Writing in 1904, Hall asserted that “International law has…no alternative but to
accept war, independently of the justice of its origin.”355 Invoking the “return to earlier and more
healthy prospects,”356 Jackson, in contrast, drew on the seventeenth and eighteenth-century
natural law distinction between just and unjust wars. He insisted that “members of the
international society, bound by the ties of solidarity of Christian civilization,” had a duty to
“discriminate against a state engaged in an unjust war.”357
According to Jackson, Grotius asserted that when one nation was in violation of another’s
territorial rights, neutrality—or impartial treatment—could be dispensed with.358 Grotius wrote
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that “it is the duty of neutrals to do nothing which may strengthen the side which has the worse
cause, or which may impede the motions of him who is carrying on a just war."359 However, as
Shapiro and Hathaway affirm, Grotius likewise “argued that war was a legitimate method for
enforcing rights in the absence of a world government.”360 The decision to justify Lend-Lease as
a preliminary right of sanction prior to the United States’ official declaration of war against axis
powers must consequently be deemed a moral decision with political ramifications. To claim the
“ties of the solidarity of Christian civilization,” as Jackson does, is to insist upon the moral
superiority of a certain segment of humanity.
III. “Christian Civilization”: The Paradox of Retributive Justice
Jackson’s statement about “Christian civilization” is indeed peculiar. Understood in the
context of Kelsen’s anthropological discussion of primitive consciousness, which Pure Theory’s
author attributes to tribal societies, the preference Jackson reserves for “Christian civilization,”
however, is not particularly anomalous. The higher form of mental acuity that Kelsen links with
ego-development under “civilized” conditions, described in detail in Society and Nature
(1943)361 and “Causality and Imputation” (1951) 362creates a paradox: if the retributive
conception of punishment is only fully-formed under civilized conditions, what use is there in
imputing guilt to those who do not belong to “Christian civilization”?
Despite atrocities wrought in the Second World War period, Kelsen places high hopes in a
revolution of consciousness born of catastrophe. Kelsen writes in the preface to Peace through
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Law (1944) “have we men of a Christian civilization really the right to relax morally?”363364The
construction of a system of international criminal adjudication reflects civilizational advances,
according to Kelsen, insuring the best chance of creating the foundation for a peaceful
international order after the cessation of war.365 However, before this can happen the assumption
is that a transformation in consciousness must first take place. “[M]en of a Christian civilization”
it is assumed can spearhead such changes.
In contrast to “civilized” consciousness, says Kelsen, “primitive” consciousness
emphasizes the prevalence of the emotional component. “The consciousness of primitive man is
essentially characterized by the fact that with him the rational component, which is aimed at
objective cognition, lags far behind the emotional component, which arises from feeling and
volition; originally this emotional component almost exclusively dominated the mind of early
man.”366 Kelsen insists that primitive consciousness is bound by an inability to think in causal
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terms. Fear of retribution by unseen forces, rather than sober evaluation, dictates action. “Upon
these ideas are based concepts of value: of what is useful because desired, of what is harmful
because feared, of what is morally good and bad because it is the expression of a group, rather
than an individual interest.”367 Decisions are dominated, not by rational cognition able to relate
cause and effect, but rather by attribution of retributive powers associated with the gods or some
other animating spirit. Assigned meaning based on accounting, not causality, a person murdered
must have angered a supernatural force, either god(s) or nature. Violence perpetrated against the
victim must have been prompted by spiritual misdeeds committed by him or his family, rather
than derived from the caused actions of his pursuer. The conception of “will” can be deduced
from such causal recognition, even if, as the case of Adolph Eichmann demonstrates (see:
chapter four), freedom under coercive orders is circumscribed, compelling obedience that must
be accounted for with any conceptualization of responsibility.
Kelsen’s anthropological investigations demonstrate his belief that a graduated
consciousness consonant with predictable, coercive organizational principles leads in the
direction of the full development of a neutral legal order where not just collective—but
ultimately individual—responsibility can be imputed.368 First, however, human consciousness
must develop from an early, primitive stage where no predictable coercive mechanism (i.e.,
anarchy) prevails to an intermediate stage where collective forms of responsibility based on the
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customary practice of vengeance or “blood feud” is commonly employed. The difference
between this earliest and intermediate phase is far more pronounced than the progressive
evolution from the stage of primitive vengeance to a period where retributive punishment based
on the pronouncements of an impartial court prevail. Kelsen writes:
The degree of progress from primitive vengeance to the higher social technique of
retributive punishment is indeed great. It consists in the fact that the reaction against the
delict no longer has solely the character of self-help; it must not be exercised anymore by
the individual directly or indirectly injured but by an impartial authority. Nevertheless,
the difference between the essentially social reaction of primitive vengeance and the
retributive punishment is purely a quantitative one, whereas the difference between
vengeance and the instinctive reflex of defense is qualitative. One should not overlook
the fact that even today a very important branch of law, namely international law, still
remains, for the most part, in the technically primitive state of self-help.”369

To hold accountable those individuals who have yet to attain a level of consciousness that
differentiates between responsibility attributable to retributive gods and human-caused actions
neglects to account for disparate states of cognitive development. Even if primitive and
international social orders share decentralized structures, consciousness under tribal laws is
certainly, according to Kelsen, not on a parallel level to that of the cosmopolitan world. This
temporal differentiation must likewise not preclude a plurality of levels of consciousness at any
given moment in time. But who can determine the level of civilizational evolvement, and with it
the degree of responsibility that ought to be attributed, first to the collective, and afterwards,
individuals, but those who have the power to claim such enlightenment? This leads to a vicious
cycle of moral justification.
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By invoking “Christian civilization” neither Kelsen nor Jackson avoids Bull’s criticism of
the “doctrine [which] excludes the category of wars that are neither delicts nor sanctions, the
category in which neither side has a just cause, and the category in which both have just
causes.”370 Rather, as the next section reaffirms, the choice to invoke the theory of bellum justum
to prove the right of the allies to try Nazis for crimes against peace, founders on the status quo
logic used by Jackson to justify his case. That Kelsen de-linked bellum justum theory from the
prosecution of core international crimes, especially crimes against peace, perhaps is an
acknowledgment of the limitations he detected in holding axis war criminals accountable
according to a criterion laden with prejudice.
IV. The Status Quo Logic and Justice as (Imperially-Administered) Peace
As early as 1941 at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, Kelsen
and international relations scholar and former student, John Herz, presented the paper “Essential
Conditions of International Justice,” in which the theory of bellum justum was relativized to such
an extent that the prospect of designating even Nazi aggression an illegal offense became nearly
impossible. Kelsen writes:
To the extent that the opposition between the right of all peoples to self-determination
and the claim of certain peoples to Lebensraum rests upon different ideas of the value of
the peoples this conflict is not capable of being decided by science. It is not so even if the
claim to Lebensraum and the correlative claim to domination of one people by another
presents itself with the argument that the domination is exercised in the interest of the
people that is not able to govern itself, with the argument that it is only a question of a
special way different from self-determination, in this case a better way to assure the
welfare of the dominated people. For, this justification, too, rests on a judgment of value
which cannot be objectively verified.371
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The policy of Lebensraum (“Living Space”) based on the racial theory that Aryans were
entitled to farmland and trade in the east, especially Russia’s, since the German people,
according to Hitler, were superior to Slavs, was certainly antithetical to Kelsen’s views as both a
Jew and humanist.372 But as an advocate of “legal science,” the author of the Pure Theory of Law
admits that in “a judgment of value which cannot be objectively verified,” Lebensraum “and the
correlative claim to domination of one people by another” is comparable “to the right of all
people to self-determination.”373 His moral relativism on the matter—as the following discussion
of imperialism in relation to the status quo logic employed by Jackson demonstrates—proves the
limitations of any judgment that elevates crimes against peace to a supreme position in the
hierarchy of charges.
Much like Lebensraum, if excised of racialist overtones, Grossraum (“Greater Space”)
theory, emphasized a sphere of influence for Germany protected from external interference.
Introduced by Carl Schmitt, Kelsen’s (1888-1985) rival in the Weimar debate over whether
supreme powers ought to be delegated to a dictatorial Reich president under Article 48 (Schmitt)
or a constitutional court (Kelsen),374 Grossraum theory was used as propaganda for Nazi
aggression. Hitler instructed Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to inform United
States Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles on his visit to Germany on March 1, 1940 that
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“[j]ust as on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine the United States would firmly reject any
interference by European governments in Mexican affairs, for example, Germany regards the
Eastern European area as her sphere of interest.”375
In “Essential Conditions of International Justice,” Kelsen described justice as indeterminable
by rational cognition. Though the object of justice is to assure peace between varying interests,
and in turn provide “social happiness,” he asks how any society can decide, for example, that the
equality of all individuals ought to be preferenced over personal freedom, or materialist interests
over spiritual ones? Since social science, writes Kelsen, cannot demonstrate the means by which
to achieve ends that optimally benefit societies, the problem of justice is reliant on subjective,
emotionally-driven, ideological judgment rather than objective insight. The same holds true, he
argues, with respect to the contradictory impulses of international justice with regard to
“regulation of the territorial problem.”376 He writes:
According to one formula…the principle of self-determination of peoples…all nations, races
and religions are equal, and hence have an equal right to exist, to maintain their own culture,
and to determine their own fate. The other formula is the claim to Lebensraum [or] living
space. It proceeds from the supposition that there are superior and inferior peoples, and that
the former, and only they, have the right to dominate a territory whose extent and natural
resources suffice to assure a satisfactory, i.e., self-sufficient existence of its people, and that
even at the expense of the inferior peoples. It is a principle which was applied in previous
centuries only to the relation between Christian and heathen, between civilized and primitive
peoples, but which today is invoked to justify the imperialistic claims of certain totalitarian
states vis-d-vis other civilized nations. To the extent that the opposition between the right of
all peoples to self-determination and the claim of certain peoples to Lebensraum rests upon
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different ideas of the value of the peoples this conflict is not capable of being decided by
science.377

Kelsen’s legitimization of Lebensraum as a valid principle of international justice on par with
the principle of self-determination, and his acknowledgment that this aggressive approach to
international relations had been the common practice of imperialism with respect “to the
relations between Christian and heathen, between civilized and primitive peoples,” demonstrates
a deficiency in Kelsen’s reasoning. With this statement, Kelsen claims that the “international
community” is not even able to decide on a valid criterion for sanctioning breaches of the peace.
For what does the theory of bellum justum even matter, if any nation can claim Lebensraum—or
Grossraum—theory as equal to the values embedded in the United Nations Charter, which states
that the charter’s purpose is “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace"?378
Kelsen confounds those seeking a clear and consistent understanding of his position on
international criminal responsibility. With the formulation of “justice as peace”, Kelsen evidently
does not mean “universal peace” in the sense of an ordering that would discourage the gross
violations of human rights associated with Lebensraum, which he relativizes. Still, he writes in
“Essential Conditions of International Justice” that:

International justice means international peace, peace secured by international law. The
international legal order is to be maintained, especially in the sense that necessary
Ibid., 71.
United Nations Charter (1945), “United Nations Charter; June 26, 1945,” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law,
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changes in the legal relations among states are to take place peaceably, not by the use of
force. International justice means prevention of war.379

He, of course, does not mean all wars. Like Jackson, Kelsen asserts that defensive wars are
certainly allowable as collective security measures to restore the state of peace in international
relations. Since international law is a social order, states that commit acts of aggression must be
treated like violent individuals under national law, sanctioned by other states. While peace, of
course, is a moral prerequisite for civil relations and may coincide with human rights concerns, it
is not necessary for implementing humanitarian protections. The Nuremberg trial proves this
point. If just war theory, an antidote against the threat of aggressive war, is proven to be not only
detrimental but inessential to the cognition of international criminal responsibility, another
methodological approach deprived of the presupposition of peace is warranted.
As with Kelsen’s moral relativism as regards the territorial problem, Jackson, in his opening
address at Nuremberg, was even more conspicuous in his endorsement of imperial interests. He
stated, “Our position is that whatever grievances a nation may have, however objectionable it
finds the status quo, aggressive warfare is an illegal means for settling those grievances or for
altering those conditions.”380 Indian Justice Radhabinod Pal at the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East (IMTFE) condemned the U.S. led prosecution for this reason.
He wrote in his dissenting opinion:
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Certainly dominated nations of the present day status quo cannot be made to submit to
eternal domination only in the name of peace. International law must be prepared to face the
problem of bringing within juridical limits the politico-historical evolution of mankind which
up to now has been accomplished chiefly through war. War and other methods of self-help by
force can be effectively excluded only when this problem is solved, and it is only then that
we can think of introducing criminal responsibility for efforts at adjustment by means other
than peaceful. Until then there can hardly be any justification for any direct and indirect
attempt at maintaining, in the name of humanity and justice, the very status quo which might
have been organized and hitherto maintained only by force by pure opportunist ‘Have and
Holders’….The part of humanity which has been lucky enough to enjoy political freedom
can now well afford to have the deterministic ascetic outlook of life, and may think of peace
in terms of political status quo. But every part of humanity has not been equally lucky and a
considerable part is still haunted by the wishful thinking about escape from political
dominations. To them the present age is faced with not only the menace of totalitarianism but
also the ACTUAL PLAGUE of imperialism.381

Pal disagreed with the chief prosecutor of the IMTFE Joseph Keenan, and the similarly
conservative sentiment held by Jackson regarding the maintenance of geographical boundaries.382
The status quo meant merely the most convenient rationale, according to Pal, to keep at bay
aspirations by subaltern populations under western colonial domination.383 As with Jackson’s
and Kelsen’s determination that just wars ought to be decided by “Christian civilization” where
an evolved conception of individual responsibility was implied, a status quo logic, said Pal,
granted imperial powers, including the allied nations, “eternal domination…in the name of
peace.”384
A status quo logic that insisted that those countries that wished to vie for their independence
were committing acts of aggression by changing the outlines of the world map implied that the
crimes against peace charge distorted fair proceedings against the accused. Since a number of
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countries at the time, especially in the East (including Pal’s own nation, India) were under
colonial domination, the western architects of the IMTFE were imposing their notion of right on
the vanquished Japanese.385 He concluded, therefore, “that every one of the accused must be
found not guilty of every one of the charges in the indictment and should be acquitted on all
those charges."386 Although he included war crimes and crimes against humanity in his general
denunciation, he took special issue with the crimes against peace charge.387
The choice to focus on crimes against peace was certainly political. Like U.S. Secretary of
War Henry Stimson, who wished to vindicate America’s position on the Neutrality Act and Lend
Lease,388Jackson felt it imperative that the trial determine that the Nazis were the ones who
began aggressive action, and, thus, were in violation of collective security measures meant to
insure peace. Similarly, Japanese officials, albeit in accordance with a deliberately natural law
approach devised by Kennan,389 were to be held responsible for acting in an unjust manner in
breaching the peace of nations. Pal’s criticism of Kennan extended to Japanese involvement in
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the Nanking Massacre, which, though brutal, was not the “product of government policy” for
which Japanese officials were to be held directly responsible under the conspiracy to commit an
aggressive war. He claimed that there is "no evidence, testimonial or circumstantial,
concomitant, prospectant, restrospectant, that would in any way lead to the inference that the
government in any way permitted the commission of such offenses".390 He added, however, that
neither from the beginning of the six-week assault on Nanjing by the Japanese starting on
December 13, 1937, nor at any point after, was conspiracy to wage aggressive war illegal. Pal’s
decision, however, to place the Japanese in the same category as his colonized home country,
India, remains inappropriate. Having colonized several countries, including Manchuria and
eastern Mongolia, which the Japanese invaded in 1931, and subsequently turned into the puppet
state of Manchukuo, and having committing gross violation of human rights,391 the Japanese
were more like Nazi aggressors than India, ruled by the British Crown from 1858 to 1947.
If a similarity did exist it was in the fact that Japan traditionally had not been considered
civilized by European states.392 The problem is that two sets of rules for European and nonEuropean, colonizer and colonized, existed. While the Victorian era that coincided with the
period of Queen Victoria’s rule (1837-1901) was a period of relative peace amongst the great
European powers, colonial expansion in Asia and Africa made the British Empire, for example,
the largest empire in history. Martti Koskenniemi in The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise
and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 chronicles a plural, if heavily-weighted social
Darwinian “anthropological” view of gradations of civilization. He writes that “by the 1870s the
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assumption of human development proceeding by stages from the primitive to the civilized had
come to form the bedrock of social anthropology and evolutionary sociology that provided much
of the conceptual background for cultivated European reflection about what Europeans often
sweepingly termed the Orient.”393 The Japanese, though assuming control over their sphere of
influence, were considered less civilized in the estimation of European imperialists. Nowhere
was this more apparent than in the decision of signatories to the Kellogg-Briand Pact not to
recognize Japanese rule over Manchukuo, whereas the Italian invasion in the Second ItaloEthiopian War, a colonial war that took place from October 1935 to May 1936 did not
delegitimize Italian conquest. This double-standard reflected preferential treatment granted to a
fellow European colonial power. 394
Although Kelsen continued to uphold bellum justum theory in his last major work on the
subject, Principles of International Law (1967), he acknowledged the “equally
serious…objection [to just war theory] resting on the argument that only a state which is stronger
than its adversary state is in a position to use war as a legitimate instrument of coercion.”395 Still,
the theoretical foundation he provided for a status quo logic preferencing an international order
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dominated by western imperial nations, aided Jackson’s effort to establish the allied right of
prosecution.
Part III describes the reasons Kelsen, though skeptical of ad hoc jurisdictional authority,
believed the Nuremberg proceedings to be internally affair.
V. Victor’s Justice

Those who focus on Kelsen’s skepticism towards the Nuremberg proceedings396 have
determined that he was uncompromising with respect to prosecution under ad hoc jurisdictional
authority. While his preference was certainly for a neutral, permanent and compulsory
international court adjudicating humanitarian crimes, there is no reason to believe that he was not
just as likely to endorse the imputation of individual responsibility under less-than-ideal
conditions as he was to impute collective responsibility for unjust—or aggressive—warfare
when no impartial international body had yet been established to decide on such matters. Kelsen
nonetheless writes that:

If the principles applied in the Nuremberg Trial were to become a precedent, then, after
the next war, the governments of the victorious States would try the members of the
governments of the vanquished States for having committed crimes determined
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unilaterally and with retroactive force by the former. Let us hope that there is no such
precedent.397

The Italian philosopher Danilo Zolo, critical of the undercurrent of imperialism in
Kelsen’s writings on just war theory, nevertheless affirms Kelsen’s status as a leading critic of
the Nuremberg proceedings. Zolo asserts that:

The severest critique of all, what has found almost universal consensus, is the one
formulated by Kelsen. The punishment of war criminals—not only Nazis—was supposed
to be an act of justice and not the continuation of hostilities by means purporting to be
judicial, but in fact betraying the desire for revenge. For Kelsen, it was incompatible with
the function of justice that only the defeated nations were obliged to submit their citizens
to the jurisdiction of a criminal court. The victorious nations should also have accepted
that citizens of theirs who had committed war crimes should be brought to trial. 398

That Kelsen preferred that an international law system be established that conformed to
his blueprint for a Permanent League for the Maintenance of Peace (PLMP) with a compulsory
international court deciding on the merit of claims to just warfare and individual criminality (as
described in chapter two), he also recognized the importance of trying war criminals, even under
ad hoc conditions. The remainder of this section argues that despite his enduring criticism of ad
hoc jurisdictional authority—and the prospect of “victor’s justice”—Kelsen understood that
without a permanent international court, justice still recommended the prosecution of major Nazi
war criminals.
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Due to the composition of the Nuremberg tribunal, and the fact that Germany was not a
signatory to the IMT charter, Kelsen held that the trial was suspect. The London Agreement
concluded by the four victorious powers and “adhered to by other states of the United
Nations,”399 provided the legal basis for the trial, said Kelsen, not a legislative act of the four
occupant nations as “the legitimate successors of the German government.”400 Without Germany
as a signatory to the agreement or else jurisdictional licensure under debellatio, Pure Theory’s
author questioned the authority of the allies to impose justice.401
Debellatio, as one modern writer has described it, occurs when "one party to a conflict
has been totally defeated in war, its national institutions have disintegrated, and none of its allies
continue to challenge its enemy militarily on its behalf".402 In the case of Germany, most of its
territory before the Anschluss (i.e., the annexation of Austria into Nazi Germany that occurred on
March 12, 1938) had not been integrated under the dominion of the Allied Control Council. The
German state, therefore, de jure continued to exist. When the Federal Republic of Germany was
established at the end of the Allied occupation, a continuous claim of sovereignty was
maintained.403 As legal successor to the Third Reich, the Federal Republic confirmed this
jurisdictional problem, which Kelsen argued contravened the public international law principle
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that “one sovereign power cannot exercise jurisdiction over another sovereign power [which] is
the basis of the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity.”404
Although “in the realm of law the formal aspect [was] essential,” Kelsen said, “the objection
against the Nuremberg trial arising out of this deficiency [was] not the most serious one.”405 For
Kelsen, the tribunal judgment was even more problematic because it imposed the will of the
victorious powers on the vanquished. Notwithstanding these valid concerns, Kelsen provides
compelling reason for why ad hoc jurisdiction, even as practiced at Nuremberg, was a viable
option in the absence of a permanent and compulsory international court. While he would have
preferred an “international court endowed with the competence to try individuals…for those
grave violations of international law which of necessity will have the character of acts of state”
he recognized the “studiously general terms in which the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal was cast.”406 In recognizing the effort to afford defendants’ rights guaranteed under
domestic jurisdiction, including the right to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, the fair
chance to present a defense, including access to counsel and evidence to counter claims made
against Nazis, including alibi evidence, the equity of the case could not be dismissed.
Even Kelsen’s fiercest critics, including Judith Shklar in Legalism: Law, Morals and
Political Trials, who concludes that the Pure Theory of Law’s structural account remains devoid
of political and moral qualities, and therefore is of little use to understanding how the law
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actually works, is in agreement on this point.407 She writes that “what distinguishes most, though
not all, political trials is that…to some degree most political trials [do] not begin with the idea of
law, but with the idea that this man must go. The judge will be subservient to the prosecution, the
evidence false, the accused bullied, the witnesses perjured, and rules of law and procedure
ignored. This is, as it were, the classical model of a political trial.”408 At Nuremberg, despite the
retroactive creation of criminal laws applicable to the defendants, “the Trial,” she writes, “was
internally fair. Each defendant [had] a German counsel of his own choice, the guilt of each was
individually established before punishment, two of the defendants were acquitted entirely, and
several were acquitted of one or more charges.”409
Kelsen stated that contravention of the rule of law should not be reduced to the rule against
ex post facto lawmaking alone. While the US Constitution under Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1
asserts that “No state shall…pass any…ex post facto law…,” retroactive lawmaking, Kelsen
states, is “an absolute principle expressing a logical necessity. Its value is highly relative and the
sphere of its validity restricted.”410 Therefore, the decision of the International Military Tribunal
to affirm retroactive lawmaking is not a violation of a general rule applicable under all
jurisdictional authority, rather, claims to fairness, where every person is subject to the same law,
whether head-of-state or low-level state official, must be considered in accordance with a higher
normative principle
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Once Kelsen’s view of international criminal responsibility with its emphasis on prosecution
of individuals for having committed core international crimes is accounted for, a fundamental
moral expectation rather than “justice as peace” becomes the central pivot of a philosophy of law
that otherwise is assumed to banish “alien elements”. In refocusing our attention on the meaning
of international criminal responsibility for this leading twentieth century legal positivist, “the
moral minimum” that Kelsen himself claims must be kept separate from a pure legal cognition 411
appears impossible to exclude.
Kelsen makes this clear when he writes:

Even if atrocities are covered by municipal law, or have the character of acts of State and
hence do not constitute individual criminal responsibility, they are certainly open violations
of the principles of morality generally recognized by civilized people and hence were, at
least, morally not innocent or indifferent when they were committed.412

The next section (Part IV) explores the method of ex post facto lawmaking. Often neglected
in the effort to prove the positivity of the case, prosecution, if for different reasons than the
courts, subscribed to a retroactive logic. While difficult to prove that Kelsen caused allied
practitioners to assert a retroactive line of reasoning, the view, for example, that Kelsen’s
student, Hersch Lauterpacht, deserves greater credit than Kelsen for influencing Jackson’s
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methodological approach must be reconsidered.413 While Lauterpacht insisted on the criminality
of treaty laws banishing war, Kelsen asserted a mode of reasoning independent of prospective
international legal norms. In this respect, not only should the recent claims of Hathaway and
Shapiro that the trial proved “that those who waged aggressive war could be put in the dock”
deserve qualification, but denominating “Hersch The Great…the father of the New World
Order” detracts from a sober assessment of his teacher’s role in the formation of the concept of
international criminal responsibility at this early stage. While Hathaway and Shapiro are certain
that Lauterpacht’s “legacy…was nothing less than [validating] a system of rules embodying the
idea that war is an illegitimate tool for establishing or enforcing legal right,”414 Kelsen in
licensing retroactivity created the legal foundation in the post-war era for ad hoc international
tribunals that would place crimes against humanity at the forefront of subject matter
jurisdiction.415
VI. Criticism of the Application of Crimes Against Peace at Nuremberg
The Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907, which established the rules of war, including
prohibitions on the use of poisons and the attack or bombardment of undefended towns, as well
as the Geneva Conventions of 1929 regulating the treatment of war prisoners, were “signposts on
the road toward a growing conviction that aggressive war must somehow be abolished.”416
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Jackson remarked in his opening address at Nuremberg that “any resort to war—to any
kind of war—is a resort to means that are inherently criminal.”417 He insisted that defendants
were aware that at the time of commission of illegal wars, they were committing a criminal act.
In “Nuremberg in Retrospect: Legal Answer to International Lawlessness,” Jackson stated that
after Germany violated treaties of friendship and non-aggression with “a dozen unprepared
countries,” “came a series of unequivocal warnings that the course of its leaders was regarded as
outside the bounds of modern warfare and criminal.”418
These warnings included the St. James Declaration (1942) by representatives of nine
occupied “governments-in-exile” meeting in London, who stated that their principle war aim was
“punishment, through the channels of organized justice, of those guilty of or responsible for
these crimes…”419; the Moscow Declaration (1943), signed by the foreign secretaries of the
United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Nationalist China, which insisted that
“fascist chiefs and army generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and
handed over to justice”420; and the United Nations War Crimes Commission (1943-48),
comprised of seventeen nations421 tasked with collecting evidence of war crimes perpetrated by
axis officials.
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In addition, Jackson made use of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1923) sponsored
by the League of Nations, which declared in Article 1 “that aggressive war is an international
crime,” and that more than a dozen parties to the treaty obligated themselves to “undertake that
no one of them will be guilty of its commission”422; the preamble to the League of Nations’
Protocol of the Settlement of International Disputes or ‘Geneva Protocol’ (1924), accepted by 48
Members of the League of Nations, which stated that “a war of aggression constitutes a violation
of…[the solidarity of the members of the international community] and an ‘international
crime’”423; the Locarno Pact or Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France,
Great Britain and Italy (1925)424; the Eighteenth Plenary Meeting of the Assembly of the League
of Nations (1927)425 pronouncing a Declaration Concerning Wars of Aggression; the Unanimous
Resolution of the twenty-one American Republics at the Sixth (Havana) Pan-American
Conference (1928) stating that “wars of aggression constituted international crimes against the
human species’” 426; the International Conference of American States on Conciliation and
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Arbitration (1929)427; and the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (1933)428
ratified by 25 states.
The 1927 US Senate Resolution introduced by Idaho Senator William E. Borah stated
“that it is the view of the Senate of the United States that war between nations should be
outlawed as an institution or means of the settlement of international controversies by making it
a public crime under the law of nations”429Finally, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Treaty of Paris,
or more formally, the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National
Policy (1928), ratified by representatives of nearly all the nations of the world, demonstrated “a
widely prevalent juristic climate which has energized a spreading custom among civilized
peoples to regard a war of aggression as not simply ‘unjust’ or ‘illegal’ but downright
criminal.”430
Kelsen disagreed. He contended that neither Kellogg-Briand, nor any of the other treaties,
did anything more than designate certain wars as illegal, granting the right of reprisal and war
directed against states violating the agreement. Thus, the pact did not constitute individual
criminal responsibility, only collective responsibility. While it confirmed a general conviction
among States to resolve conflicts peacefully, Kelsen considered it problematic to deduce
individual criminal responsibility from acts denominated illegal under the Pact, as the
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International Military Tribunal did in its judgment “that those who plan and wage such a war,
with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing.”431 It “is in
contradiction,” says Kelsen, “with positive law and generally accepted principles of international
jurisprudence.”432 He remarks in “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a
Precedent in International Law?” (1947) that:
The treaties for whose violation the London Agreement establishes individual criminal
responsibility are in the first place the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, and certain nonaggression pacts concluded by Germany with States against which Germany, in spite of these
treaties, resorted to war. All these treaties forbade only resort to war, and not planning,
preparation, initiation of war or conspiracy for the accomplishment of such actions. None of
these treaties stipulated individual criminal responsibility.433

Still, Kelsen did not criticize Jackson for emphasizing the crimes against peace charge,
only his reliance on treaty law to prove the right to try Nazis. In “Collective and Individual
Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals”
(1943), Kelsen, writes that “the demand to punish the war criminals is, or should be, above all,
the demand to punish the authors of the second World War, the persons morally responsible for
one of the greatest crimes in the history of mankind.”434 Kelsen uses moral normative language
(i.e., “persons morally responsible”) to demonstrate that crimes against peace was to be the
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preeminent charge. 435 Yet his endorsement of the primacy of the crimes against peace charge
does not necessitate agreement with the method used to prove its criminality.
Retroactive lawmaking, according to Kelsen, is the only other choice when no
international treaty stipulates criminality.436 Whether retroactive legislation ought to be
introduced is therefore dependent on the state of development of the international law system.
While it is not ideal to apply retroactive laws, an ad hoc order may require prosecution of
offenses that under national law would certainly be criminalizable. With time, the development
of legal norms applicable prospectively, heralding a federated world state with a permanent
compulsory international court adjudicating cases against war criminals, would, he believed,
replace ad hoc international justice. However, as long as international law remained in a decentralized form, retroactive lawmaking based on substantive criterion would need to be
enforced.
Kelsen writes, “since the internationally illegal acts for which the London Agreement
established individual criminal responsibility were certainly also morally most objectionable,
and the persons who committed these acts were certainly aware of their immoral character, the
retroactivity of the law applied to them can hardly be considered as absolutely incompatible with
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justice.”437 (my emphasis). The application of retroactive legislation does not necessitate an
evaluation of the preeminence of the allied cause, only whether the act was ‘morally most
objectionable’.
After determining that “in the second place, the crimes for which retribution may be
claimed are breaches of the rules of international law regulating the conduct of war”438—or war
crimes—Kelsen hesitated to implicate crimes against humanity, which he referred to under the
rubric of “principles of humanity”. He writes:
The demand for retribution is sometimes extended to violations of the principles of humanity,
that is to say, to acts which, though not illegal from the point of view of international or
national law, are breaches of the norms of morality against which neither international nor
national law provides any sanction, and for which no legal responsibility is established.439

Despite remarking in his correspondence with Jackson that such violations did not constitute
law,440 “it was Kelsen’s conviction that on the eve of the intended prosecution of Nazi criminals
the legal basis ought to be re-established in order to be able to try former members of the
German government for having started the war and for their violations of the principles of
humanity.”441 Kelsen’s recommendation that this charge be designated an offense by which
retroactive lawmaking be employed under the London Agreement proves that, statements to the
contrary, he confirmed that crimes against humanity were not only valid, but “morally most
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objectionable.” With the post-Second World War ratification of humanitarian treaties applicable
to internal atrocities, such as the Genocide Convention (1948) and Geneva IV (1949), subsequent
case studies demonstrate Kelsen’s intensified support for sanctions with respect to violations of
“principles of humanity”.
While Kelsen rejected Kellogg-Briand as criminalizing core international offenses, violations
of state practice were not the reason for his dismissal. George Schwarzerberger, a political realist
and scholar on international criminal law at the time of the Second World War, claimed that
neither Kellogg-Briand nor any of the other pronouncements on aggressive warfare were legally
binding, because state practice proved that prior agreements were void. In addition to Nazi
aggression towards Poland (1939), Schwarzenberger included the invasion of Manchuria by the
Soviet Union (1929), and later by Japan (1931), as well as the Soviet Winter War against Finland
(1939-40) to demonstrate that state practice could not be established in advance of the
proceedings.442 This is important to any discussion of Kelsen’s contributions in the post-Cold
War era (see: chapter five), where the construction of customary international law has been
based, in part, on a far less rigid determination of state practice.
Kelsen also disagreed with the rationale of judges. According to the IMT Judgment (as
quoted by Kelsen):
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national
policy necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is illegal in international law; and
that those who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are
committing a crime in so doing…But it is argued that the Pact does not expressly enact that
such wars are crimes, or set up courts to try those who make such wars. To that extent the
same is true with regard to the laws of war contained in the Hague Convention. The Hague
Convention of 1907 prohibited resort to certain methods of waging war. These included the
442
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inhumane treatment of prisoners, the employment of poisoned weapons, the improper use of
flags of truce, and similar matters. Many of these prohibitions had been enforced long before
the dates of the Convention; but since 1907 they have certainly been crimes, punishable as
offenses against the laws of war; yet the Hague Convention nowhere designates such
practices as criminal, nor is any sentence prescribed, nor any mention made of a court to try
and punish offenders. For many years past, however, military tribunals have tried and
punished individuals guilty of violating the rules of land warfare laid down by this
Convention. In the opinion of the Tribunal, those who wage aggressive war are doing that
which is equally illegal, and of much greater moment than a breach of one of the rules of the
Hague Convention.443

Kelsen was critical of the court’s analogy. While the Hague Convention regulating the
conduct of war had been transformed into positive national criminal law, the Kellogg-Briand
Pact had not. No state had changed the rules of international law into sanctionable criminal
offenses after the ratification of Kellogg-Briand. Moreover, no individual had been tried or
punished by a military tribunal for having resorted to an illegal war prior to the London
Agreement. Therefore, “neither by the doctrine of the American prosecutor,” writes Kelsen, “nor
by the doctrine of the tribunal is it possible to prove that existing international law, especially the
Briand-Kellogg Pact, has already established individual criminal responsibility for acts by which
a State resorts to an internationally illegal war…For the tribunal they were criminal, and that
means punishable, only under the law created by the London Agreement, which is the only legal
basis of the judgment.”444
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While prosecution and court reasoned that aggressive war was criminalizable based on
previous international agreements, especially Kellogg-Briand, a review of Jackson’s writings and
the IMT judgment demonstrate that retroactive lawmaking assumed primacy, and thus Kelsen’s
rationale dominated the consensus opinion amongst practitioners. Jackson writes:
If no moral principle is entitled to application as law until it is first embodied in a text and
promulgated as a command by some superior effective authority, then it must be admitted the
world was without such a text at the time the acts I have recited took place. No sovereign
legislative act to which the Germans must bow had defined international crimes, fixed
penalties and set up courts to adjudge them. From the premise that nothing is law if not
embraced in a sovereign command, it is easy to argue that the Nuremberg trial applied
retroactive, or ex post facto law.445 (my emphasis)

While Jackson admits that the common law tradition, based on the inductive logic of
general rules developed from particular decisions, preferences a less text-bound approach, he
nevertheless “does not deny the authority of the London charter.”446 “The judge reaches a
decision more largely upon consideration of the inherent quality and natural effect of the act in
question…[in] what has sometimes been called a natural law that binds each man to refrain from
acts so inherently wrong and injurious to others that he must know they will be treated as
criminal.” 447 In so doing, Jackson admits to the same substantive prerequisite of retroactive
justice that Kelsen used to determine international criminal responsibility.
The Literature Review (chapter two) described Kelsen’s positive law rationale for
retroactive lawmaking. While Kelsen’s position contradicted Austin’s classical legal positivist
approach, which contended that command was always future-oriented, since commanding a past
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event would be a contradiction in terms, Kelsen nevertheless asserts that retroactivity is a
legitimate, if exceptional, positive law approach to criminalization. By claiming that natural law
theory prohibited ex post facto lawmaking on the grounds that individuals subject to the rule of
law, “whose legal conduct is prescribed by the rule,”448 are protected from prosecution, Kelsen
assumes that those natural lawyers who describe the “inner morality” of law as protecting
individuals from the predations of dictatorships and other forms of government that flout the
inviolability of human freedom, represent the totality of natural law thinking.449 Rather, natural
law thinking, as Jackson noted, retroactively “binds each man to refrain from acts so inherently
wrong and injurious to others that he must know they will be treated as criminal.”450 Thus, it is
the substantive nature of an act that is the condition of prosecution. Even Kelsen, who argues
along structural lines for the positive validity of retroactive lawmaking, admits as much.
IMT judges stated that “the maxim nullem crimen sine lege (Latin: “no crime without
law”) is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice.”451 Kelsen
similarly remarks that state constitutions often prohibit ex post facto lawmaking, a reflection of a
more centralized legal order insuring legal protections for individuals. General international law,
however, does not prohibit retroactivity. While IMT judges attempted to anchor their view in
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legal positivism, like Kelsen they ended up endorsing a line of reasoning centered around “a
higher-ranking principle of natural justice.”452 As Kelsen writes:
In case two postulates of justice are in conflict with each other, the higher one prevails;
and to punish those who were morally responsible for the international crime of the
second World War may certainly be considered as more important than to comply with
the rather relative rule against ex post facto laws, open to so many exception.453
VII. Conclusion
Since the Nuremberg Tribunal was heavily weighted in the direction of criminalizing
aggressive war making, this chapter reviewed the ways in which just war theory was applied to
favor “Christian civilization” and a status quo logic benefitting imperial nations. While Kelsen’s
endorsement of the theory of bellum justum provides a legal rationale for assigning collective
responsibility, the author of the Pure Theory of Law indicates a general recognition of the
problems associated with the application of this theory as the grounds for imputing individual
criminal responsibility. In contrast, Jackson’s reluctance to concede bias creates the foundation
for victor’s justice, as allied powers were a priori considered innocent of war offenses.
Despite questioning the authority of the allies to conduct a trial without German ratification
of the IMT charter, Kelsen nevertheless fundamentally considered the ad hoc proceedings valid,
since the trial was internally fair. Moreover, while Kelsen is often assumed to advocate an
unyielding view of “justice as peace” (see: chapter two), he is nevertheless committed to
developing a conception of ICR that prioritizes protections for victims of human rights abuses
separate from any value placed on the peaceful resolution of conflict. In this respect, his decision
to endorse ad hoc jurisdiction at Nuremberg, based on a moral criterion associated with
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retroactive lawmaking ought to be viewed, not as anomalous, but integral to his pure theoretical
project.
Since every German was collectively responsible for crimes against peace, in accordance
with traditional rules of international law, Kelsen’s recommendations related to individual
responsibility, which Jackson integrated into what became the final draft of the IMT, advancing
the cause of international law. If the focal point of all law, according to Kelsen, is imputation, as
designated in the Literature Review (Chapter II, Part I), then international criminal
responsibility, even if assigned through a creative juridical methodology (retroactivity) rather
than a more conservative one (prospective lawmaking) bolsters the prospect of a more
centralized legal authority, since centralized organization is gauged based on the degree to which
a society has moved away from collective forms of responsibility towards imputing individual
responsibility.
While Jackson insisted that the Kellogg-Briand Pact gave fair warning to the suspects, and
was the preeminent reason crimes against peace assumed a central place in the hierarchy of
subject matter jurisdiction, like IMT judges, he acknowledged the distinct possibility that Nazi
were responsible for their actions because of offenses committed in the past, despite no
normative law in place to sanction those offenses. In examining how retroactive lawmaking
based on moral estimations of responsibility shifted attention away from this “Class A” charge,
“which protects the sovereignty of all states, even criminal states, so long as they do not launch
wars,”454 it is possible to re-think the place of crimes against peace relative to more human
rights-oriented international charges.
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The defense would apparently have preferred [Adolph Eichmann] to plead not guilty on the
grounds that under the then existing Nazi legal system he had not done anything wrong, that
what he was accused of were not crimes but ‘acts of state,’ over which no other state has
jurisdiction (par in parem imperium non habet)455, that it had been his duty to obey and that,
in [Defense Attorney] Servatius’ words, he had committed acts ‘for which you are decorated
if you win and go to the gallows if you lose.’456
—Hannah Arendt—

Chapter 4
Twilight of the Acts of State Doctrine: Ex Post Facto Lawmaking and the Making of
‘Moral Responsibility’ at the Jerusalem Trial of Adolph Eichmann

I. Introduction
This chapter analyzes the evolving theory and practice of international criminal responsibility
(ICR) using Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law (PTL) as a continuing point of reference. Whereas
the last case study reflected on the tension between Kelsen’s licensing of just war theory and his
criticism of the approach introduced by the allied prosecution to justify the application of crimes
against peace at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, this chapter analyzes
rival claims in the 1961-62 Jerusalem trial of Nazi SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer (Lieutenant
Colonel) Adolph Eichmann. On the one hand, Eichmann’s defense counsel Robert Servatius
attributed to Kelsen a convincing rationale for immunizing his client on the basis of the acts of
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state doctrine (AoSD), and on the other, Israel’s prosecutor, Gideon Hausner, and judges in the
case, turn to Kelsen in support of retroactive lawmaking based on moral criterion.
While no direct evidence of Kelsen’s view of Eichmann’s culpability exists, read in the
context of his moral licensing of ex post facto lawmaking, Pure Theory’s author arguably would
have accepted the judgment rendered by Israel’s court. Kelsen’s brief, if inconclusive, reference
to the Eichmann case in a footnote in Principles of International Law (1967) does not deny the
possibility that he would have endorsed prosecution. “As for the retroactive aspect of the Israeli
law,” he writes, “the Court stated ‘the penal jurisdiction of a state with respect to crimes
committed by ‘foreign offenders’ insofar as it does not conflict on other grounds with the
principles of international law, is not limited by the prohibition of retroactive effect.”457 This
chapter is an exercise in thinking through Kelsen’s position on ex post facto lawmaking as the
higher form of justice in cases where an act of state does not immunize an official from assuming
“moral responsibility”. 458
As with other case studies, chapter four confronts the main obstacle at a given moment in
ICL history to realizing a moral conception of ICR. A seemingly unlikely candidate to guide us
along this path to recognition, given his express commitment to the separation of law from
morality or “the separation thesis” (see: chapter two), Kelsen is nevertheless critical to proving
the limits of ICR as an object of positive legal cognition. Acts of State were defined by Kelsen as
“acts performed by individuals in their capacity as organs of the State and therefore acts imputed
to the State.”459 In Eichmann’s trial, these ‘protections’ proved to be useless. Both Israel’s
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district court and appeals chamber held that previous case law, including the IMT charter and
judgments, invalidated the AoSD. The “penal provisions of international law would be a
mockery,”460 the Supreme Court of Israel adjudged, if states immunized offenses that under
normal circumstances would constitute a breach of national law. Since Eichmann’s acts could
not be sheltered by the “character of [his] task or mission,”461 the Supreme Court determined that
he was no longer protected by sovereign right.
Head of the Central Office for Jewish Emigration, Adolph Eichmann was responsible for the
deportation of European Jewry to ghettoes and extermination camps of German-occupied
Eastern Europe during the Second World War period, which made him a prime target after his
post-war escape from Germany to South America.462 Assuming the identity Ricardo Klement, a
foreman at an Argentine Mercedes Benz dealership, the Austrian-born Eichmann escaped
detection until 1960 when he was abducted in a suburb of Buenos Aires by operatives of Israel’s
intelligence agency, Mossad. Brought to Jerusalem without the permission of Argentina’s
government, and perhaps in violation of international law, to stand trial for 15 counts of crimes
against the Jewish people, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in a hostile
organization, the case brought worldwide attention as the most significant war crimes trial since
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the IMT.463 Due to the high profile status of the accused, the clandestine nature of the operation,
The Jewish State’s role in trying a representative of a regime responsible for the genocide of
two-thirds of European Jewry, and several enduring debates about the culpability of this “desk
murderer”464, the case against Obersturmbannführer Eichmann remains a significant reference
point for any study of ICR. Louis Henkin in How Nations Behave (1968) speculated that “one
may expect that the Eichmann case will [one day] be cited as some authority for ‘universality’
for the crime of genocide, and…as a basis of jurisdiction...”465
The judgments of the District Court in Jerusalem and Israel’s Supreme Court’s judgment
in appeal differed. While the District Court was mostly concerned with the specific atrocities
perpetrated against European Jewry, the Supreme Court focused on the “universal dimensions of
the Holocaust.”466 The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment ) Law (NNCL) passed by
Israel’s Knesset in 1950 was the basis for the indictment. The NNCL stated that:
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A person who has committed one of the following offences - (1) done, during the period
of the Nazi regime, in an enemy country, an act constituting a crime against the Jewish
people(2)…an act constituting a crime against humanity;(3)…an act constituting a war
crime, is liable to the death penalty…(7) "crime against humanity" means any of the
following acts: murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation or deportation and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, and persecution on national,
racial, religious or political grounds…467

The Supreme Court, for example, classified the charge of crimes against the Jewish
people (section 1)468 as a particular type of crimes against humanity that symbolized the
interdependence of all the categories under the NNCL. These also included crimes against
humanity as a general offense (section 2). By grouping categories together, the Supreme Court
affirmed that the differences between them were only artificial distinctions. Despite focusing on
the specific crimes Eichmann perpetrated against Jews, Israeli law nevertheless affirmed that it
was indeed guided by the universalizing thrust of international law.469
The AoSD, however, did play a significant role in the case—and Kelsen has often been
introduced as a leading defender of this doctrine. International law scholar Andrea Gattini in his
entry on Kelsen in the Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice writes:

If it is true that Kelsen’s theory was open to the idea of recognizing the individual as a
subject of international law, it is also true that Kelsen remained throughout his life
faithful to a traditional and strict view of legal responsibility and its consequences. Every
act performed by an individual in command or with the authorization of his government
is ipso facto an ‘act of state,’ over which no other state can claim jurisdiction, regardless
of its being characterized as a crime under domestic or international law.470
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While Gattini is correct to point to the traditionally narrow scope of Kelsen’s description
of the AoSD, he neglects to consider that categories of humanitarian offenses committed against
a state’s own citizens, for example, expanded in the years from the end of the Second World War
to the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem (1961-62), as a result of the multilateral ratification of the
Genocide (1948)471 and Geneva IV472 (1949) conventions.473 Kelsen also acknowledges the
prospect of ad hoc jurisdiction when he states that a “number of writers contended during and
after World War II that ‘universality of jurisdiction extended to war crimes and that any state—
even neutrals—might apprehend and punish war criminals found within their jurisdiction.”474
After introducing a discussion of Kelsen’s view of the AoSD and the principle of
universal jurisdictional right in the first part of this chapter, the second part considers Kelsen’s
philosophical critique of the court’s criterion of “manifest illegality” where alleged war criminals
were expected to draw on their “conscience” to distinguish legal from illegal acts under superior
orders. Kelsen’s description of how “conscience” is produced by legal norms parallels Hannah
Arendt’s thesis in Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil475 as each considers
the impact of the Nazi legal order on the formation of Eichmann’s behavior. Both question
Immanuel Kant’s philosophical claim—invoked by the courts—that inclination and obedience to
the law ought to be distinguished. What if one is inclined, however, to obey the law but the law
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licenses immoral acts? This section explores Kelsen and Arendt’s shared critique of the court’s
criterion of manifest illegality.
After determining shortcomings in the court’s estimation of standards for subordinate
prosecution, this case study examines Kelsen’s support of retroactive lawmaking for acts for
which Eichmann ought to have been held “morally responsible,” including the subject matter
jurisdiction of crimes against humanity. The gravity of Nazi offenses presumably forced Kelsen
to shift his doctrinal position on the separation of law from morality, as the previous chapter
confirms. This section argues that Jorg Kammerhofer’s claim that Kelsen would affirm that since
there are no moral absolutes the normative imperative “You ought to commit genocide” is a
statement irreconcilable with pure theoretical cognition.476 The application of ex post facto
lawmaking based on moral criterion, in spite of Kelsen’s doctrinal commitment to the separation
of law from morality, disconfirms Kammerhofer’s position.
The last section explores Eichmann’s capacity to judge. According to legal scholar
William Ebenstein, Kelsen retained a causal conception of human behavior throughout his life.
Ebenstein writes that:

In the perspective of a normative order, man is free to the extent that sanctions are
imputed to certain types of behavior, although in the perspective of causality such
behavior must be presumed to be causally determined. Far from excluding causality, the
linking of freedom and imputation presupposes it.477

While Arendt remarks that Eichmann possessed an ‘inability to think’ from the
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standpoint of someone else,478 and ‘blind obedience’479 impeded his ability to judge due to the
compulsion of his ‘oath’,480 she nevertheless indicates that he made a choice. In contrast to
Arendt’s belief that Eichmann’s initial decision to join a criminal regime made him culpable,
Kelsen diminishes the capacity for ‘agency’ by virtue of his belief that any social order
instituting coercive legal norms predominantly structures thought patterns. Eichmann’s choice to
join the Nazis, for Kelsen, would not be the reason he was guilty; he was guilty because he
committed a universally condemnable act: genocide.
Like the previous chapter on the theme of peace, the object here is to reconcile Kelsen’s
notion of freedom associated with “induc[ing] men to be motivated by ideas in accordance with
the conduct indirectly prescribed by the legal order” 481 with an endorsement of retroactive
lawmaking for acts deemed ‘immoral’. The central paradox of this thesis is that Kelsen both
supports a causal-deterministic description of human agency, while implicitly recognizing the
choice to disobey immoral commands by virtue of his retroactive methodological licensing.
Part I
II. The Acts of State Doctrine
That Kelsen is seldom referenced in contemporary ICL proceedings should not serve to
diminish his importance as a leading international publicist who spurred evolved practice.
Defense counsel Robert Servatius writes that:

Kelsen, a scholar of international law, respected all over the world, has recently given
[The Acts of State] doctrine its most lucid expression. In this context, a personal remark
has to be added immediately namely, that Kelsen, formerly a professor teaching at the
University of Vienna, had suffered personally from National Socialist persecution and
had been compelled to emigrate to the United States. Therefore it would only be human
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 48.
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480
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and absolutely understandable, if, owing to the effect of the “Acts-of-State-Doctrine”…
turning out in favour of the main German war criminals…Kelsen would have tried to
reject or to weaken the validity of this doctrine in international law. It bears witness to the
human integrity and the juristic impartiality of this scholar that, being under the influence
of obvious and only too understandable resentments, he has not succumbed to this
temptation, but has affirmed time and again the validity of [the Acts of State Doctrine]
with forceful determination.482

The deference Servatius showed Kelsen was equally matched by associate IMT defense
counsel Hermann Jahreiss’s favorable remarks on the Pure theory of Law at Nuremberg.483 Even
Carl Schmitt, appealed to his Weimar legal rival in his own defense during allied interrogation
after World War II, after Schmitt was almost tried for his role as “crown jurist” of the Nazi
regime.484485
Critical of the view of the AoSD associated with Kelsen, lead-IMT U.S. Prosecutor
Robert H. Jackson, recognized that if those in lower ranks were protected from prosecution by
orders of their superiors, and superiors were protected because their commands were sheltered by
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the acts of state doctrine, then no one could be held responsible for their actions. “These twin
principles working together have heretofore,” as Jackson noted in his opening address, “resulted
in immunity for practically everyone concerned…”486 Article 7 of the IMT Charter reads:
The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or
mitigating punishment. 487

The authority to decide whether to hold axis officials responsible was determined by the
allied powers under the London Agreement. Article 8 of the IMT Charter, in contrast, accounted
for mitigating factors related to the severity of an order taken under superior command. The
Article reads:
The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior
shall not free him from responsibility but may be considered in mitigation of punishment
if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 488
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His commitment to this doctrine, however, seems to have wavered. 489490 Before taking
into
account how acts committed by state officials under superior order were deemed contrary to
international law and subject of inquiry by foreign states, it is necessary to engage the view that
Kelsen indeed affirmed the AoSD. In “Collective and Individual Responsibility for Acts of State
in International Law” (1948), Kelsen defines the doctrine as follows:

Acts of State are acts of individuals performed by them in their capacity as organs of
State, especially by that organ which is called the Government of the State. These acts are
performed by individuals who belong to the Government as the head of State, or
members of the cabinet, or are acts performed at the command or with the authorization
of the Government. It is within the competence of the national legal order, the law of the
State (or municipal law), to determine under what conditions a certain individual is acting
as an organ of the State, or, in other terms, what acts of human beings are imputable to
the State and hence have the character of acts of State. Since the contents of the
obligations, responsibilities and rights established by International Law are acts of State,
International Law does not directly determine the individuals whose acts are prescribed
or authorized by International Law. It leaves the determination of these individuals to the
national legal orders.491

Despite acknowledging the limits of the acts of state doctrine, the last edition of Principles of International Law
in certain passages reaffirm a traditional view he consistently held throughout the majority of his career. He writes,
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Individuals performing acts of state are indirect subjects of international law; only a state
is a direct subject. While each state delegates responsibility to officials in roles specified by their
normative legal order, any offense committed on behalf of a state is sanctioned by international
law indirectly through a ‘primitive’ form of ‘blood-revenge’ attributable to the state as a social
group. Like a family or tribe, which in ancient times was considered the locus of political
responsibility, the state is directly sanctioned through wars and reprisals for international
offenses.492 This correspondence between tribal and international law has already been discussed
with reference to just war theory (see: chapter three).
With few exceptions (i.e., espionage and treason), the state is solely responsible to repair
damages caused by their legal organs.493 Meaning, both officials of the state and ordinary
citizens are subject to sanction under a form of collective responsibility, even if certain state
officials and the citizenry did not personally commit acts in violation of international law. While
the violation of international norms independent of an act of state, such as the self-governing
commission of breach of blockade, carriage of contraband or piracy can be tried under general
international law (i.e., customarily), no authority, without explicit permission of the home state
may adjudicate over acts (i.e., with the exception of espionage and treason) that an official
performs in his authorized role. Only the nation from which the alleged offender hails retains this
right. 494
Since consent between states is necessary for adjudication of offenses committed on
behalf of a state, self-help, including war and reprisals, are the common form of punishment.495
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The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), for example, is a collective treaty that reflects the customary
right to ‘self-help’ against countries that breach the peace.496 Even those officials who have
“violated the laws and customs of war (so-called war crimes),” according to Kelsen, are
sanctioned under “rules obliging States to punish their own subjects.”497 This presumably creates
a different problem of ‘neutrality’ than the punishment of state offenders by ad hoc international
courts, since biased judgment accompanies any national court adjudicating its own state
officials.498
Notwithstanding this restrictive reading, there is proof that Kelsen’s view on the AoSD
evolved at the time of the final publication of Principles of International Law (1967). He writes:
Whatever the position taken toward this principle—commonly termed the acts of state
doctrine—‘that the courts of one state are not entitled to question the validity of acts of
another state performed with its jurisdiction,’ the courts of most states…may and
occasionally do refuse to give effect to, that is, refuse to recognize and to enforce, the
laws of another state if these laws are considered contrary to the state’s public policy.499

If the courts of one state decide not to endorse acts of another state that are contrary to
public policy, Kelsen insists that a state may also refuse to implement acts of another state if they
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contradict international law. “It is quite true,” he writes, “that by refusing to give effect to acts of
another state because these acts are deemed contrary to international law, the courts of a state
necessarily judge the conformity of the acts with international law and thereby question the
international validity of acts of another state.500 Kelsen endorses the expansive right of states to
determine if states have contravened international law, in which case, not only are states not
required to implement acts of another state, but those acts that violate international law
presumably would be subject to prosecution.
The previous chapter affirms—against Gattini’s judgment—that Kelsen was far less
concerned with upholding the AoSD than in finding legal, albeit retroactive, grounds for trying
individuals responsible for core international crimes. In fact, he introduced individual criminal
responsibility into the lexicon of ICL. In his correspondence with Jackson prior to the London
Conference, he recognized that drafts of the IMT charter assumed that individual rather than
collective responsibility had already been defined by international law. Rather than quibble about
procedural concerns related to the AoSD, the allies he suggested ought to create new law to be
applied ex post facto. The imputation of individual responsibility was clearly preferable, since it
identified the exact perpetrators, who were equally subject to penalty under collective
responsibility. Was not Hermann Goring “well aware that the Allies could drop a bomb on him
as a result of his country’s violation of the law—[so] what complaint could he then have if they
decided to hang him from a gibbet instead?”501
III. The Right to Universal Jurisdiction
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According to the Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, “universal
jurisdiction is the criminal jurisdiction exercised on the basis of the universality principle.
This…jurisdiction entitles states to prosecute specific crimes regardless of the place of
commission, the nationality of the perpetrator, and the nationality of the victims.”502 ‘Thirdstates invoke the principle of universal jurisdiction as a rule of customary international law when
core international crimes are either not prosecuted by the state of commission, which may be
unable or unwilling to prosecute its own public officials for state crimes or else an international
court, which due to issues of capacity, is incapable of assuming authority.
While piracy, terrorism, drug trafficking and torture are deemed by some subject to
universal jurisdiction, none of these crimes technically fall under this principle. Piracy, which
typically is defined as a crime that takes place on the high seas503 outside the jurisdiction of any
state for obvious reasons is an offense that can be prosecuted anywhere without violating the
AoSD. Alternatively, terrorism, drug trafficking and torture are more appropriately classified
under the active nationality principle, which entitles states to exercise jurisdiction over their
nationals. These offenses are based on inter-party agreements between signatory states.
The response of the Court was four-fold to the complaint that Israel was exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction when no national connection existed between the victims and Israel, and
that Germany (or any of the eighteen states where Eichmann was alleged to have committed
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crimes) could have assumed jurisdiction.504 First, under the ‘passive nationality principle,’ which
is based on the nationality of the victim, a link did in fact exist between the Jews that were
Eichmann’s victims and the State of Israel. Since Israel retained an historical, internationally
recognized connection with the Jewish people as the national homeland of the Jews, it asserted
its ‘natural right’ to determine its own fate.505 Second, without a specific rule restricting extraterritorial jurisdiction, every state retains jurisdictional power over its ‘people’.506 Third, only
states, not the accused, have the right to protest extra-territorial jurisdiction. Since no state either
protested Israel’s case against Eichmann or petitioned to bring the accused to trial, Israel was
granted tacit right to adjudication.507 Last, if only a permanent compulsory criminal court was
sufficient to hold hearings against Eichmann, he never would have been tried.508
According to the judgment in the Eichmann case, “crimes of the magnitude of
Eichmann’s offenses, “struck the whole of mankind and shocked the conscience of nations,”
granting Israel the right to punish these acts, which “[shook] the international community to its
very foundation.” 509 “The countries of the world” were therefore mandated, according to the
Supreme Court of Israel, “to mete out punishment for the violation of its provisions.”510 While
there was no clear legal claim only a moral one, given the undeveloped nature of methodological
construction in 1961-62, judges merely declared custom in Eichmann’s case, in accordance with
natural law theory.511
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Although Kelsen granted states the right to prosecute those “acts which are directly
forbidden by general international law and for which…law provides individual responsibility,”512
including “the right to punish individuals for acts of piracy,” he nevertheless was skeptical of
ICL scholars and practitioners who invoked the right of universal jurisdiction.”513 That, however,
does not necessarily mean that he was opposed to universal jurisdiction.
Unlike Germany, Israel could not claim a direct sovereign relationship to the offender or
his crimes. Servatius held firm to this line of reasoning. In the defense submission, he drew on
Kelsen’s description of acts of state:

If the wording of the [Acts of State Doctrine] adopted by Kelsen…will serve as a point of
departure for the examination of the question, no Israeli tribunal has jurisdiction over the
Accused. The exceptions from the [Acts of State Doctrine] considered as permitted by
Kelsen (espionage and treason in times of war) do not apply in Eichmann’s case.
…The exception permitted according to [the restrictive theory of immunity]
doctrine…does not apply in Eichmann’s case: for a state of war does not exist—and has
not existed—between the State of Israel and Germany, and the State of Israel keeps him
in custody not by virtue of a capture made in the course of military operations—and
therefore as a prisoner of war—but as a result of his abduction from the territory of a
foreign state.
It must therefore be emphasized…that already the ‘Acts of State Doctrine’ excludes the
existence of any claim for criminal jurisdiction of the State of Israel over the accused
Eichmann. If nevertheless he would be tried by an Israeli tribunal, this would amount to a
violation of international law.514
Formal restrictions, following Kelsen’s instructions, did not permit the Jerusalem court to
try Eichmann, since he was kidnapped from a foreign territory, in this case Argentina, nor would
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a pure theoretical definition of acts of state515 permit Eichmann’s trial to take place in Israel
rather than Germany unless he was captured as part of a military operation.516 While it is
questionable whether Eichmann even retained German citizenship after he assumed the status of
non-state national after the war517, other biases and impairments would also need to be accounted
for, including the role of ex-Nazis in West German government518; the memory of the ill-fated
national trials conducted by Germany against its First World War veterans at Leipzig519; and
Germany’s lack of experience in handling proceedings after WWII, which had been the purview
of Americans and other allied powers.520
Kelsen’s student, the international law publicist Hersch Lauterpacht’s wrote an article,
"Allegiance, Diplomatic Protection and Criminal Jurisdiction over Aliens," that Hausner
introduced to affirm Lauterpacht’s position that territoriality "is not a requirement of justice or a
necessary postulate of the sovereign state."521 The reconstitution of sovereignty by Lauterpacht
evidently contrasted Kelsen’s ambiguous pronouncements with respect to a state’s binding right
to assume responsibility over its nationals to Lauterpacht’s explicit embrace of the universal
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jurisdictional right associated with natural law theory.522 The nature of the crimes becomes the
basis for prosecution, not the fact that those crimes were committed terra nullius (on land
belonging to no one).523
While the Jerusalem District Court claimed that “universality of the right to punish refers
to criminal acts which cannot be dealt with due to the absence or non-availability of a competent
court,”524 the Supreme Court maintained a more nuanced position, acknowledging that a
competent German court did in fact exist. Hugo Grotius, according to the Supreme Court, “refers
to a universality [that] can only be applied as an alternative [under] the principle…aut dedere aut
punire.”525 In its modernized form as aut dedre aut judicaire, the principle denotes the
requirement that a state either “exercise jurisdiction (which would necessarily include universal
jurisdiction in certain cases) over a person suspected of certain categories of crimes or…extradite
the person to a State able and willing to do so or…surrender the person to an international
criminal court with jurisdiction over the suspect and the crime.”526 Although certainly more
restrictive than the District Court’s opinion, the Supreme Court’s reading affirmed the naturalist
right of universal jurisdiction, insofar as no other state requested Eichmann’s extradition, and no
international criminal court as-yet existed.
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Part II
IV. Superior Orders
Kelsen distinguishes acts performed under superior command from that of acts of state. He
writes:
The fact that an act is an act of State constitutes, in the first place, a problem of general
international law, which, as a rule, excludes individual responsibility for an act of State.
The fact that an act is performed at a superior command constitutes a problem of national
criminal law.527

Individuals accused of crimes committed under superior command are held responsible only,
it would seem, if acted out independent of an official state role. The critical issue here is whether
obligations to superior orders and acts of state can be assessed on the same plane by a court of a
foreign state acting under international law. “Responsibility for acts performed at superior
command [remain] a specific problem of criminal law, not of international law.”528 A two-edged
defense would therefore remain a viable option under pure theory, which could potentially
immunize those in high ranking positions, who claim absolution under the AoSD, while
simultaneously protecting those in subordinate positions who plead immunity from prosecution
under the superior orders defense.529 Another possible outcome is that no liability could ever be
attributable to those in lower rankings following the instructions of their immediate superiors,
since those in higher ranking positions already absolved those lower down in the organizational
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hierarchy under the AoSD. Even in exceptional cases, such as treason, a subordinate would
seemingly be absolved from international prosecution.530 Nevertheless, as has been described in
the previous case study, Kelsen’s application of retroactive lawmaking in instances where
offenses were so egregious as to make state officials “morally responsible,” and hence criminally
culpable, warrants a re-evaluation of his position on superior orders prosecution.
The Trial chamber suppressed the plea of obedience to superior orders under Article 8 of the
NNCL531. While the court of first instance made passing references to the denial of this defense
in the London Charter and Control Council Law No. 10532, for example, the Supreme Court of
Israel embarked on a detailed survey of international law, including its relationship to the AoSD,
to justify the NNCL’s denial of the superior orders defense. The Supreme Court of Israel
resolved that the reason for the strict application of Article 8 was predicated on two distinct
arguments against the application of the superior orders defense: (a) the Fuhrer Principle or
‘leadership principle’, which granted Hitler’s will the force of law, created a reductio ad
absurdum, and (b) ‘criminal consciousness’ could be deduced from Eichmann’s commission of
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atrocities on the magnitude of crimes against the Jews and crimes against humanity.533
These two arguments were famously subject to forceful criticism in Eichmann in Jerusalem.
The claim, according to Arendt, that Hitler’s “oral pronouncements…were the basic law of the
land,” and hence “within this ‘legal’ framework, every order contrary in letter or spirit to a word
spoken by Hitler was by definition, unlawful,”534 indicated that Eichmann considered it his duty
to obey Hitler’s law, even when his more immediate superiors commanded otherwise. Since
“these crimes undeniably took place within a ‘legal’ order,”535 according to Arendt, “it was not
[his] fanaticism but his very conscience that prompted Eichmann to adopt his uncompromising
attitude.”536 In this case, Eichmann’s “conscience” required that he not deviate from the rules of
the legal order in which he found himself. The court’s determination that Eichmann possessed
“criminal consciousness” of the “magnitude of crimes against the Jews and…humanity,”537
ignored the fact that his “conscience,” according to Arendt, was arguably also heavily influenced
by Hitler’s decrees. His belief that the source of law or Hitler’s pronouncements caused him to
“always act[] against his ‘inclinations’ whether they were sentimental or inspired by interest, that
he had always done his ‘duty’”538 bears on a fuller assessment of Eichmann’s culpability. The
correspondence between Arendt’s and Kelsen’s emphasis on ‘inclination’ and ‘duty’ will be
discussed after a general evaluation of the court’s test of manifest illegality.
V. The Test of Manifest Illegality
The Supreme Court of Israel “indirectly added its voice to the chorus of proponents of the
manifest illegality principle as the generally acceptable criterion for establishing criminal
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responsibility under international law in case of compliance with orders.”539 While the Supreme
Court found Eichmann “fully conscious at the time that he was a party to the perpetration of the
most grave and horrible crimes,”540 it nevertheless was impelled to ‘add its voice’ to the issue of
“whether moral choice was in fact possible”541 under international law.
Choosing a middle path between, on the one hand, the doctrine of respondeat superior,
which categorically relieved soldiers of responsibility to superior orders by attributing culpability
solely to the commanding officer, and on the other, absolute responsibility, or imputation of ICR
to those on the receiving end of orders,542 the Supreme Court recognized the difficulties both of
maintaining “good order in the disciplinary body” and “the damage that [would] be caused to the
public by the offence involved in carrying out the order…”543 Subject to two jurisdictions, a
soldier risked the possibility that he might face a court martial for disobeying the orders of his
commanding officer or else if he carried out orders and they proved to be illegal, “he would be
liable to punishment under…general criminal law.”544 According to Section 11 of the NNCL:

In determining the punishment of a person convicted of an offence under this Law, the court
may take into account, as grounds for mitigating the punishment, the following
circumstances: (a) that the person committed the offence under conditions which…would
have exempted him from criminal responsibility or constituted a reason for pardoning the
Yoram Dinstein, The Defence of "Obedience to Superior Orders" in International Law (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff,
1965), 67.
540
Recounting Eichmann’s reply to District Court of Jerusalem Judge Halevi: “…I already at that time realized that
this solution by the use of force was something illegal, something terrible, but to my regret, I was obliged to deal
with it in matters of transportation, because of my oath of loyalty from which I was not released.” The Nizkor
Project, “The Eichmann Trial (Second Instance),” B’nai Brith.
http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi/people/e/eichmann.adolf/ftp.cgi?people/e/eichmann.adolf//transcripts/Appeal/AppealSession-07-07 (accessed December 15, 2014)
541
Ibid.
542
Yoram Dinstein, The Defence of "Obedience to Superior Orders" in International Law (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff,
1965), 8.
543
The Nizkor Project, “The Eichmann Trial (Second Instance),” B’nai Brith.
http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi/people/e/eichmann.adolf/ftp.cgi?people/e/eichmann.adolf//transcripts/Appeal/AppealSession-07-07 (accessed December 15, 2014)
544
Ibid.
539

187

offence, and that (b) he did his best to reduce the gravity of the consequences of the
offence545.

The District Court determined, based on the defendant’s own testimony, that he had seen “in
this murder, in the extermination of Jews, the gravest crimes in the history of humanity.” 546
Eichmann, therefore, “did not do his best to reduce the gravity of the consequences of the
offence,” and admittedly knew that his acts were “unlawful, something terrible.”547 Section 11
stipulating mitigation of punishment therefore did not apply, according to the pronouncement of
the District Court judges, since Eichmann was fully aware of the immorality of his actions.548
The District Court confined its analysis of the manifest illegality test chiefly to local
rulings. The massacre at the Arab village of Kfar Kassem, for instance, underscores the limits by
which soldiers claiming respondeat superior could invoke an absolute defense.549 The case
hinged on the orders of Israel Defense Forces brigade commander Colonel Issachar Shadmi, who
insisted that Israeli border police officers and soldiers in a district comprised of a complex of
twelve villages, including Kfar Kassem, institute a new nightly curfew to begin at 5PM and end
at 6AM at the start of the 1956 Suez War. Concerned that Jordan would join forces with Egypt in
attacking Israel as part of the war effort, and that Arab villagers from the Central District or
“Triangle” in the Jordanian border region of Israel might link up with enemy troops, Shadmi
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gave the order to enforce the new curfew on October 29, 1956 at 3:30 PM when several hundred
villagers of Kfar Kassem were still out in the fields unaware that an order had been put into
effect.
One Palestinian witness described the situation, which resulted in the deaths of 49 Arab
civilians, including men, women and children:
We talked to them. We asked if they wanted our identity cards. They didn't. Suddenly
one of them said, 'Cut them down' - and they opened fire on us like a flood.550

No villagers outside of Kfar Kassem were shot, because local commanders ordered their
platoons to hold fire, breaching the instructions set by Shadmi. Even in Kfar Kassem, only one
unit followed Shadmi’s order, which resulted in 1958 in charges brought against eleven border
police men and soldiers, including Shadmi and Major Shmuel Malinki, the latter directly
responsible for overseeing the village curfew.
Quoting the judgment, the District Court in Jerusalem acknowledged that for manifest
illegality to exist there must be “a black flag over the order…as a warning reading ‘Prohibited!’”
Cases where a belligerent opened fired on its enemy’s sick conveyed by an International Red
Cross (IRC) ambulance where the sign of the cross was clearly visible would constitute, for
instance, a ‘black flag’.“[A] certain and imperative unlawfulness appearing on the face of the
order or of the acts ordered, an unlawfulness which pierces the eye and revolts the heart, if the
eye is not blind and the heart not obtuse or corrupted”551 was the natural human response to the
illegality of positive orders.552
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The compulsion to act under the threat of persecution to a subordinate’s own life was the
standard that the Appeals Chamber interpreted as the test by which an accused could be granted
mitigation of punishment. The danger to his life, however, would need to be imminent, and he
could have no method of saving himself from direct punishment.553 The test amounted to a
question of mens rea, defined as the criminal intent or “the state of mind indicating culpability,
which was required by statute as an element of a crime.”554 Was the defendant coerced to act a
certain way or did he know that what he was doing was wrong when he was ordered to act? The
Supreme Court stated that “when the will of the doer merges with the will of the superior in the
execution of the illegal act, the doer may not plead duress under superior orders.”555556557

recognized the defense of superior orders, especially as pertained to the laws of war. The British and American
Military Code of 1914 assigned responsibility solely to the commanding officer under respondeat superior. Only in
the 1921 Llandovery Castle case, did the Supreme Court of Germany rule on the lawfulness of obeying patently
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case, the German submarine, the U-86, torpedoed a British hospital ship, the Llandovery Castle. Lieutenant Helmut
Patzig, the submarine commander, acted against the known-interests of his superiors, instructing his crew to open
fire not only on the vessel conveying sick patients, but several lifeboats that had managed to be launched after the
attack. While Patzig was not apprehended, two of his officers, Ludwig Dithmar and John Boldt, faced prosecution.
The defendants’ claimed that they were merely following Patzig’s orders. The court in turn responded that in most
instances the military subordinate must not question the order of his superior officer, “but that no such confidence
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VI. Critique of ‘Manifest Illegality’
Does the criterion of manifest illegality apply to crimes legalized by the state? Neither
was Eichmann a common soldier, nor had he acted within a normal legal framework. What was
illegal under ordinary circumstances was legal under Hitler’s rule. Moreover, the Jerusalem
court, according to both Kelsen and Arendt, confused intention, inclination or desire with
behavior or action. A Kantian description that granted “no true moral worth” 558 to actions
performed out of inclination, distorted a conception of ICR based on the perceived lawfulness of
the orders delegated to Eichmann. Arendt writes:

And just as the law in civilized countries assumes that the voice of conscience tells
everybody ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ even though man’s natural desires and inclinations may
at times be murderous, so the law of Hitler’s land demanded that the voice of conscience
tell everybody: ‘Thou shalt kill,’ although the organizers of the massacres knew full well
that murder is against normal desires and inclinations of most people. Evil in the Third
Reich had lost the quality by which most people recognize it—the quality of
temptation.559
Informed by the law of Nazi Germany, which was decidedly not “civilized”560 and where
only exceptional men and women could withstand the behavioral pressures of fascist rule, a
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Nazi’s conscience, according to Arendt, could not so easily distinguish “manifest illegality.” The
court’s criterion presupposed the doctrine associated with Kant’s moral philosophy, which,
according to Kelsen, meant “that only conduct directed against inclination or egoistic interest is
of any moral value.”561 “Bound up with man’s faculty of judgment, which rules out blind
obedience,”562 and does not license through the categorical imperative “theft or murder…because
the thief or murderer cannot conceivably wish to live under a legal system that would give others
the right to rob or murder him,”563 Kant nevertheless, according to Kelsen, obscures the fact that
“this crime [was] not an ordinary murder but what [Arendt] calls an ‘administrative
massacre.’”564 As such, “this is a new crime, one that depends less on being able to establish
psychological intentions than on describing politically organized modes of uncritical obedience.
In this sense, Eichmann himself is a new kind of person or an unprecedented sort of criminal,
and so the mechanisms and terms of justice have to be rethought and remade in order to address
this new situation.”565
Before entering into a discussion of how Kelsen’s retroactive methodology is relevant to
Arendt’s determination that Eichmann, in spite of his “uncritical obedience” to Nazi regulations,
was to be found guilty, it is necessary to linger on the question of the relationship between law
and intentionality. The question, writes Arendt, is whether “a feeling of lawfulness [lies] deep
within every human conscience...A striking feature of the Israeli court’s line of argument is that
the concept of a sense of justice grounded in the depths of every man is presented solely as a
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substitute for familiarity with the law.”566
Eichmann understood the rules of the Nazi legal order. Any decision to turn to
conscience was therefore superfluous. In accordance with the court’s expectation that a soldier
be capable of distinguishing regular from irregular rules, Eichmann knew legally what his
conscience only confirmed. For example, in clear violation of Reichsführer of
the Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadron SS) Adolph Himmler’s order to stop the deportation of
Hungary’s Jews from Budapest to Auschwitz in July 1944, Eichmann, on the pretext that Hitler
would have supported furtherance of the extermination process, ignored Himmler’s more
immediate orders.567 “He did not abide by Himmler’s orders,” writes Arendt, “but rather
followed a “version of Kant ‘for the household use of the little man”568 based on the will of the
Fuhrer. For Eichmann, adherence to Hitler’s words meant identifying his own will with the
principle source of law in Nazi Germany—the Fuhrer Principle (or grundnorm in Kelsenian
terminology). As Arendt describes it, “he had always acted against his ‘inclinations’ whether
they were sentimental or inspired by interest, that he had always done his duty.”569
Eichmann operated under a criminal, if legal, regime where “a huge shower of regulations
and directives, all drafted by expert lawyers and legal advisers…”570 followed the Fuhrer’s
orders for the Final Solution. By shifting the focus from motivation to behavior, Kelsen asserts,
“each is able to insist that a person, who acts “’from duty’ or ‘respect for law’, acts from
inclination; for he acts in this way because he finds an inner pleasure in obeying the law, because
the consciousness of acting lawfully or dutifully gives him ‘inner pleasure’.”571 Kant’s assertion
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that an individual act “from inclination [who] finds [inner] pleasure” in acting a certain way, 572
does not, therefore, preclude the prospect of “inner pleasure” in obeying the law. Morality is
inner directed, according to Kant, “insofar as [the laws of freedom] are directed to mere external
actions and the lawfulness of such action…are called juridical.”573 Kelsen insists that “this
means that ‘legality’, too, is agreement with moral laws. Legal norms are moral norms; and so
moral norms refer to external actions; there is, however, a moral norm prescribing that one
should act, not from inclination, but from respect for the law.”574
VII. Retroactive Methodology
Although Kelsen claims that law does not represent a “moral minimum,”575 and
contemporary Kelsenian Jorg Kammerhofer affirms that since there are no moral absolutes the
normative imperative “You ought to commit genocide”576 is a statement reconcilable with a pure
theoretical cognition of law, there is nevertheless convincing reason to believe that Kelsen would
have licensed Eichmann’s prosecution. Even if murder is “performed against [ones] inclination,”
it is forbidden, if the social order deems it illegal. Kelsen writes:

It is not any conduct you please that can be moral, so long as it is carried out contrary to
inclination or egoistic interest. If somebody obeys another’s order to commit a murder, his
act can have no moral value, even though performed against his inclination or egoistic
interest, so long as the murder is forbidden, i.e., deemed of negative value, by the social order
assumed to prevail.577

Since Kelsen entitled IMT judges, for example, to enforce retroactive laws criminalizing
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Nazi offenses based on a criterion of “moral responsibility,” presumably he would have similarly
licensed Eichmann’s prosecution. Did his commentary on the Nuremberg trial not suggest the
illegality of crimes against humanity? Even if he did not believe that at the time of the Eichmann
proceedings the scope of illegality had expanded to incorporate international licensing of
prosecution for crimes of the magnitude of Eichmann’s acts as manifested in provisions
associated with the Genocide convention (1948)578, Kelsen would certainly have granted Israel
the right to judge Eichmann’s immoral acts on retroactive grounds.
Chapter three argued that Kelsen deserves credit for de-linking the Nuremberg trial from
criminalization of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and in turn placing international criminal law on a
firm legal foundation free of the war-nexus requirement. The same can methodological
innovation can likewise be applied to this case. Ex post facto lawmaking is the means by which
Kelsen intercedes against objections based on his own strict evaluation of the AoSD and superior
orders defense. While Kammerhofer may have a point with regard to a national legal order’s
licensing of individual responsibility for genocidal acts at the time of their commission, there is
no reason to assume that state officials will not eventually be held accountable in accordance
with international law for such acts. Kelsen repeatedly makes this point.579 Kelsen writes:

Since the internationally illegal acts for which the London Agreement established
individual criminal responsibility were certainly also morally most objectionable, and the
persons who committed these acts were certainly aware of their immoral character, the
retroactivity of the law applied to them can hardly be considered as absolutely
incompatible with justice. Justice required the punishment of these men, in spite of the
“Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (December 9, 1948),” The Avalon
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fact that under positive law they were not punishable at the time they performed the acts
made punishable with retroactive force.580 (my emphasis)
While Servatius described Kelsen’s position as clearly supporting his client’s immunity,
Attorney General Gideon Hausner argued before the Appellate Court that:

In 1947, Hans Kelsen…the last important survivor of the conservative approach,
concludes that the principle of individual responsibility for crimes committed within the
framework of the state is a loftier expression of justice than reliance on laws which
ostensibly allowed those crimes to be perpetrated.581

The Attorney General thus countered Servatius’ claim that Kelsen would find the
Eichmann proceedings illegitimate. While according to a formal logic any illegal acts that
Eichmann may have committed could not be considered a violation of international law because
no punishment for individuals was specified in a treaty signed by Germany, Kelsen also asserted
that if an “act was at the moment of its performance morally, although not legally wrong,”582 an
ad hoc court like Nuremberg’s ought to have the right to prosecute.
Hausner states that “[Kelsen] admits that where two principles collide, the principle of
basic justice on the one, and formalism on the other, justice must gain the upper hand.”583 This
statement of course runs counter to a traditional reading of pure theory. For how could Kelsen
implicate those responsible for core international crimes when he repeatedly implores jurists to
separate law from morality584 in constructing the AoSD?
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The argument that was introduced earlier focused on the centrality of Kelsen’s
description of the AoSD in defense of Eichmann. However, Kelsen recognized that, though
exceptional, “acts which were illegal though not criminal at the time they were committed,”585
such as international offenses that were “certainly…morally most objectionable,” were subject to
prosecution.586 The District Court was therefore right to speculate that it was “possible [that]
even according to Kelsen…there [was] no longer any basis for pleading ‘act[s] of State’”587. In
judging that there was “clearly no principle of international law embodying the maxim against
retroactivity of criminal law,”588 the Jerusalem court reaffirmed Kelsen’s major doctrinal
contribution to the changing notion of ICR. Kelsen wrote that no rule of general customary
international law existed “forbidding the enactment of norms with retrospective force…,”589 and
therefore war criminals could be tried retrospectively since the “act was at the moment of its
performance morally, although not legally wrong.” Notwithstanding Kammerhofer’s statement,
there is no reason to suggest that Eichmann would have been protected from prosecution.
Like Kelsen, Arendt states that “what [Eichmann] had done was a crime only in
retrospect….” and that his offenses “violate[d]… only formally, not substantially, the principle
nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.”590 As with the 1945 London Agreement, which produced
the IMT charter, Israel’s Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law of 1950 was valid, she
claimed, because of the type of crime: genocide.591 As a consequence of its application to
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persecutions of national minorities, crimes against humanity encompassed a similar subject
matter jurisdiction at Nuremberg as the genocide charge. The substantive element of Eichmann’s
crimes, consequently, warranted the attribution of international criminal responsibility under
universal jurisdiction.592As with Kelsen’s earlier criticism of the jurisdictional authority of allies
at Nuremberg, Arendt’s polemic against the Jewish state as creating a form of victor’s justice593
in prosecuting Eichmann was superfluous. She already believed that Eichmann deserved to be
prosecuted due to the gravity of his offense; a retroactive methodology similar to the one
articulated by Kelsen was the means by which the court, according to Arendt, could legitimately
hold him accountable.
VII. Freedom and Causality
This last section speculates on Kelsen’s view of Eichmann’s guilt, given his
circumscribed notion of ‘agency’. Given that the phrase ‘banality of evil’ is so enmeshed with
the case against Eichmann, Arendt’s approach to judgment must be considered, if briefly,
alongside Kelsen’s. The intention is not to provide a definitive account of Arendt’s views on
Eichmann’s capacity to judge, but to furnish a deeper understanding of Kelsen’s much-neglected
contributions to this case.
As “the normative relations between the two elements of the legal norm—delict and
sanction,”594 imputation possesses a degree of precision, according to Kelsen, that responsibility
does not.595 “Whereas the concept of responsibility links the behavior to the person, imputation,

Ibid., 275.
Ibid., 169-171.
594
William Ebenstein, “The Pure Theory of Law: Demythologizing Legal Thought,” California Law Review 59, no.
3 (May 1971): 635.
595
Ibid., 635.
592
593

198

by contrast, links a certain behavior, the delict, to the sanction.”596 Therefore, as with his
structural account of the “concept of ‘imputation’ [which] removes the notion of ‘the criminal’—
with its existential and moralizing undertones—and replaces it with the morally neutral concept
of a set of circumstances or specific delict that ought to be followed by a sanction,”597 judgment
is circumscribed by societal regulation. Similarly, ‘freedom’ must be understood as separate
from the ‘willing’ element traditionally associated with ‘agency’.598 Kelsen writes:
Freedom is ordinarily understood to be the opposite of causal determinacy. That which is
not subject to the law of causality is held to be free. That the human will is free is
understood to mean that it is not causally determined…It is understood to assume that
only man’s freedom, the fact that his will is not subject to the causal law, makes it
possible to hold him to account. But the very opposite is the case. Man is not held to
account because he is free; he is free because he is held to account. Accounting and
freedom are indeed essentially connected with each other.599

A legal order that performs its function effectively channels the ‘will’. It motivates or
induces individuals under threat of coercion to behave in accordance with conduct indirectly
prescribed by the legal order. Though still part of the chain of causality, behavior is effectively
regulated, so that individuals are inclined or desire to ‘will’ what the coercive social order
specifies as right legal conduct. Consequently, individuals “‘will’ what they legally ought to do,
and their will thus become a cause of their actions in conformity with the law.”600
Having no choice but to be born into a coercive order pre-structured by a set of legal
values that strictly regulate human behavior, Kelsen diminishes the capacity for human agency.
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Arendt, in contrast, emphasizes the practice of thinking, a cognate of judgment, which though
distinguishable in her later writings,601 is here used interchangeably to indicate a “broadened way
of thinking”602 or “enlarged mentality.”603 Reconciling Kelsen and Arendt’s divergent views on
the capacity to judge, this section closes with a shared affirmation of the “principle of tolerance,”
which Eichmann violated in his attack on the “plurality of humanity”604.
While Arendt’s critique of the court’s criterion of “manifest illegality” aligns with
Kelsens’s, including criticism of the Kantian differentiation between inclinations, interests and
desires, on the one hand, and the law on the other, she states that “[Eichmann] functioned in the
role of prominent war criminal as well as he had under the Nazi regime; he had not the slightest
difficulty in accepting an entirely different set of rules. He knew that what he had once
considered his duty was now called a crime; and he accepted this new code of judgment as
though it was nothing but another language rule.”605 While agreeing with Kelsen that the law’s
function is “to induce men to be motivated by ideas in accordance with the conduct indirectly
prescribed by the legal order,”606 Arendt “faults Eichmann for his failure to be critical of positive
law, that is, his failure to take distance from the requirements that law and policy imposed on
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him; in other words, she faults him for his obedience, his lack of critical distance, or his failure to
think.”607
In contrast, Kelsen assumes that to be effective, positive law must not only regulate
behavior in a certain manner but must influence the faculty of judgment. But adhering to law,
even bad laws, as Kelsen writes, can also be construed as a moral act, since the peaceful ordering
of a given society (i.e., “justice as peace”) is of supreme value.608 While judgment may be
caused by other moral or religious social norms, it is preponderantly derived from the threat of
coercive measure—or the law. The capacity to judge is consequently informed by a chain of
causality stemming from the structured, often legal, norms of a given society.
Like Kelsen, Arendt recognizes that causality and freedom are not easily disassociated.609
But she does not agree with Kelsen’s position that “man is free because, and to the extent that, he
is ‘imputable,’ that is, because legal consequences can be attached to his actions.”610 Such causal
reductionism is irreconcilable with her distinction between practical reason and obedience.
Notwithstanding her critique of Eichmann’s claim that his duty derived from Kant’s universal
moral precept that the principle of his will could become the principle of general laws, which she
asserted “was outrageous, on the face of it, and also incomprehensible, since Kant’s moral
philosophy is so closely bound up with man’s faculty of judgment, which rules out blind
obedience,”611 she nevertheless departs from Kant’s notion of practical reason.612 Rather than
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subscribing to Kant’s idea of judgment, "as the faculty of thinking the particular under the
universal," where a universal morality is known in advance and the particular follows,613 Arendt
describes Socrates’ tentative approach614 as a ‘model’615 of the thinking man, who engages his
fellow citizens in conversations about ‘perplexing’616 matters. In Thinking and Moral
Considerations: A Lecture, Socrates is set up as the anti-Eichmann. Arendt comments:

Socrates…who is commonly said to have believed in the teachability of virtue, seems
indeed to have held that talking and thinking about piety, justice, courage, and the rest
were liable to make men more pious, more just, more courageous, even though they were
not given either definitions or ‘values' to direct their further conduct.617

Arendt uses three similes—the gadfly, the midwife and the electric ray—to describe
Socrates618 and his method of social inquiry. The gadfly attempts to awaken his fellow citizen
slumbering in the dark, to examine the unexamined life; the midwife, whose main function in
ancient Greece was to decide on whether a baby should live or die just as Socrates was known to
“purge[] people of their ‘opinions,’ that is, of those unexamined prejudgments which prevent
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thinking”619; and the electric ray, which ‘paralyzes’, as opposed to ‘arouses’ like the gadfly,
reaffirms the importance of “remain[ing] steadfast with [one’s] own perplexities.”620
Arendt insists that ‘banality of evil’ was not meant as a ‘thesis’ or ‘doctrine’ but to
indicate a distinction from the common use of the word ‘evil’ as signifying radical forms of
depravity.621 While traditionally associated with the sins of ‘pride’ and ‘envy’, ‘weakness’, ‘the
powerful hatred wickedness feels for sheer goodness’ or ‘covetousnes’, Eichmann’s ‘evil’ “was
quite ordinary, commonplace, and neither demonic nor monstrous.”622 When confronted with
routines that deviated from the normal course of acting, he resorted to standard bureaucratic
language, clichés. “It was not stupidity,” she writes, “but thoughtlessness.”623
Standardized expressions immunize us to a reality full of surprise; Eichmann’s habitual
use of stock phrases protected him from the arduous task of thinking. Arendt asks:
Might the problem of good and evil, our faculty for telling right from wrong, be
connected with our faculty of thought?... Could the activity of thinking as such, the habit
of examining whatever happens to come to pass or attract attention, regardless of results
and specific contents, could this activity be among the conditions that make men abstain
from evildoing or even actually 'condition' them against it?624

The capacity for critical distance, and, with it, moral judgment, coincides with Arendt’s
phenomenological inclination, where, circumspect of traditional political, moral and legal
theoretical ‘concepts’, she instead prefers to return to "to the things themselves" (zu den Sachen
selbst).625 Kelsen’s pure theoretical methodology—with its formal conceptualization of
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imputation or legal responsibility would therefore seem ill-fitted to Arendt’s approach. By
presupposing legal norms as predominating the faculty of thought, Kelsen’s structural approach
indicates a lack of agency.
To locate the agent one must search specifically in Kelsen’s writings on war crimes
prosecution. In “The Rule Against Ex Post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War
Criminals,” he writes:
Even if the atrocities are covered by municipal law, or have the character of acts of State
and hence do not constitute individual criminal responsibility, they are certainly open
violations of the principles of morality generally recognized by civilized peoples and
hence were, at least, morally not innocent or indifferent when they were
committed…There can be little doubt that, according to the public opinion of the
civilized world, it is more important to bring the war criminals to justice than to respect,
in their trial, the rule against ex post facto law, which has merely a relative value, and
consequently, was never unrestrictedly recognized.626

With this statement, Kelsen affirms a ‘moral minimum’, which he otherwise denies.627
He begins by focusing on ‘the atrocities’, which are “open violations of the principles of morality
generally recognized by civilized peoples.”628 But Kelsen does not discount that the acts were
also “morally not innocent or indifferent when they were committed.”629 This suggests agency
that Kelsen generally excludes from his pure description. “In defining imputation as the
normative relation between delict and sanction, according to Ebenstein, “Kelsen…removes an
element of morality and natural law thinking implied in the traditional concept of
responsibility.”630 But the evaluation of whether an act is “morally…indifferent when they were
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committed,”631 presupposes someone ought to know that he is acting in violation of “principles
of morality generally recognized by civilized peoples.”632
At the end of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt suggests that even if it “was nothing more
than misfortune that made [Eichmann] a willing instrument in the organization of mass
murder,”633 he still ought to be punished for the crimes of genocide. She writes:
[T]here still remains the fact that…just as you supported and carried out a policy of not
wanting to share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other
nations—as though you and your superiors had any right to determine who should and
who should not inhabit the world—we find that no one, that is, no member of the human
race, can be expected to want to share the earth with you.634
The principles of morality that Kelsen invokes depends on civilizational ‘standards’.
Genocide—and the principle of tolerance that prevention necessitates—must be the ‘moral
minimum’. But it is not clear if agency can be fully restored to Kelsen’s interpretation of the
parameters of judgment or if the atrocity is what makes a war criminal like Eichmann culpable.
IX. Conclusion
This case study focused on pure theoretical contributions to the changing notion of
international criminal responsibility at the trial of Adolph Eichmann in Jerusalem. At the time of
the 1961 proceedings, Kelsen’s prodigious commentary on international criminal law and his
legacy as a scholar who influenced practice at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
had been well-documented. However, aside from an unresolved footnote in Principles of
International Law (1967), he left no direct evidence regarding the case.
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In analyzing trial transcripts where Kelsen is invoked by court practitioners as a leading
international publicist, it is possible to recreate a pure theoretical view of Eichmann’s culpability.
He is both drawn upon by defense counsel in order to reaffirm a traditional notion of the acts of
state doctrine, and prosecutors and judges as an advocate of a higher principle of justice based on
retroactive lawmaking for acts deemed morally irresponsible. The significance of re-visiting this
case is not only important in terms of filling a historical gap but provides insight into the
philosophical question of agency with respect to Hannah Arendt’s commentary on the ‘banality
of evil’ where under conditions of terror most comply with the norms of the national legal order.
Like Arendt, Kelsen would certainly have contested the court’s criterion of “manifest
illegality.” Individuals accused of war crimes were expected to disregard the orders of their
superiors when those orders patently deviated from the law in conformity with Kant’s ethical
doctrine that only conduct directed against ‘inclination’ is of any moral value. But what if an
individual’s inclination is to observe the law of his legal order, even if the grundnorm is the
Fuhrer Principle?
As Kelsen often observed, if the law is to be effective it must forge behaviors that
conform to the coercive norms of a given social order. Freedom, normally understood to be the
opposite of causal determinacy, is the end point to a chain of causality or imputation that consists
of a delict and sanction. Rather than accepting the traditional view that acts of state, a
personification of the duties that officials are ordered to perform, comprises the sum total of
Kelsen’s vision—mechanistic or deterministic—Kelsen also affirms that when acts are “morally
most objectionable, and the persons who committed these acts were certainly aware of their
immoral character, the retroactivity of the law applied to them can hardly be considered as
absolutely incompatible with justice.”
206

This case study followed from a reconceptualization of the acts of state doctrine to a
Kelsenian exploration of agency under superior orders arguing that while Kelsen would not have
subscribed to the court’s criterion of “manifest illegality,” like Arendt he would have found
Eichmann guilty for having committed core international crimes.
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In the history of international criminal law, international tribunals have done more than
merely give jural imprimatur to norms in waiting and have been much more than mere
‘evidential sources’ of customary law. In effect, taking advantage of the…indeterminacy
of customary law, international courts and tribunals, not least the ad hoc Tribunals, have
often acted as ‘customary midwives’…so that international criminal law may owe more
to judges than any other part of international law.635

Chapter 5
Judgment in the Post-Cold War Era: The Decline of Formalism in the Mirror of Pure
Theory
I. Introduction
As with previous case studies on Hans Kelsen’s contributions to the changing notion of ICR,
including the author of pure theory’s validation, based on retroactive lawmaking in violation of
principles of legality, of international criminal prosecution at the Nuremberg IMT (chapter
three), and the universal jurisdictional application, in accordance with pure theory, of standards
ascribed to “the international community” at the trial of Adolph Eichmann in Jerusalem for acts
of state of the magnitude of crimes against humanity (chapter four),636 this chapter emphasizes
how a purposive judicial logic, which focuses on the core humanitarian element instantiating the
purpose or intention of the ICL regime, may be reconciled with Kelsen’s structural account of
imputation.
Kelsen’s endorsement of discretionary powers for ICL judges, in accordance with a
hierarchically-delegated normative schema, is especially pronounced in the post-Cold War era
where customary international law, a traditionally indeterminate international law source, has
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been mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as sponsor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). Although this chapter does not claim to be an
exhaustive account of judicial lawmaking at the ICTY, the choice to emphasize this tribunal, as
representative of the turn to expressly purposive hermeneutics in the post-Cold War era,
animates the broader narrative arc. Application of Kelsen’s theoretical approach, once again
demonstrates a progressive commitment to the regulation of barbarous acts of state.
In the Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of the ICTY, judges were
instructed to only apply those legal norms that were beyond doubt part of customary
international law637. In contrast, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was
empowered to also use treaty law, regardless of whether it conformed to existing custom.638 As a
result, the ICTR is a less compelling test case than the ICTY for flexible construction, since
decision-making at Arusha has not demonstrated the same potential for extracting the moral
claim on responsibility that an unwritten identification of law dealing exclusively with custom
would.
The Report of the Secretary General states that:
In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the principle nullum crimen sine
lege requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of international
humanitarian law which are beyond doubt part of customary law so that the problem of
adherence of some, but not all States to specific conventions does not arise. This would
appear to be particularly important in the context of an international tribunal prosecuting
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.639
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), presented
3.5 1993, (S/25704), para. 34.
638
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639
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Part II reviews Kelsen's theoretical contributions to customary international law
application. In the modern approach, opinio juris emphasizes statements rather than actions,
depending on the “intention” of states to elicit the meaning of custom. The author of Pure
Theory’s neo-Kantian epistemological project, in contrast, endorses state practice as the
exclusive element of customary international law, in accordance with a de-psychologized
description of responsibility that is meant to disregard the legal subject’s “intention”. Those
critics who assert that Kelsen viewed international law as inevitably progressing away from the
use of custom as a determinant source, however, are incorrect.640 Part II endorses the claim that
Kelsen champions the supremacy of this highly flexible “meta-norm” in order to shore up
structural limitations associated with this sphere.641 As a result, Part II focuses on why Kelsen
remains relevant as a seminal international legal publicist for the post-Cold War era where
customary construction, vital to the development of ICR, is employed in a highly creative
fashion.642
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The tension observed in previous chapters between, on the one hand, Kelsen’s general
advocacy of the principle of legality’s rule against ex post facto lawmaking, and on the other, his
endorsement of retroactive laws based on principles of morality for crimes of the magnitude of
crimes against humanity and genocide, reasserts itself anew at the ICTY. Although Kelsen’s
moral emphasis seems counter-intuitive, as pure theory limited the customary scope of judicial
interpretation to the “frame” derived from an examination of actual state practice, Part III
nevertheless emphasizes how Kelsen’s theory is reconcilable with extra-legal judicial decisionmaking.
Historian and legal scholar Jeremy Telman writes that:
Within the law of interpretation, Kelsen acknowledges that the norm is but a frame. Legal
norms provide the frame within which various interpretations can arise, but those
interpretations do not involve cognition and application of higher norms but exercises of will
in the furtherance of legal policy. Judges resolve issues within the framework of the legal
norm by consulting non legal normative systems.643

In recognizing international judges, including representatives of national or hybrid courts
as authorized by state parties to decide on the degree of culpability for once-valid acts of state,
Part III emphasizes Kelsen’s view on the supremacy of discretionary judicial interpretation.
Unlike Judith Shklar’s position that Kelsen’s legal philosophy remains thoroughly “formalist,”644
this section, follows Kelsen scholar Stanley Paulson’s distinction between the “scientific” frame
of legal normativity conforming with pure theoretical cognition, and non-formal or “authentic”
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judicial interpretation, which Kelsen readily endorses. Kelsen’s embrace of Hermann
Kantorowicz’s “free law” methodology resembles the broad interpretive scope professed by
American legal realism, a camp that Shklar professes to admire.645
While “scientific” legal cognition provides a frame for valid interpretation of
international law sources, these sources are informed by the structural position of the judge in the
stupenfau or hierarchy of delegation described in chapter two. Once judges of core international
crimes are authorized to decide cases introduced through treaty ratification by state parties, acts
of state are subsequently deprived of their immunizing quality. This would include tribunals
sponsored by the UNSC and authorized by the implied consent of all members of the United
Nations. The UNSC is further animated by the normative authority of Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.646 The judicial ruling, whether it deviates from the pure theoretical “frame” of cognition
or not, in consequence, legitimately delegates responsibility.
Part IV reconciles Kelsen with the prevailing purposive interpretive methodology used in
post-Cold War cases before the ICTY. Through his support of “Free Law,” Kelsen grants judges’
wide scope for interpreting humanitarian violations specific to the material jurisdiction of this
sphere. In addition to providing theoretical legitimacy for the application of a purposive
approach, the particular problem of how to expand the parameters of international criminal
responsibility to incorporate “non-international armed conflict” is also reconciled by Kelsen
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through theoretical endorsement of an expanded conception of “international legal subjects”.
Perpetrators of humanitarian crimes, for example, who belong to the same state as victims, can
be tried, according to Kelsen, in accordance with new descriptions of “substantial relations”
based on “ethnic affiliation”. In addition to justifying the now-commonplace proposition that
ICL applies to non-international armed conflict, Kelsen furthers the prospect that “principles of
humanity” may be used as a purposive interpretive remedy, not in defiance of positive law
commitments, but in conjunction with permitted discretionary judgment.

II. Customary International Law from a Pure Theoretical Perspective
Customary international law is not a special department or area of public international law: it is
international law.”647
a. Traditional and Modern Approaches to CIL
“[W]hat distinguished custom amongst nations in public international law?” asks legal
philosopher David Bederman. “An answer may lie in the sheer volume, breadth, and density of
[customary international law] norms. Custom—as distinct from treaty obligations or the
application of inchoate ‘general principles of law’—continues to dictate broad swathes of
Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the
United Nations (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1998), 18. Brownlie (1932-2010), a highly regarded public international law
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international legal obligation.”648
Much of the post-World War II project of ensuring states protect the human rights and
dignities of their citizens, and that they observe restraint in their treatment of non-combatants in
war time, has been elucidated through customary international law. Yet “some jurisprudes,”
Bederman notes, “most famously Hans Kelsen—have maintained that, over time, treaty-based
sources of international norms will dominate over customary principles…” because of “a natural
tendency, as in any ‘mature’ legal system, for legislation to crowd out custom. One might,
therefore, believe that custom is actually waning as an influential or legitimate source for
international legal obligation.”649
While Bederman’s analysis underestimates the central role that custom plays for Kelsen in
validating international law, he is right to conclude that Kelsen saw treaties rather than
customary principles as the source of international law that would transform international law
from a “primitive” to a more “mature” system. The proof for this is the fact that Kelsen believed
that in time state legal organs would likely delegate their powers through treaties to international
organizations—creating the blueprint for a “a thoroughly legalized and institutionalized world
order.”650
Before examining the pure theoretical application of custom, which in addition to treaty law
is considered the only other valid source, according to Kelsen, in cognition of ICR651, this
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chapter briefly reviews the distinction between “traditional” and “modern” approaches to this
enduring source of international criminalization. Legal scholar Anthea Roberts, for example,
considers the fault line between, on the one hand, those approaches that elevate state practice to a
supreme position in the hierarchy of customary interpretation (“traditional”), and, on the other,
those that recognize that state practice, hard to detect and easy to renege, requires a more
subjective, extra-legal interpretive element (“modern”)652.
While the traditional approach to custom, says Roberts, is based on an inductive process
that is evolutionary and “derives from specific instances of state practice,”653 a modern approach
uses deduction that starts with a general statement—or principle shared by states—rather than
particular instances of practice.654 Opinio juris is emphasized in the modern approach to custom
where statements rather than actions often become the basis of interpretation in determining the
“intention” of states. Whereas the traditional approach is typically associated with an inductive
method and the consent of state parties, a modern consideration of customary international law is
linked with a deductive method and substantial principles of justice.655
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) defines international
custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”656 The phrase can be broken into
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two distinct units: (a) “evidence of a general practice” associated with state practice or “usage,”
and (b) “accepted as law” or the element concerned with opinio juris.657
Roberts describes modern customary international law as part of a deductive process that
emphasizes opinio juris—or the “accepted as law” element in Article 38. Opinio juris begins
with general statements of rules rather than specific instances of practice.658 The Merits decision
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in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua659 before the ICJ exemplifies
the thrust of this deductive approach, which becomes central to the moralization of customary
application in ICL beginning with the Tadic appeals court judgment660. Like Roberts, legal
scholar Anthony D'Amato distinguishes state practice as a form of action as opposed to opinio
juris, which he considers akin to statements, such as treaties and declarations about the legality
of action.661 The Filartiga v. Pena-Irala case662, in which the Second Circuit of the U.S. Court of
Appeals relied on UN General Assembly resolutions to determine violations of the “law[s] of
nations” confirming the right of the court to jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act,663 the
Nicaragua judgment derived customs of non-use of force and nonintervention from General
Assembly resolutions. The Nicaragua opinion determined that “In order to deduce the existence
of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of State should, in general, be
consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule
should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition
of a new rule.”664 The assumption of the court was that a state practice that deviated from the
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general statement condemning the non-use of force and nonintervention was not “recognition of
a new rule.” Similarly, in the Filartiga v. Pena-Irala case, since states—even those that practiced
torture—voted in the UN General Assembly for resolutions condemning state-sponsored torture,
the assumption was that opinio juris carried more weight than practice that diverged from the
articulations of those states' responsible for such abuse.
Legal scholar Frederick Kirgis re-orients the debate between traditional and modern
approaches by viewing each method along a sliding scale where “[t]he more destabilizing or
morally distasteful the activity—for example, the offensive use of force or the deprivation of
fundamental human rights—the more readily international decisionmakers will substitute one
element for the other...”665 Kelsen, who determines in a uniform manner the parameters of
custom based on what states actually “do” rather than pronouncements of “belief”, alters his
method in its application to human rights violations—specifically core international crimes— as
opposed to other international delicts. Chapter two argued that in order for retroactive lawmaking
to take full effect, a distinction would need to be made between laws pertaining to what
Blackstone describes as acts “indifferent in itself” and offenses on the magnitude of core
international crimes. Kelsen uses this statement of acts “indifferent in itself” to justify the
prosecution of acts which were not. Kirgis' sliding scale approach in consequence mirrors
Kelsen’s concern for the distinctively debased acts that comprise the substantive jurisdiction of
ICL.
b. The Pure Theory of Law and Custom
“Custom is, just like a legislative act, a mode for creating law,” writes Kelsen.666 The
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equivalence drawn by Kelsen between custom and legislation is qualified by the fact that in
legislation lawmakers are “conscious and deliberate,”667whereas in the creation of custom “men
do not necessarily know that they create by their conduct a rule of law, nor do they necessarily
intend to create law.”668 Custom encompasses the effect of conduct (i.e., state practice) that
individuals subject to the law create unconsciously through a decentralized process; whereas,
legislation is made through a centralized process by an organ that is “more or less”
distinguishable from those subject to the law.669
Treaties, or contracts between nations, resemble both legislation and custom. Similar to
the legislative process, a treaty is “conscious and deliberate” lawmaking. However, while a
legislative enactment is made by special organs who legislate in a stable legal environment, those
subject to treaties are the contracting parties themselves, which includes officials who transfer
responsibility to the “state”. While “conscious and deliberate,” treaties, which create law
applicable to the contracting parties only, are not the predominant source of international law.
“With respect to its validity,” treaty law, writes Kelsen, “is inferior to customary international
law.”670
Bederman's assessment of pure theoretical contributions are therefore misguided,
especially when he suggests that for Kelsen “there can be no real legal obligations for states in
following CIL rules.”671 Pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be kept”), attributed to
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international treaty law, is a norm, according to Kelsen, subordinate to the customary idea that
states ought to behave the way they customarily do in practice.672 Treaties alone do not
constitute a basic norm, or presupposed source from which international law derives, says
Kelsen. What grants each legal normative order or personified “state” the right to make treaties is
the fact that “agreements must be kept”; and “agreements must be kept” because a higher norm
dictates that “states ought to behave as they have customarily behaved.” Custom, for Kelsen,
constitutes general international law.
Bederman contests the accusation of contemporary critics of customary international law
like Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner,673 who use game-theoretical and rational choice models to
prove that there is no legal obligation for states to follow customary rules of international law.
“For Goldsmith and Posner,” Bederman writes, “to follow a [customary international law] norm
because of its inherent value (coincidence), or out of self-interest (cooperation and coordination),
or even because of fear of negative consequences (coercion) is inimical with its being a legal
rule.”674
These writers endorse a description that suggests that these norms are adhered to, not out
of a sense of legal obligation, but because it is beneficial to follow a customary norm. This
implies that Goldsmith and Posner elevate sovereign right above the requirements of
international society, and are in fact, according to Bederman, political realists.675 Bederman
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consequently attributes their critique to a skepticism towards customary international law rooted
in “Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart’s two-edged attack on international law.”676
“Kelsen and Hart famously argued that, to the extent that custom plays any role in
international legal obligation, it is a sign of a ‘primitive’ legal order and, even worse, a thinly
disguised naturalist one based on inchoate notions of ‘international morality’.”677 While Hart's
view of customary international law may affirm such a view, since Hart dismisses the customary
validity of international law (see below), given that Kelsen grounds his basic norm of
international law in a customary source, and values customary international law as
methodologically useful in determining ICR, Bederman is incorrect when he attributes to Kelsen
the sentiment that “there can be no real legal obligations for states in following [customary
international law]...”678 Bederman obscures the fact that Kelsen, unlike Hart, turns to custom to
validate international law as a “system” in which states pattern behavior on customary practice.
Unlike Kelsen, Jeremy Bentham, an early critic of naturalism in legal theory679 associated
custom with ‘barbarism.’ John Austin in Province of Jurisprudence Determined also provided
limited guidance for the determination of custom.680 Austin certainly did not consider it
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legitimate for the purpose of international legal obligation, which to Austin was no more than
‘positive morality’ classified alongside the laws of fashion and honor.681682
While Hart’s “neo-positivist” legal philosophy would seem to be a good candidate for
endorsing international law and the criminalization of humanitarian offenses, since like Kelsen
he shared a post-Austinian view of law that granted legal norms validity free of sovereignbacked commands, he, too, creates obstacles to prosecution.683 Even as he devotes a chapter of
The Concept of Law to the subject684 of international law, he considers it to be a system that
contains only primary rules685. Primary rules govern conduct, while secondary rules “serve,
among other purposes, the vital function of establishing procedures for identifying the primary
rules that bind people. The ‘rule of recognition’ [being] the master rule for such a purpose”
functions similar to Kelsen's basic norm.686
With regard to Kelsen’s belief that the basic norm of the international system is that
“states should behave as they customarily behaved,”687 Hart rejects this on the grounds that there
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can be no secondary rule of recognition in international law. Hart writes with reference to the
aforementioned phrase that:

[I]t says nothing more than that those who accept certain [customary] rules must also
observe a rule that the rules ought to be observed. This is a mere useless
reduplication…688
“What Hart overlooks,” writes Neil MacCormick, “is that his theory of a ‘rule of
recognition’ is a theory concerning a rule about the standards which it is obligatory for judges [as
state officials] to observe. In that case, it is no mere useless reduplication to say that certain
judges, when states voluntarily refer disputes to them, must decide according to the standards of
‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice of law accepted as law…”689
This standard is found in Article 38 of the statute of the Permanent International Court of Justice.
Judges merely follow the standards set forth by the international community in Article 38 that
specifies sources that judges must follow in order to maintain the validity of the system. These
sources, in addition to custom, include treaties, general principles of law, judicial rulings and the
scholarship of international publicists.690
Notwithstanding the fact that Kelsen validates international law according to the principle
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that “states should behave as they customarily behaved,” which Hart dismisses as mere
“reduplication,” the issue is still what is meant by this phrase. Does it not also include what is
“accepted as law” even when there is scant evidence of state practice? While contemporary legal
positivists like G.J.H. van Hoof691 enunciated a sentiment that Kelsen could not but agree with—
the notion that opinio juris was far too vague and general to constitute a “rule of recognition” in
the Hartian sense—692 Kelsen does indeed incorporate custom—contra Hart—as a valid source
of international law.
In Kelsen’s “Theorie Du Droit International Coutumier” or “Theory of Customary
law,693 Kelsen rejected what he called the “metaphysical doubling” of the law. Since customary
law was created by state organs through their conduct, any reference to opinio juris sive
necessitatis would have already been confirmed through state practice. Kelsen consequently
believed that such a conviction only adulterated—in a metaphysical sense—the purity of
international legal norms.
Like a dryad behind a tree, a nymph behind a river, or sun god behind the sun, from an
epistemological vantage point none could be proved.694 Likewise, opinio juris created an
unwarranted dualism between what the state did in fact and what it was assumed to believe. It,
too, could not be proved, he suggested. To try and elicit the real intention of states beyond what
was already confirmed in state practice, said Kelsen, was wholly redundant.
But how could state practice, for example, determine customary judgment when violations of
international rules so frequently occur? Such violations would seem to “constitute a law-
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destroying exercise…”695 Without the added element of opinio juris, each “Is” act—or state
practice—would be given equal weight in the determination of norms. Furthermore, as suggested
previously, modern international law demonstrates that opinio juris has played a substantive role
in international judicial rulings when state practice is contrary to moral principles that states have
simultaneously upheld through declarations constituting opinio juris.
However, Kelsen denies this psychological element effective power. He writes:
To be sure, the psychological element of custom, the [opinio juris sive necessitaties], may be
inferred from the constancy and uniformity of state conduct. Indeed, in practice it appears
that the opinio juris is commonly inferred from the constancy and uniformity of state
conduct. But to the extent that it is so inferred it is this conduct and not the particular state of
mind accompanying conduct that is decisive.696

Conduct, not the particular “state of mind” of the state, which Kelsen considered a
personification impossible to access, was the essential element of custom. To introduce opinio
juris in concrete cases, especially in a deductive manner as per the modern method of customary
interpretation, was tantamount to filling “gaps” with moral or political elements. This ignored the
fundamental principle that subjects (in this case, states) were legally permitted to do all that was
not legally forbidden. Lawmaking organs therefore could not fill “gaps” under the guise of
creating new international law where none existed. Insofar as neither treaties, nor a “longestablished practice of states”697 under customary international law could be located, the
introduction of opinio juris, in accordance with deductive methods of customary interpretation,
was considered invalid.
The wording of Article 38 that international custom is “evidence of a general practice...”
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is of particular interest to Kelsen, as he considered the idea that “custom was created by another
fact than custom”698 (i.e., “evidence”) to contravene the legal positivist notion that custom can
only have a constitutive, not a declaratory character. The idea “that the true creator of law
stands—so to speak—behind custom” were the “assumptions of social theorists, who...attempt[]
to present moral-political postulates as objectively valid principles when, in fact, they are neither
verified, nor verifiable.”699 Kelsen implicates those advocates of the German doctrine of the
Volkgeist (national spirit)700, as well as the French doctrine of the solidarite social (social
solidarity),701 in accordance with his general disapproval of all doctrines that affirm that “there
exists, behind and above the positive law, customary or statutory, an absolutely just law which
can be deduced from nature—the nature of man, the nature of society, or even the nature of
things...”702 Opinio juris as a “psychological” element dependent on “belief” thus contradicted
Kelsen's commitment to banishing moral and political ideas that “inferr[ed] from that which is
that which ought to be...”703
Towards the end of his life, Kelsen still acknowledged that problems associated with
customary international law could be resolved through a permanent compulsory international
court, but he reluctantly conceded that a court might never be established. In his book Principles
of Public International Law, he wrote:
It may be readily granted that for the most part these uncertainties would not arise if
international tribunals had the same role in the interpretation and development of
international law that national courts have in the interpretation and development of national
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law. But in the absence of a system of compulsory jurisdiction the many uncertainties
attending customary law must be expected to persist.704

According to Kelsenian Jörg Kammerhofer, commenting on Kelsen's contributions to the
study of customary international law, “a deduction of norms means that these are not the result of
a human act of will, a human legislation in the widest sense.”705 At international tribunals,
however, norms have been followed, not because they were considered legislation based on a
human act of will steeped in a valid procedural method, but “out of a sense of legal or moral
obligation.”706 Contrary to Kelsen's narrow observation of the limits of customary international
law based on opinio juris, which he weds to a deductive methodology that ICL judges have often
turned to in order to constitute “principles of humanity,” he nevertheless counter-intuitively
provides justification for the introduction of a far more robust customary element than is
normally associated with the author of the pure theory of law.
Kelsen’s preference for “consensus,” as legal scholar and diplomat J. Peter Pham notes,
points to Kelsen’s role in promoting the interests of the international community” over, for
instance, defectors from the “consensus”.707 Strict interpretation of state practice as requiring
“unanimity” of “opinion” is offset by Kelsen’s introduction of the “will” of the “international
community”. “What Kelsen proposes,” writes Pham, “is a sociological circle wherein the norm
ought to reflect the conduct of the members of the group. This ‘consensus’ is interpreted to be
the expression of a ‘general will,’ that is then obligatory on all as a norm.”708 Pham quotes
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Kelsen to this effect:

At first the subjective meaning of the acts that constitute the custom is not an ought. But
later, when these acts have existed for some time, the idea arises in the individual
member that he ought to behave in the manner in which the other members customarily
behave, and at the same time the will arises that the other members ought to behave in
that same way. If one member of the group does not behave in the manner in which the
other members customarily behave, then his behavior will be disapproved by the others,
as contrary to their will. In this way the custom becomes the expression of a collective
will whose subjective meaning is an ought.709
Despite Kelsen’s emphasis on long-standing state practice, his concern for the “general
will” of “the international community” creates a progressive model for customary international
law interpretation, relaxing strict hermeneutical standards to promote [morally-informed]
“consensus”. (The next, concluding chapter, engages Pham’s argument in detail to express
implications to the changing notion of international criminal responsibility derived from a pure
theoretical model that embraces “consensus” as “the will” of “the international community”).
Notwithstanding Kelsen’s effort to grant custom a defining role as a binding source of
international law free of moral attributions, pure theory licenses ICL adjudication that has
become dependent on the moral element associated with post-Cold War “gap-filling”. His
acknowledgement that “many uncertainties” abound in relation to the interpretation of customary
international law is, at the very least, an important first step to communicating a problem
resolvable under Kelsen’s general approach to judicial law making.

III. Judicial Discretion and The Purposive Method in ICL
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Despite retaining a critical approach to the use of opinio juris as an element of customary
construction, Part III demonstrates how the author of the Pure Theory of Law reconciles a
hierarchically-ordinal interpretive approach accommodating purposive methodological
construction with “formal” rules of legal cognition. Kelsen’s contributions to the changing
notion of ICR in the post-Cold War era must therefore be understood as fundamental to
reconstructing the general imagery of Kelsen as an arch-formalist.710 As Paulson notes, Kelsen
agrees with nineteenth century legal philosopher Rudolf von Jhering’s criticism of the notion of
the judge as a “juridical slot machine” (Rechtsautomat).711 Responding to the widespread
accusation amongst German legal scholars that Kelsen promoted a “jurisprudence of concepts”
(Begriffsjurisprudenz),712 Kelsen writes that “to want to belittle the Pure Theory of Law as
Begriffsjurisprudenz—a charge not uncommonly made—is a truly pathetic
misunderstanding.”713 The importance of distinguishing “the process of discovery, where the
idea is to arrive at a suitable reading of the premises of the legal argument” (i.e., non-formal
legal interpretation) with “the process of justification, where the task is a post hoc reconstruction
of the legal argument with an eye to showing its legal validity”714 (i.e., formal legal cognition),
according to Paulson, places Kelsen outside the bounds of “logicistic” thinking.715 Judges, as the
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last delegated authority in the hierarchy determining legal accountability, are free to deviate from
“juridico-scientific” interpretation. “[T]he interpretation by the law applying organ,” according
to Kelsen, “is always authentic.”716
Paulson writes in “Formalism, ‘Free Law’, and the ‘Cognition’ Quandary: Hans Kelsen’s
Approaches to Legal Interpretation” that:

Always authentic, [Kelsen] adds, for [the interpretation of judges] creates law. To be
sure, legal cognition imposes constraints on what the judge or official can decide, for—so
the standard Kelsenian line—the scope or frame of the general norm sets limits on what
will count as possible interpretations of the general norms. That is, the judge, say, can
‘cognize’ individual norms qua possible interpretations of the general norm only if they
fall within the scope of the general norm. At the same time, Kelsen grants the point that
the judge’s choice from among the possible individual norms—the judges ‘authentic’
interpretation, handed down as law—may well be guided by the judge’s standpoint on
politics and ideology.717
Paulson provides a general framework for a rejoinder to those who claim that Kelsen’s
“formalism” denies the possibility of purposive ICL construction. While Paulson emphasizes
Kelsen’s radical skepticism towards legal interpretation, including Kelsen’s denial of all standard
approaches in the mode of Hermann Kantorowicz, a leading figure in the Free Law Movement,
Paulson nevertheless introduces a range of options to interpretation that could include
purposiveness. Kantorowicz’s position in The Struggle for Legal Science718 inaugurated a
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challenge to judicial formalism that Kelsen, through his student Fritz Schreir719, would
consequently come to endorse.
For scholars who wish to uphold the ideal of pure theoretical cognition within a frame of
possible positive law meanings the problem is particularly acute. Since scholars are prohibited
from turning to “politics and ideology” (a particularly nebulous phraseology) 720 to resolve
possible meanings of legal norms, and since Kelsen denies traditional canons of interpretation,
legal scholars are encouraged to banish political and ideological views “on pain of violating the
purity postulate”.721 Drawing on Max Weber’s separation between scientific and value judgment,
on the one hand, and Weber’s embrace of value-reference (Werbeziehung)722, on the other,
Paulson champions “the legal community” as instrumental for the legal scholar “in arriving at a
spectrum of possible meanings.”723 Although the legal scholar cannot introduce his own value
judgment, value-reference means that the “legal scholar is not cut off from the political and
ideological views current in the legal community.”724
Paulson, however, does not engage with the humanitarian frame specific to ICL
judgment. As with his general neglect of Kelsen’s contributions to the conception of ICR, which
Paulson overlooks in his otherwise masterfully written “Classical Legal Positivism at
Nuremberg,”725 Paulson’s comprehensive analysis of Kelsen’s approaches to legal interpretation
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do not link up with the author of Pure Theory’s particular concern for imputation at the highest
level of criminal concern. The legal community that Paulson alludes to may be different at
different levels of interpretive valuation. The spectrum changes in the international sphere. Here,
unlike at the national level, ICL judges must turn to what Kelsen constitutes as “principles of
civilization,” to determine “the political and ideological views current in the legal
community.”726 For now, the question of what these “principles” are, must be left to the
concluding discussion, which summarizes Kelsen’s position on the relationship between law,
politics and morality at the level of international criminality (see: chapter six).
Turning to the purposive methodological choice incorporated in the post-Cold War era, it
is possible to detect correspondence between Kelsen’s conferring of discretionary interpretive
powers over customary interpretation once state’s license ICL courts. Before determining how
this is possible, it is necessary to engage with a leading contemporary figure advocating for the
use of purposive methodology. In a 2007 review of Aharon Barak’s book Judge in a
Democracy727 in The New Republic728—and again in How Judges Think (2009)729—Richard
Posner, the most-cited legal philosopher today730, wrote that “Barak is a world-famous judge
who dominated his court as completely as John Marshall dominated our Supreme Court. If there
were a Nobel Prize for law, Barak would probably be an early recipient.”731 Yet his detractors
are many, including Posner himself. Like the late Robert Bork732, an originalist and strong critic
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of Barak’s, Posner, an economist in legal methodology, finds in Barak’s writings a tendency
towards “judicial hubris”.733
Much of this has to do with the fact that Barak’s method steers away from authorial
intention towards a high level of abstraction734 in order to integrate the ‘enlightened’ values of
judicial interpreters. This is an especially egregious usurpation of power by the judiciary in a
system with “separation of powers”, according to Posner. In the U.S. judicial system, judges
must “make some effort to tether [decisions] to orthodox legal materials, such as the
constitutional text.”735 In contrast, Barak’s judicial approach has been hailed by Supreme Court
Justice Elena Kagan. “In 2006, while dean of Harvard Law School, Ms. Kagan introduced Judge
Barak during an award ceremony as ‘my judicial hero.’ She added, ‘He is the judge or justice in
my lifetime whom, I think, best represents and has best advanced the values of democracy and
human rights, of the rule of law and of justice.’”736 US Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer
makes multiple references in Active Liberty, which summarizes Breyer’s judicial philosophy, to
Barak’s position that “law is tied to life”.737
While Barak’s method in Purposive Interpretation in Law, which sets out his views on
the integration of elements of justice that move beyond the bounds of strict construction focuses
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exclusively on domestic law738, international scholar Mia Swart has drawn extensively on
Barak’s purposive hermeneutic to explain changes in decision-making in the post-Cold War era
of ICL.739 (Part IV integrates Swart’s analysis with respect to key ICTY judgments). Barak
rejects a hard textualist approach740 that excludes “reasonable” authorial intent, or what judges
understand to be contextual factors “implicit” in the text and mirrored by societal norms,
including “social goals (like the public interest), proper modes of behavior (like reasonableness
and fairness), and human rights”,741 and on the other hand, the radical invention of new texts742
with little or no consideration of the “explicit” authorial intent, which “the author of the text
sought to actualize.”743 Moving back and forth between text and context, purposive interpretation
is thus, according to Barak, able to approximate a “reasonable” judicial intent. Judges do this
either consciously or unconsciously, and their judicial opinions reflect “the horizon of the author
and the horizon of the interpreter” simultaneously.744
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Barak emphasized the importance of “pre-interpretation” in rendering legal judgment.
He asserts:

The interpreter does not try to enter the shoes of the text’s author, a task made impossible
by the gap in time. The interpreter and the text’s author live in different time periods.
Each has his or her own pre-understanding. The interpreter therefore does not try to relive
the experience of creating the text. He or she tries to combine his or her modern
understanding with the understanding at the core of the text. This blending of horizons,
central to purposive interpretation, expresses the proper hermeneutic perspective.745

Context matters. Fundamental values and human rights norms change over time, says
Barak. In addition to the “explicit” text or “subjective” intent of the author it is also necessary for
judges to entertain “the social values prevalent at the time the text is interpreted, including values
of morality and justice” or ‘the objective component of purpose’.746 The “blending of
horizons”747 is an apt metaphor for the methodological effort in “the intellectual history of
dignity,” as Barak puts it,748 to elicit the humanitarian purpose or intent of the originating legal
norm.
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In Kelsen’s “The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International
Organization” (1944), it is possible to glean a purposive endorsement of judge-created
international law. In analyzing the Moscow Declaration (1943), which proclaimed “the necessity
of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all peace loving States, and open to membership by all such
States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security,”749 the author of
Pure Theory stresses the international judge’s primary position in defining the parameters of
sovereignty. This is especially necessary given the lack of executive and legislative functions at
the international level. Rather than conceive of sovereignty as “supreme authority” in the sense
of the unlimited right of each nation to act how it wishes, Kelsen interprets the Moscow
Declaration to mean “the existence of an international law which imposes duties and confers
rights upon States.”750 The goal of the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and
China—the four signatory powers at Moscow—was to create law and order “for the purpose of
inaugurating a system of general security, [which] can only be the Law of Nations, the
international legal order as a set of norms binding upon the States.”751 The Moscow Declaration,
the first public pronouncement of the intent of the allied powers to try the heinous acts of Nazis
under international jurisdiction, must be recalled with respect to “a system of general security”.
U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and
Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin noted that "evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass
executions which are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have
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overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled"752 required justice. Nazis would
either be returned to the countries where they had committed their crimes and "judged on the
spot by the peoples whom they have outraged,”753 or else, for those Germans whose criminal
offenses had no geographical localization, they would be prosecuted under international
jurisdiction. Although Winston Churchill is often associated with the position that summary
execution was the most fitting punishment for Nazi crimes,754 he was instrumental in drafting the
“Statement of Atrocities,” which led, in turn, to the formation of the European Advisory
Committee, a body instrumental in drafting—with the consent of state parties— the IMT
Charter.
In arranging the legal limits of sovereignty, judges dealing with core international crimes,
as Kelsen avers, may go beyond the parameters of positive law. Purposive construction follows
from the valid delegation of powers by states to neutral international judges to try state officials
for core international crimes. First, however, it is necessary to once again de-link Kelsen’s
position on cognition from interpretation. Kelsen writes:
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The establishment of compulsory adjudication of international disputes is a means—
perhaps the most effective means—of maintaining positive international law. It may be
doubted, however, whether a court endowed with compulsory jurisdiction always will
apply only and exclusively positive international law to the disputes submitted to its
decisions, even though the court is not expressly authorized by its statute to apply other
norms. It is probable that a court which has the power to decide all disputes without any
exception will, in cases in which a strict application of positive law seems unsatisfactory
to the judges, adapt the positive law to their idea of justice and equity. (my emphasis)755

Like Barak, Kelsen maintains the right of judges to introduce conceptions of justice that
may not comport with “orthodox legal material”.756 Judges, as Kelsen notes, will “adapt the
positive law to their idea of justice and equity,”757 since “it is difficult…to prevent a court
endowed with compulsory jurisdiction from applying other norms than those of positive
international law…. “758 Kelsen, therefore, disputes the notion that international judges, under
the principle of sovereign equality, assume a “declaratory” rather than “constitutive” role, once
assigned powers by states subject to a dispute. “According to traditional doctrine,” writes Kelsen,
“the law to be applied by the judicial decision exists prior to the decision; this preexisting law is
disputed only in respect to the relationship between the parties to the conflict.”759 Whether the
dispute is based on questions of fact or law, interpretation is necessitated.760 Disputed facts or
disputed rules of law are therefore resolved by judicial decision.761
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Courts rather than legislative organs, as chapter two describes in relation to the
architecture of the international system Kelsen envisions, are more compatible with this principle
of sovereign equality, according to Kelsen. Courts impose new obligations or duties, including
those applicable to state actors, in an objective or neutral fashion, which is slower than
legislation, and therefore less apt to impose “political decrees issued according to the principle
that might goes before right, which is a negation of law.”762 Once states submit disputes to
international judgment (and for our purposes, national or hybrid courts deciding cases of core
international crimes), “it is the fact that judgments, even if not the strict application of a
preexisting legal rule, are based on the idea of law, that is, on a rule which, although not yet
positive law, should, according to the conviction of independent judges, become law and really
becomes positive law for the case settled by the judicial decision.”763 Kelsen therefore premises
his position related to international legal validity, and inter alia, international criminal law, on
the ability of judges to move outside the range of predetermined positive law, in accordance with
their “idea of justice and equity”.
“International criminal law rules,” writes Swart, “because of their essentially unwritten
nature, are relatively indeterminate, adaptable to new circumstances and possess a certain
‘malleability’ and ‘flexibility’”.764 While this may create the international public perception of
“adventurous” judicial decision-making, Kelsen’s approach to interpretation and the process of
discovery legitimizes such a role. Kelsen’s strict interpretation of customary international law,
notwithstanding, he remains committed to a position that mirrors Barak’s. Although this is not
readily apparent, as Paulson notes, Kelsen’s skeptical approach to legal interpretation in the

Ibid., 219.
Ibid.
764
Swart, “Is there a Text?,” 771.
762
763

239

mode of Kantorowicz’s “free law movement” points to the latitude Kelsen grants judges. To
claim that Kelsen is agnostic on the question of legal interpretation in the ICL sphere is neither
born out either by earlier case studies, or Kelsen’s insistence that there be limits to inhumane
conduct under the guise of “acts of state”.

IV. The Acts of State Doctrine Revisited: ‘Substantial Relations or Formal Bonds?’

In the first trial before the ICTY, the defendant Dusko Tadic, a former member of the
paramilitary forces supporting the attack on the district of Prijedor, and a Bosnian Serb involved
in mistreatment and killings at the Omarska, Trnopolje and Keraterm detention camps,765 was
convicted in 1997 of crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and
violations of the customs of war.
In reviewing the case, the Tadic Appeals Chamber did not always explicitly reference the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)766, which provided ample instructions on the
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scope of interpretation, but, noted Swart, “…applied the principles set out in that instrument”.767
Nowhere was contextual balancing more apparent than in (a) the effort to characterize the
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina as international based on the purpose, or intention, of the grave
breaches regime under the Geneva Conventions, and (b) the decision to expand the meaning of
crimes against humanity to include other categories besides ‘persecutory crimes’ as contained in
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute.768 While the next section engages with the ever-changing
description of crimes against humanity, this section considers the way ICL further eroded the
distinction between international and internal conflicts through contextual ‘balancing’ of Article
2.

Article 2 reads:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering
to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant
Geneva Convention:
(a) willful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
legislature.” Although the latter may be in violation of a strict adherence to the principle of legality, it insures that
under a system where ambiguity of language, due to the politicized nature of multilateral treaty negotiations and
unwritten customary norms is prevalent, the “intention” of ICL authors is taken into consideration. This “intention”
mirrors the purpose of the ICL sphere, which is to extract a generally accepted, if changing, notion of
“humanitarianism” as manifested in the evolving conception of international criminal responsibility.
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(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power;
(f) willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian;
(h) taking civilians as hostages.769

In order for the Geneva Convention to apply770, not only would the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia need to be conceptualized as an international armed conflict, but the victims of the
conflict would need to be categorized as “protected persons”.771 The test of effective control (i.e.,
the nationality requirement), established by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the
Nicaragua case,772 did not apply in this case because, according to defense counsel, the
Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb Republic) and Bosnian Serb army, of which Tadic was a
member, was not formally controlled by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).773 A cross-
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appeal by the prosecution nevertheless argued that the Defense was wrong to formulate the test
according to the question: “Were the Bosnian Serbs acting as ‘organs’ of another State?”774
“The Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/Republika Srpska (“VRS”)
had a “demonstrable link,” the prosecution argued, “with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) (“FRY”) and the Army of the FRY (“VJ”). It was not a situation of
mere logistical support by the FRY to the VRS.”775 While the Appeals Chamber did not endorse
the prosecution’s “demonstrable link” test, it did demonstrate that the VRS acted as a proxy
force—and that “effective control” could be proven.
The Appeals Chamber concluded that the Third Geneva Convention implicitly referred to a
test of control by providing in Article 4 the requirement of “belonging to a Party to the conflict”:
This conclusion, based on the letter and the spirit of the Geneva Conventions, is borne out by
the entire logic of international humanitarian law. This body of law is not grounded on
formalistic postulates. It is not based on the notion that only those who have the formal
status of State organs, i.e., are members of the armed forces of a State, are duty bound both to
refrain from engaging in violations of humanitarian law as well as - if they are in a position
of authority - to prevent or punish the commission of such crimes. Rather, it is a realistic
body of law, grounded on the notion of effectiveness and inspired by the aim of deterring
deviation from its standards to the maximum extent possible. It follows, amongst other
things, that humanitarian law holds accountable not only those having formal positions of
authority but also those who wield de facto power as well as those who exercise control over
perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law. Hence, in cases such as
that currently under discussion, what is required for criminal responsibility to arise is some
measure of control by a Party to the conflict over the perpetrators.776

774

Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 1999, available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40277f504.html [accessed 14
October 2018], para 75.
775
ibid. para. 72.
776
Ibid, para. 96

243

Even if the Appeals Chamber deferred to the defense’s “test of effective control,” claiming
that members of the VRS were taking orders from the FRY, judges deviated from a formal
reading. Not only the letter, but also the spirit of the Geneva Conventions, would need to be
considered. Those “who wield de facto power as well as those who exercise control over
perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL)” were just as culpable
as those in traditional positions of authority. In order to remain a “realistic body of law”, the
Appeals Chamber acknowledged its need to expand the meaning of “effective control” to “the
maximum extent possible” in “order to deter deviation from its standards...”
But what are ‘standards’? Do they not entail purposive consideration, which accounts for
‘objective’ needs like “social goals (the public interest), proper modes of behavior (like
reasonableness and fairness), and human rights”777? The Geneva Convention (1949) provided a
framework. There was “authorial intent” but a lack of forecasting. A new variant of allegiance
pertaining to de facto power dictated a different notion of “effective control”. By implicating
non-traditional entities, including proxies like the Bosnian Serb Army, the Tadic Appeals
Chamber conceived of customary international law in a way that expanded the meaning of
“belonging to a Party in the conflict” beyond traditional associations with “organs of state”.
In addition to establishing that the conflict was international, The Appeals Chamber also
needed to prove that Bosnian Muslims were “protected persons”. However, if nationality rather
than ethnicity were to be the primary criterion of “protected persons”, then Bosnian Muslims
targeted by Bosnian Serb forces (VRS) could not assume a separate status. Formally they
belonged to the same nation—Bosnia.

777

Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, xiv.

244

The Appeals Chamber thus decided to use a purposive logic to draw on exceptional
categories of victims who assumed “protected persons” status under the Geneva Convention like
refugees and neutral nationals.778 Although the Tadic case did not involve victims who fell into
either of these categories, judges decided to abandon a literal interpretation of “protected
persons” by appealing to the general purpose, or intention, of the nationality requirement. The
“lack of allegiance to a state and diplomatic protection by this state were” ultimately
“considered…more important than the formal link to nationality.”779
The Appeals Chamber wrote:
This legal approach, hinging on substantial relations rather than on formal bonds, becomes
all the more important in present-day international armed conflicts. While previously wars
were primarily between well-established States, in modern inter-ethnic armed conflicts such
as that of the former Yugoslavia, new States are often created during the conflict and
ethnicity rather than nationality may become the grounds for allegiance.780

“Substantial relations” informed a more contextualized ruling. Inter-ethnic conflict took on
the role that war between states traditionally had. The Tadic Appeals Chamber decided that in
order for Art. 2 of the ICTY Statute to fulfill its purpose—the moral rather than strictly legal
instructions contained in the Geneva Convention—the Tribunal had to find a way of classifying
the conflict as international. The Appeals Chamber showed fidelity to international provisions by
demonstrating that even if formally the parties belonged to same nation (Bosnia), they were
essentially fighting a war between parties independent of one another—one of which acted as a
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proxy for another nation. “In order to make Art. 2 of the ICTY Statute functional,”781 the
“subjective intent” of the authors would need to be interpreted as if licensing new configurations
of inter-party conflict. Acknowledging that context had changed nearly half a century after the
ratification of the Geneva Accords (1949), the Appeals Chamber “return[ed] to the text with a
‘correction’ and ‘improvement’ in [their] preliminary understanding.”782
Kelsen’s dynamic approach to law recognizes the inherent mutability of circumstances.
Judges who may be separated by generations from the promulgation of constitutional norms, are
licensed to re-interpret, in the mode of Kantorowicz’s “Free Law” approach to juridical
construction, elements of ICR, including the scope of the acts of state doctrine. As with legal
realism’s emphasis on judicial discretion, Kelsen’s appeal to the process of discovery rejects
Begriffjurisprudenz or a “jurisprudence of concepts”. Paulson’s description of Kelsen’s skeptical
interpretive position, notwithstanding, there is reason to question Kelsen’s agnosticism towards
juridical construction. Like Kirgis’s sliding scale theory, Kelsen acknowledges that core
international crimes produce a different set of criteria in the ICL sphere than in other areas of
law. The moral criterion associated with “principles of civilization” (see: chapter two) is the
reason why Kelsen initially endorses retroactive lawmaking.
But this does not mean that the methods initially endorsed are applicable under
circumstances forbidding retroactive lawmaking. In an era when the UN Secretary General
admonishes judges in cases before the ICTY to adhere to preexisting customary international
law, or the Rome Statute, where the legal basis for the ICC, prohibits retroactive lawmaking,
“prospective” methodology emphasizing “intent” or “purpose” is the optimal means in which to
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reconcile the functional needs of a sphere that must defend the valid grounds on which state
officials are tried. While contradicting what Andrea Gattini describes as Kelsen’s appeal to
nineteenth century statist (positive law) protections783, this new interpretive gloss on Kelsen’s
position on AoSD immunities insists on an implied licensing of moral criterion associated with
higher principles of justice.
Kelsen’s position on new actors of universal law, especially international organizations,
produces a pure theoretical conception of ICR that has caught up with the times. Turning to
Kelsen’s commentary on the League of Nations as a model for re-conceptualizing the
relationship between international and state law784, we may deduce an equally similar position on
the scope of power associated with the United Nations785—and especially the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC). Bernstorff writes:
The Vienna School’s theory of international law regarded the newly created organization in
Geneva as the organ of a particular community of international law capable of taking action.
The limitations on the authority of the League to act were to be laid down exclusively
through the organization’s Covenant. From the perspective of universal law, it was precisely
the constituent treaty that could endow the organization with whatever competencies it
wished. That could also include material areas of regulation that had previously been dealt
with exclusively within states. Because of the new conception of state sovereignty, the latter
did not act as an a priori barrier to integration. Rather, the international treaty instrument was
able to restrict the competencies of the state legal system at will. The supraordinated edifice
of international law thus decided—in a sovereign and flexible manner—on the allocation of
competencies between international law and national law.786
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Josef Laurenz Kunz, a student of Kelsen’s and one of the most prominent orthodox
expositors of the Pure Theory of Law, neither precluded the possibility of the League of Nations
pressing members to adhere to norms enacted with or without ratification by the entire body (i.e.,
unanimity’), nor rejected the introduction of laws applicable to individuals.787 Bernstorff’s study
of Kelsen’s international law theory emphasizes the pure theoretical position that an
“international treaty instrument [is] able to restrict the competencies of the state legal system at
will.”788 Although state officials are traditionally protected under the AoSD, international
organizations, beginning with the League of Nations, have been granted wide-ranging
competencies with regard to its members. The creation of international courts, either ad hoc or
permanent, in this case by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), adhered to the custom
associated with “the supraordinated edifice of international law”.789
As final arbiter of matters related to the Geneva Conventions, the UNSC is licensed by the
UN Charter. Article 25 of the UN Charter states that “the Members of the United Nations agree
to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter.”790 While the UNSC seldom authorizes coercive measures over state actions in violation
of the Geneva Conventions, obligations to this constituent treaty assumes primary status over
regional treaties and national laws. Since the UNSC licensed ad hoc tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Geneva Convention’s codes, as adjunct to UN-sponsored treaties,
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could be modified to incorporate new conceptions of state sovereignty, in accordance with
formal requirements.
The order of delegation that licenses the final purposive interpretation of “substantial
relations” with respect to the “test of effective control” and “protected persons,” therefore,
begins with the customary grundnorm, licensed by 193 member states of the United Nations. The
invocation of contextually-licensed interpretations of the Geneva Convention is mandated by the
UNSC in its licensed adjudication of ICTY and ICTR under UNSC Resolution 827 and Chapter
VII provisions of the UN Charter.791 Since member states subscribing to the UN Charter license
all acts of normative delegation by UNSC member states, including collective security
intervention in accordance with forms of collective responsibility, as well as the delegation of
powers to international courts to try individuals for acts of state in contravention of international
peace (and Chapter VII), Kelsen’s structural hierarchical analysis of a valid legal normative
order licenses the ICTY. Those ad hoc judges who chose to expand our understanding of custom,
albeit seemingly contrary to Kelsen’s strict understanding of custom as based on state practice,
nevertheless were permitted to act in accordance with their mandate. Pure Theory, therefore,
accommodates discretionary interpretation by international judges that leads to the
reconceptualization of “legal persons”. Bernstorff writes:
The Pure Theory of Law regarded the application of the law as a process that, while
prestructured could not, in the final analysis, be completely grasped jurisprudentially in its
creative dimension. For example, Kelsen regarded the decision of a court not as a formalistic
and immediate application of the law, but as the creative generation of an individual norm.
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And that was the reason why, according to Kelsen, the Pure Theory of Law could not be
associated with a formalistic legal practice.792

V. Principles of Humanity? A Test of the ‘Separation Thesis’
The author of the Pure Theory of Law endorses “principles of humanity”—termed
“principles of civilization” in the Kelsenian lexicon—as a standard by which to determine the
gravity of an offense meriting suspension of protections under the acts of state doctrine (AoSD).
Kelsen’s doctrinal commitment to the separation of law from morality, transgressed under a pure
theoretical conception of ICR, subjects international crimes to penalty for moral offenses
committed in the past. This section analyzes the prospect of reconciling Kelsen’s approach with
the court’s emphasis on an expanded notion of crimes against humanity.
The transfer of powers to ICL judges in the post-Cold War era implies broad interpretive
range. Judges now “make” law—but they do so based on a contextual apprehension of
“civilizational” changes compatible with a deepening emphasis on the purpose at the core of this
sphere. The difference between the post-Cold War era and previous iterations of ICL, including
(a) the proto- or pre-modern effort to establish an order of war crimes retribution after the First
World War, (b) the modern era encompassing the immediate post-Second World War
international trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and ( c) ad hoc national trials against war criminals,
most notably, the Cold War era case against Adolph Eichmann in Jerusalem, is that the postCold War period, encompassing inter alia cases before the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, reflect an
acceleration in consciously developed purposive juridical construction.793
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Against the constrained results of his cognition of valid customary construction based solely
on state practice (Part II), the skeptical or discretionary interpretive position Kelsen assumes
with respect to judicial decision-making is of a higher ordinal value than any general framing
used to determine pure theoretical cognition. As with the tension between principles of morality
(which may be retroactive) and principles of legality (which may not), Kelsen again places, in
this case judges, as “midwives” of a higher principle.
Even if Kelsen rejects the customary element of opinio juris for reasons described in Part II,
the latitude he grants judges in determining responsibility for core international crimes is valid
because of the nature of the act. Thus, acts of state that cannot be criminalized according to
international law standards, such as housing or labor policy, must be distinguished from policies
of widespread murder, especially for the furtherance of genocidal goals. What is purposive in the
court’s licensing of customary interpretation resembles the criterion necessary for retroactive
lawmaking: “principles of civilization”/”humanity”. Here, Kelsen’s broad account of the process
of discovery serves to animate “pure theoretical” claims on the power of judges as guardians of
civilization.
In a reversal of the Trial Chamber’s ruling that all crimes against humanity must be
committed with a discriminatory intent and only applied to ‘persecution type’ crimes, The Tadic
Appeals Chamber followed a purposive line of reasoning to expand the ambit of crimes against
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humanity.794 Was this an unprincipled form of discretion, as some critics argued, 795 or was the
method, as part of the process of discovery, valid in accordance with pure theoretical
construction? Article 5 of the ICTY Statute reads:

Crimes against humanity—The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or
internal in character, and directed against any civilian population.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)

murder;
extermination;
enslavement;
deportation;
imprisonment;
torture;
rape;
persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
other inhumane acts.796

Writing on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), legal experts
Marco Sassoli and Laura M. Olson argued that the decision of the Tadic Appeals Chamber to
reject the Report of the UN Secretary General along with the travaux préparatoires (preparatory
works) or statements made by the United States, the Russian Federation and France as UN
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Security Council members,797 was a form of illegitimate legal construction.798 Both the Report of
the Secretary General and the travaux préparatoires associated crimes against humanity
exclusively with ‘discriminatory intent’.799 The decision to limit the scope of interpretation to
what the Chamber considered an unambiguous (or ordinary) reading of Article 5 of the ICTY
Statute, consequently minimized, according to Sassoli and Olson, the Report of the Secretary
General and the dissenting views of the three Security Council members.
The Tadic Appeals Chamber concluded that a “clear and unambiguous”800 or “ordinary”801
interpretation of Article 5 in the ICTY Statute supported the view that “[discriminatory] intent is
only made necessary for one sub-category of those crimes, namely ‘persecutions’ provided for in
Article 5 (h).”802 Otherwise, Article 5 (h) would be a residual provision applicable to all crimes
against humanity803, which would have made Article 5 (i) (“other inhumane acts”) superfluous.
The only logical explanation for the inclusion of “other inhumane acts” was that the “statutory
framers” wished to demonstrate that the list was non-exhaustive and “persecutions on religious,
racial and religious grounds” were only applicable to one sub-category of article 5, ‘persecutiontype’ crimes requiring discriminatory intent. “It is an elementary rule of interpretation that one
should not construe a provision or part of a provision as if it were superfluous and hence pointless:
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the presumption is warranted that law-makers enact or agree upon rules that are well thought out
and meaningful in all their elements.”804
Barak recommends that judges move back and forth between ‘text’ and ‘context’. The context
in which the norm is to be applied plays a significant role in determining the goals or aims of the
promulgated rule after all effort to elicit ‘authorial intention’ has been exhausted. Even a
seemingly ‘clear and unambiguous’ norm requires interpretation. In what way did the Tadic
Appeals Chamber introduce the “humanitarian goals of the framers of the statute”805? In filling
‘normative lacunae[s]’ with the opinio juris of the “international community,”806 ICTY judges
deviated from pure theoretical concerns only in terms of the cognitive commitment to banishing
this “alien” psychological element (i.e., opinio juris). In coupling Kelsen’s emphasis on higher
principles of justice (i.e., “principles of civilization”) with judicial latitude, the courts followed
the implied purposive reasoning of the author of the Pure Theory of Law.
The Tadic Appeals Chamber did not confine itself to a literal, ordinary or unambiguous
definition of ‘persecutory crimes’. Following an earlier decision in Trial Chamber II in Furund`ija
acknowledging the legal weight granted to the Rome Statute, which at the time was a non-binding
international treaty807 adopted by the majority of States attending the Rome Diplomatic
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Conference,808 the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case commented that “…[The Rome Statute] is
supported by a great number of States and may be taken to express the legal position i.e. opinio
iuris of those States.”809 Article 7 of the Rome Statute, in consequence, represented the drafters’
denial of discriminatory intent as the exclusive element of crimes against humanity. Quoting the
Rome Statute, the Tadic Appeals Chamber wrote that:
“For the purposes of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following acts
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) murder […].” Article 7(1) of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court thus articulates a definition of crimes against humanity based
solely upon the interplay between the mens rea of the defendant and the existence of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 810

The Defense argued that it would “be unjust if a perpetrator of a criminal act guided solely by
personal motives was…to be prosecuted for a crime against humanity.”811 The Appeals Chamber
rejected this assertion. Basing its opinion, in part, on the Nuremberg Charter and Control Council
Law No. 10, which distinguished between ‘murder type’ crimes such as murder, extermination
and enslavement, and ‘persecution type’ crimes committed on political, racial or religious
grounds,812 the Appeals Chamber suggested that a distinction was made very early on in the
creation of the ICL system with regard to these two categories. Article 7, paragraph 1, of the ICC

808

UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July
1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html [accessed 14 October
2018].
809
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 1999, available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40277f504.html [accessed 14
October 2018], para. 291.
810
Ibid.
811
Ibid., para. 246.
812
George Andreopoulos, “Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity” in International Crime and
Justice, ed. Mangai Natarajan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 295-306.

255

Statute, which lacked any specific mention of discriminatory intent,

813

by omission reaffirmed

views contained in the Nuremberg Charter and Control Council Law No. 10. The Prosecution
contended that:

…the object and purpose of the [ICTY’s] Statute support the interpretation that crimes against
humanity may be committed for purely personal reasons, arguing that the objective of the
Statute in providing a broad scope for humanitarian law would be defeated by a narrow
interpretation of the category of offences falling within the ambit of Article 5.

What the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case maintained was that (a) the opinions of the three
dissenting states amounted to a minority sentiment akin to the occasional violation of rules
through state practice, and (b) that the travaux préparatoires and the Report of the Secretary
General played a subordinate role in determining ‘authorial intent’. While the Appeals Chamber
was willing to concede that each could be drawn upon to assess authorial intent, as “for instance,
when interpreting Article 3 of the Statute…pronouncing on the question whether the International
Tribunal could apply international agreements binding upon the parties to the conflict,” the
Chamber concluded that the travaux préparatoires and the Report of the Secretary General did
not apply in this instance.814

In light of the humanitarian goals of the framers of the Statute, one fails to see why they should
have seriously restricted the class of offences coming within the purview of “crimes against
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humanity”, thus leaving outside this class all the possible instances of serious and widespread
or systematic crimes against civilians on account only of their lacking a discriminatory intent.
For example, a discriminatory intent requirement would prevent the penalization of random
and indiscriminate violence intended to spread terror among a civilian population as a crime
against humanity.815

Judges turned to historical examples to demonstrate how even ‘persecution-type’ crimes ought
not to be limited to the charges specified under Article 5 (h). In Nazi Germany, those with physical
and mental disabilities, deviant sexual preferences and infirmity were targeted. In the Soviet
Union, ‘class enemies’ were singled out. And under the rule of the Khmer Rouge, the urban
educated were forced out of their homes and made to work in labor camps where the prospect of
death was ever-present. Through a more purposive reading of the Appeals Chambers judgment,
one may presume that failing to protect any group targeted would run counter to the humanitarian
goals of the original authors and community of interpreters. Even “lacking a discriminatory
intent,” however, should not “prevent the penalization of random and indiscriminate violence
intended to spread terror among a civilian population.”816

As with the Tadic Appeals Chamber decision, judges in the Kupreskic Trial similarly
concentrated on the “purposes of persecution” and the category of “other inhumane acts,” which
allowed courts flexibility in determining criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity.817
Reprisal attacks, a focal point of the Kupreskic Judgment, evaluated the capacity of state agents
to distinguish between legitimate acts of war and gross humanitarian violence in the shelling of
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population bases. Some reprisals, according to international law, are considered legitimate acts of
war; others, because they are “random and indiscriminate,” prosecutable. The Martens Clause
acted as a customary tool critical to ‘humanizing humanitarian law’ in the Kupreskic case. 818 A
preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention II-Laws and Customs of War on Land, the clause was
named after the Russian delegate to The Hague Peace Conference, Fyodor Fyodorovich
Martens.819 “The Martens Clause,” according to international lawyer Mia Swart 820, “has had an
important influence on the unconventional determination of custom at the Tribunals.”821 The code
reads:

Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it
right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as
they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity
and the requirements of the public conscience.822
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Antonio Cassese, an Italian jurist who specialized in public international law and the first
President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, stated that the
Martens Clause can be used as an equally valid historical source of international law as “usages
of States”, or state practice.823 “It is logically admissible,” Swart asserted, “to infer that the
requirement of state practice [usus] may not be strictly required for the formation of a principle
or rule based on the laws of humanity. The Martens Clause, in [Cassese’s] view, loosens the
requirement of usus while at the same time elevating opinio juris to a rank higher than normally
acknowledged.”824

Likewise, international legal scholar Guenael Mettraux remarked that opinio juris played a
disproportionate role relative to state practice in ICTY rulings. Whereas Kelsen advocated an
inductive method in which to locate customary norms “based on an analysis of a sufficiently
extensive and convincing state practice,” Mettraux asserted that deduction825 was the more
common approach at post-Cold War proceedings. Although the result has been that judges have
often “been too ready to brand norms as customary, without giving any reason or citing any
authority for that conclusion,”826 they have also been instrumental in “turn[ing] the customary
process on its head” by introducing principles of humanity. The Kupreskic Trial Chamber wrote:

This is however an area where opinio iuris sive necessitatis may play a much greater role than
usus, as a result of the ... Martens Clause. In the light of the way States and courts have
See generally: Antonio Cassese, “The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?”, European Journal
of International Law 11, no.1 (2000): 187-216 and Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
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implemented it, this Clause clearly shows that principles of international humanitarian law
may emerge through a customary process under the pressure of the demands of humanity or
the dictates of public conscience, even where State practice is scant or inconsistent. The other
element, in the form of opinio necessitatis, crystallizing as a result of the imperatives of
humanity or public conscience, may turn out to be the decisive element heralding the
emergence of a general rule or principle of humanitarian law.827

“Principles of civilization” are central to Kelsen’s theoretical justification of retroactive
lawmaking for core international crimes (see: chapter 2, Part IV). The Martens Clause affirms
what Kelsen accepts as “legal”: the prosecution of immoral acts amounting to core international
crimes. Although problems associated with Kelsen’s banishment of opinio juris from pure
theoretical cognition persist, and while he traditionally refused to recognize “morality” as a
legitimate criterion for assessing the “validity “of law as a sanction-oriented enterprise, Kelsen’s
emphasis on “consensus” rather than unanimous assent by state parties, permits judges to assess
deviation from state practice in light of the “the pressure of the demands of humanity.”
VI. Conclusion
North America’s foremost contemporary Kelsen scholar, Stanley Paulson828, creates the
theoretical framework for a rejoinder to those like Judith Shklar who claim that Kelsen’s
“formalism” denies the possibility of purposive ICL construction. Paulson’s emphasis on Kelsen’s
embrace of “free law”—or radical skepticism towards legal interpretation—does not deny the
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possibility of purposiveness. Rather, Paulson identifies Kelsen as licensing discretionary
judgments by ICL judges, which complements Kelsen’s clear statements on the matter in “The
Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization” (1944). In
affirming the judge’s role in the hierarchy of delegated legal normative authority, Kelsen
emphasizes how ICL judges as representative of the “international community” are authorized to
pronounce on the intended purpose of this sphere. Substantive in orientation and therefore
exceeding a traditionally-conceived “frame” of pure theoretical legal cognition, Kelsen
nevertheless provides the theoretical “tools” for an expanded notion of ICR exceeding the
immunizing preferences of classical legal positivism.829
If the strictest legal positivist licensing the “scientific” analysis of imputation in the
international sphere must turn to “principles of civilization” to justify prosecution of core
international crimes, then presumably the same reasoning Kelsen used to identify ICR in the
period around the time of the promulgation of the IMT Charter could be extended to the case of
former Yugoslavian war criminals. But the post-Cold War era presents new challenges. If at the
time of the alleged humanitarian offense no customary norms existed to regulate acts of state, then
the ICTY required that retroactive lawmaking be prohibited, in accordance with “principles of
legality.” This, of course, was not the case at the inauguration of the modern ICL system where
Kelsen justified retroactivity in all ICL cases where no general rule of international law existed
to prohibit ex post facto lawmaking (see: chapter 2, part IV, for a detailed discussion). Since the
ICTY mandated what would be enshrined in the 1998 Rome Statute as a prohibition against
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retroactive lawmaking, a new, more refined method of legal construction, would need to be
introduced.

Although Kelsen does not recognize psychological factors as relevant to cognition of law, and
explicitly denies that “intention” matters with respect to customary construction, he nevertheless
recognizes the importance of this flexible source of ICL interpretation. Kelsen’s affirmation of
state practice and his denial of opinio juris must not be construed, therefore, as a general
infringement on purposive legal application. Rather, the effort to demonstrate the significance of
(unwritten) customary law, to Kelsen, produces a less-formal estimation of permitted sources of
ICL construction. He does not circumscribe the potential for what former ICTY President Theodor
Meron refers to as “the humanization of humanitarian law,” even as he seemingly remains
unwavering in his rejection of the psychological element of opinio juris.
In what ways, then, is a purposive application aided by Kelsen’s theoretical model? In
addition to the contested role of state practice, J. Peter Pham, associates Kelsen’s theory of
international law with “[the] drive to subsume national sovereignty within [a] single
‘multilateral’ consensus.”830 Pham writes that international law “derives its theoretical
foundations from the legal philosophy of Hans Kelsen, one of the most important jurists of the
twentieth century, if not the most preeminent.”831 The “consensus” Pham criticizes relates to
state practices, especially those of non-signatory states that contest the
customary assumption by international officials and NGO’s that an “international community”
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promoting “principles of civilization” indeed exists.832.
Pham’s skepticism is not unwarranted from a state-centered perspective. But Kelsen’s
approach, consistent with the” consensus” model, is better suited to maintaining an efficacious
order adjudicating core international crimes. Reconfiguring the identity of legal subjects and
reconceptualizing the parameters of crimes against humanity, as the Tadic appeals court did,
reflects a purposiveness compatible with Kelsen’s otherwise putatively ‘formalist’ or ‘logicist’
approach to legal cognition. In introducing “substantial relations “based on “ethnicity” the courts
affirmed a dynamic conception of the “legal subject”. The Appeals Chamber demonstrated
fidelity to Geneva IV by asserting that even if formally the parties belonged to the same nation
(Bosnia), they were essentially fighting a war between parties independent of one another—one
of which acted as another state’s proxy. This is fully reconcilable with Kelsen’s position that the
identification of “legal subjects” may be reconfigured with time as conforms with the dynamism
of pure theory.
Moreover, the ICTY’s position on the expanded notion of crimes against humanity is
reconcilable with the validity requirements of Pure Theory. Here, Pham’s criticism of Kelsen’s
embrace of the “consensus” of the “international community” is pertinent to a broader
conception of this charge. Kelsen’s recognition of changing customary law—as identified by
“the international community”—justifies ICTY judges in the Tadic appeals court decision in
altering the interpretation of crimes against humanity to reflect the current moment. The next
chapter engages in a historically-informed discussion of Kelsen’s conception of “principles of
civilization” as rendered by the “international community,” was, as Pham puts it, was informed
See: Kofi Annan’s stated that: “More than ever, a robust international legal order, together with the principles
and practices of multilateralism, is needed to define the ground rules for an emerging global civilization .....” Kofi A.
Annan, ‘We The Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (New York: United Nations
Department of Public Information, 2000), 13 in Pham, The Perils of Consensus, 557.
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by Kelsen's theoretical vision, [which] lay[s] the intellectual foundations for the world body's
overall ideology as to the binding nature of its ‘consensus.’"833
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Chapter 6
The Sovereignty of Conscience: Concluding Remarks on Hans Kelsen’s Conception of
International Criminal Responsibility

I. Hans Kelsen, Humanist

International law scholar J. Peter Pham argues that “the jurisprudence of the United
Nations” is an artificial construct of states, the UN and affiliate bodies, including NGOs. It
represents “the Orwellian corpus produced by the legal hodgepodge of overlapping conventions,
commissions, committees, and other ‘deliberative’ bodies.”834 In implicating the author of the
Pure Theory of Law, Pham writes, “…it is the role that Kelsen’s theoretical vision plays in
laying the intellectual foundations for the world body’s overall ideology as to the binding nature
of its ‘consensus’ that is of capital importance.”835 For Kelsen, the Alleszermalmer or “universal
destroyer,” according to Jochen von Bernstorff, “the instrument of the treaty…opened up for
international politics quasi-unrestricted spheres of action.”836 Bernstorff, and expert on Kelsen’s
role in public international law, confirms the flexibility of international treaty law, which could
apply to third party states and individuals. Once the national legal order transfers authority to
another national legal order, or a hybrid or international jurisdiction, for example, customary
laws and prior decisions assume pivotal roles as sources of ICL. This is confirmed especially in a
Bernstorff’s recent writings on Kelsen’s interpretation of sources of international law.837
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The traditional nineteenth century methodological vision of George Wilhelm Hegel,
which culminates in spiritual (and actual) rule by the Prussian state, is subverted by Kelsen, who
reinterprets the personified “state” as the unity of legal norms. A national legal order under the
authority of a system of international law creates the space, according to Kelsen, for validity
claims that aid in the legal functioning of this sphere. Conservative objection to universal legal
cognition is reflected in the intensity of the Hegelian rejection of sovereignty beyond the aegis of
the Prussian state with its rigid assignment of administrative roles. "[State’s] rights are actualized
only in their particular wills,” writes Hegel, “and not in a universal will with constitutional
powers over them. This universal proviso of international law therefore does not go beyond an
ought-to-be, and what really happens is that international relations in accordance with treaty
alternate with the severance of these relations."838
Hegel’s approach to imputation denies a “supra-state” model of a federated world state,
or even a universal moral “consensus” that does not require centralization of authority, but a
fragmented, primarily-ad hoc, system of international criminal law adjudication. Hegel shares
with Austin’s “command” skepticism an unwarranted rebuttal, according to Kelsen, of the rule of
international law. This last chapter interrogates a subject that has been bracketed throughout this
dissertation: “agency” beyond an exclusively normative conception of legal responsibility.
Overcoming the politicization of the state through a putatively, but ultimately inaccurately,
applied Kelsenian conception of the acts of state doctrine (AoSD) is revealed in the bold initial
assertions by Kelsen of (a) the necessity of differentiating traditional collective forms of
international responsibility imputed to states with a modern, individual or fault-based,
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conception of international criminal responsibility, and (b) the development of a positive law
analysis of retroactive lawmaking in violation of the principle of legality rule against ex post
facto laws. Kelsen understood that the magnitude of Nazi offenses warranted prosecution.
Part II demonstrates what I have found out in the course of my research and what I
believe to be original contributions to a subject area that matters especially in a period of
accelerated technological and political change. Part III points to recommendations, specific to the
evidence of this study and what I believe to be healthy areas for future research. After describing
the merits of Kelsen’s theoretical and empirical analysis of this term, I proceed to propose a
conception of imputation in international law that reflects the logical path of Kelsen’s “extralegal” or moral assumption that “choice” can indeed be made under heavily-influenced legal or
coercive conditions (see: chapter four). Kelsen reveals his true feelings regarding “agency” when
he writes that “Since the internationally illegal acts for which the London Agreement established
individual criminal responsibility were certainly also morally most objectionable and the persons
who committed these acts were certainly aware of their immoral character, the retroactivity of
the law applied to them can hardly be considered as absolutely incompatible with justice.” (my
emphasis).839 In addition to recognizing that “internationally illegal acts” retroactively created
“were also morally most objectionable” by a standard— “the consensus” of the “international
community,” Kelsen further acknowledged that the individual was “certainly aware of their
immoral character”. Recommendations for further exploration, in the mode of Erich Fromm’s
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humanistic psychological diagnoses of democratic and autocratic characterology, is briefly
discussed in Part III.
II. Research Objectives
Chapter 1 introduced Kelsen’s practical contributions to the development of an individual
(fault-based) conception of responsibility expressed in retroactive terms as applicable to state
officials, including heads-of-state. Kelsen’s recommendations to Jackson on the necessity of
including a definition of individual criminal responsibility in the London IMT charter produced a
wholly new conception for jurisprudence. Whereas Kelsen endorses protections for most acts of
state closely linked to the collective unit as a national legal order (or state”), he denies the
automatic right to immunity for officials who committed acts of the magnitude of crimes against
humanity and genocide. By the standards or “principles of civilization,” these acts were
manifestly immoral, even if legally valid, Kelsen maintains, and state officials ought to have
known this. The correspondence between Kelsen’s advice and the wording of the text of the IMT
Charter was explored in this chapter along with Kelsen’s general transatlantic influence on the
development of ICR.
Chapter Two examined the primary philosophical point of inquiry animating the
correspondence between Kelsen’s pure theoretical approach and progressive methodological
choices necessary to the development of ICR. Dueling principles of justice, including the
principle of legality rule against ex post facto lawmaking, on the one hand, and a higher moral
principle of justice retroactively determined by judges, on the other, is reconciled in accordance
with a “formal” determination of this term.
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Chapter Two also described the ways in which Kelsen’s neo-Kantian theory of ICR,
predicated on a strictly positive legal description of the relationship between legal norms as
conditioning offenses, and coercive, normatively authorized sanctions, frames our understanding
at the highest level of imputation. In addition, this chapter addresses acts of state, or legallyauthorized acts immunized under state-centered protections. In introducing the Fuhrer Principle
as a legitimate constitutional ordering within a national legal order in which the leader is the law,
where total authority resides in “decrees” or “words” that cannot be countermanded, Kelsen
abides by his doctrinal position that responsibility ought to be “depersonalized” or “depsychologized”. To understand coercive normativity as the command (“act” or “fact”) of the
autocrat is to recognize that legal responsibility is ontologically relativist. Under such an order,
legal by Kelsen’s standards, the prospect of future liability nevertheless abounds.
The last part of Chapter Two consequently reconciles Kelsen’s position that acts oncelegal can also have the capacity for prosecution under a retroactive methodological model unique
to ICL based on “principles of civilization,” including recognition from a legal vantage point of
the immorality of core international crimes. Thus, Kelsen is finally able to reconcile his
commitment to the principle non sub homine sed sub lege (or “not under man, but under law”), a
central concern of jurisprudence and political theory, which otherwise is undermined by acts of
state immunity under autocratic rule.
Chapter Three established, against the view of international law scholars Oona Hathaway
and Scott Shapiro, that Kelsen, regardless of his effort to establish “peace through law” and the
priority he seemingly places over the “Class A” charge of crimes against peace, nevertheless
created a retroactive methodological description of ICR applicable equally to all core
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international crimes. Additionally, Kelsen’s endorsement of just war theory, the basis for
determining crimes against peace, and how it reflected the classical colonial model of
international criminal law that presumed European dominance in the world, is interrogated here.
Chapter Four shifted the historical focus fifteen years from the 1945-46 IMT Nuremberg
to the 1961 trial of Adolph Eichmann in Jerusalem. Wolfgang Friedmann in his classic The
Changing Structure of International Law (1966) recounted that international society had
“undergone fundamental transformations which, though far from completed…already
profoundly modified the substance and structure of international law.”840 While attention is paid
to the Jerusalem court’s instrumental role in restructuring the notion of crimes against humanity
as not merely an adjunct to the crimes against peace charge and the “war-nexus” requirement, the
introduction of a series of major multilateral treaty agreements after the Second World War
furthered the transformation of the ICL sphere.
Chapter Four also examined the progressive transformation of the acts of state doctrine
through universal jurisdictional principles and a deepened reflection on superior orders under the
acts of state doctrine. Andrea Gattini’s conservative description of Kelsen’s philosophical
contribution to the changing notion of ICR neglected to consider the Cold War implications of
pure theoretical application. I argue that customary international law application in the Eichmann
case once again endorsed an ex post facto logic that granted judges the progressive latitude in
which to counter the immunizing acts of state doctrine. Additionally, Arendt’s famous “banality
of evil” thesis is engaged in the last part of the chapter. Here I contended that Arendt’s approach
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to superior orders found common ground with Kelsen’s insight into the heavy influence that law,
especially under the Fuhrer Principle, assumes in a state official’s decision-making process.
Despite the importance in recognizing the role that law assumes over every day social life, the
methodological approach to ICR Kelsen licensed implied moral agency. The next—and final—
section briefly draws out this point.
Chapter Five shifted attention from the mainly personified “individual” (who otherwise is
merely the point of imputation in the relationship of a “bundle of legal norms”) to the judge,
analyzing the way in which the post-Cold War era re-shapes the concept of imputation. Although
Kelsen died in 1973, his approach remains useful. What made post-Cold War tribunals especially
fertile for progressive interpretation was the imprimatur granted by the United Nations Security
Council and UN General Assembly. Not only could the “international community” be said to
endorse a significant role at the ICTY in customarily expanding, for example, the conception of
state allegiance for the purpose of determining official immunity, but the “international
consensus” invested such powers to judges who could, in turn, in accordance with pure
theoretical doctrine, flexibly account for restrictions associated with the customary nature of
lawmaking in this period. While Kelsen presented a view of customary international law
seemingly limited in its value, his conviction that international judges ought to be afforded a
discretionary role in determining ICR indicates his commitment to a judge-centered institution
progressive in orientation.
III. Recommendations
Initially, Kelsen’s writings animated one small part of my project on the genealogy of
international criminal responsibility. Kelsenian Stanley Paulson’s minor account of Kelsen in
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“Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg” coupled with Andrea Gattini’s seemingly definitive
assessment in “Kelsen’s Contributions to International Criminal Law” as a “nineteenth century
statist” closed the door on further interrogation of Kelsen’s notion of ICR. But in reading through
key texts written by Kelsen during the period of his relocation to the U.S. as a refugee from Nazi
Germany along with his sustained interrogation of this concept throughout the Forties, the notion
propagated by Gattini and others of Kelsen’s conservatism did not conform to the reality of
Kelsen's conception of a dynamic international institution that, not only validated ICR, but
nurtured the strictest attempt at a positive legal construction. I found that Kelsen’s contributions
consequently produced a progressive vision of an ICL sphere that skeptics like Gattini have asyet failed to consider a serious object of research.
Kelsen’s theory about the nature of authority is based on moral “principles of
civilization”. These “principles” are connected to general “principles of humanity” as “principles
of tolerance,” which animates the international community’s implied “consensus” about the
limits of depravity under contemporary international conditions. While setting aside an analysis
of Kelsen’s direct impact on the philosophy of “consensus,” which Pham argues “derives its
theoretical foundations from the legal philosophy of Hans Kelsen, one of the most important
jurists of the twentieth century,841” the social construction of morality is implied in the
politicized debate over the limits of ICL adjudication. In the mode of Rawls’ interpretation of
Kantian constructivism, this socially-derived moral construction is categorically different than
the absolutist description of natural law theory based on God, nature or reason.842 Social
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construction associated with “international consensus” produces a relative scheme of morality
that changes over time, investing legal normativity, from Kelsen’s perspective, with its most
important feature: transparency.
Having described Kelsen’s theory as vital to comprehending the changing notion of ICR,
it is necessary to explore the prospect for future research. The present evaluation contains only a
partial account of Kelsen’s overarching contributions to the conception of imputation or
responsibility in international law, including three representative case studies that could be
expanded to include further analysis of ICL proceedings, especially an expanded consideration
of Justice Radhabinod Pal’s integration of Kelsen’s writings in his comprehensive dissent at the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (for a brief account of Pal’s position, see Chapter
Two).
The “international consensus” is a political statement, always ideological in its claim to
regulate unjust, previously enacted, national laws. Under a historically-generated organizational
and technological framework specific to the time in which adjudication of cases of core
international crimes takes place, the unyielding “nineteenth century statism” attributed to Kelsen
by Gattini is refuted by the validity Kelsen imputes to retroactive prosecution of core
international crimes. Neither Gattini’s conservative statement regarding Kelsen’s unyielding
support of the AoSD as a statist-politicization of ICR, nor J. Peter Pham’s position that the
author of Pure Theory is responsible for an unfettered commitment to “supra-nationalism” whose
denouement is necessarily a centralized legal order, are correct.843

843

Ibid.

273

Kelsen endorses a judge-centered, ad hoc “system” of international criminal justice. His
theory not only adapts to the discretionary role assumed by judges within this order, he also
validates the record or chronicle of judicial decisions comprising all cases of international
criminal law, including national, hybrid and international, ad hoc and permanent jurisdictions
adjudicating cases of core international crimes. Much like the common law system practiced in
England, the international criminal law system, which Kelsen endorses, is heavily based on the
customary practice of using prior judicial decisions as a basis for determining present cases.
Bernstorff has recently confirmed this configuration as structurally legitimate.844
Kelsen’s legacy resides in his acknowledgment that the individual as state official is
subject to the command of law, which masquerades as legitimate, retroactively-authorized
command authority under the Fuhrer principle, but also, and in ordinal value, as the substantive
normative jurisdictional locus of a future-existent warning of international criminal law to all
state officials. Kelsen realized that principles of humanity or principles of civilization must be
realized through the act of imagination beyond the prospective rule. Here, in the future, where
there is knowledge that the once-legal act of state influenced the decision-making apparatus
responsible for the conscience of would-be genocidists, the ICL judge must nevertheless assess
the prospect of “choice”.
Kelsen writes in “What is Justice?”: “Relativism imposes upon the individual the difficult
tasks of deciding for himself what is right and what is wrong.”845 Despite claiming that only
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legal norms ought to be the object of legal cognition, Kelsen does not reject the possibility of
moral choice. As Kelsen scholar Drury Stevenson correctly notes, the law is addressed to legal
organs, since the central concern of law is the sanction.846 If a state official does not proceed with
her responsibilities, she can expect a coercive action to be applied. At the most modest end, this
means termination of position; in the extreme scenario, death resulting from non-compliance.
Moral responsibility, Kelsen concedes, is difficult because we possess no absolute blueprint.
There is no universal moral law that is a continuous source animating social life. Rather, an
official’s choice “implies a serious responsibility,” writes Kelsen, “the most serious moral
responsibility a man can assume.”847 The “weaknesses” of “men who turn to an authority above
them, to the government and, in the last instance to God” for answers to life’s existential
dilemmas demonstrates Kelsen’s belief that law must be distinguished from the sovereignty of
conscience.848
Kelsen’s response to Sigmund Freud’s social theoretical approach in Group Psychology
and the Analysis of the Ego discounts the general psychoanalytic contention that the same basic
mental processes exist in transient and more permanent groupings.849 Kelsen’s theory intimates
that law is the predominant organizing force in everyday social life, the technique that best
balances divided social interests, producing a distinctive rule-bound mentality. The regression of
those who identify with aggressive leadership, especially under autocracy, is discounted by
Kelsen in his criticism of Freud. Rather than emphasizing the place of the aggressive instinct, as
Dru Stevenson, “Kelsen’s View of the Addressee in the Law. Primary and Secondary Norms,” in Hans Kelsen in
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Freud does, Kelsen chooses instead to identify group psychology with general obedience to the
legal norms that organize, on a relatively permanent basis, social behavior. Democracy, rather
than autocracy, insures such an ordering.
But where does this leave the prospect for individual freedom or agency? According to
psychologist Erich Fromm, humanistic ethics,” in contrast to authoritarian ethics, which
encompasses limitations on rights protections, is “formally…based on the principle that only
man himself can determine the criterion for virtue and sin, and not an authority transcending
him. Materially, it is based on the principle that ‘good’ is what is good for man and ‘evil’ what is
detrimental to man; the sole criterion of ethical value being man’s welfare.”850 Any agreement
with Fromm’s position, however, is obscured by Kelsen’s general unease in introducing moral
decision-making into jurisprudential consideration. Nevertheless, Kelsen scholar Monica
Zalewska points out the humanistic psychological elements conducive to independent decisionmaking under democracies. She writes:

Although Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law is arguably one of the most influential
theories of law in Europe, it has been occasionally misunderstood. One of the most
common misunderstandings is the claim that Kelsen’s concept of the Rechtstaat (the rule
of law) legitimizes any regime, the Nazi one included. This misunderstanding stems from
the fact that Kelsen ascribed a double meaning to the concept of Rechtsstaat. While in a
broad sense, Kelsen identified every legal order and state with Rechtsstaat…he also
recognized the classical meaning of the Rechtsstaat in the narrow sense, which
corresponds with the concept of the rule of law.851
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Zalewska is right to recognize the impossibility that Kelsen could ever endorse the
legitimacy of Nazism from the vantage point of the liberalism animating pure theory. Zalewska
correctly identifies Kelsen’s commitment to moral relativism as an identifying mark of his liberal
allegiance, encouraging democratic social compromise, a scientific outlook, and the rule of law.
Kelsen argues that “Only freedom directed towards the equality relationship defined by Me —
You, which entails a sense of responsibility, recognition of the other, and which directs I not into
Myself but rather You, can be the basis of democracy.”852 Clemens Jabloner, co-director of The
Hans Kelsen Institute, reaffirms this point. Jabloner writes:

Since the basic principle of democracy is that freedom is desired also for other human
beings who are regarded as essentially equal, equality joins freedom and thus justifies the
majority principle. Kelsen looks for a particular type of characteristic and finds it in the
human being whose basic experience is expressed by a famous formula of Sanskrit
philosophy, the tat wam asi—the human being with whom, when he faces another, a
voice says: that is you. Kelsen says this person has a “relatively diminished” ego; he is
sympathizing, peace-loving, and not aggressive; he is a human being whose primary
aggressive instinct is directed inwards with an inclination to self-criticism and an
increased sense of guilt and responsibility. Democracy, therefore, is not a fertile ground
for the authoritarian principle.”853

Further exploration of how autocratic and democratic forms of law impact the conception
of ICR could provide a more useful psychological framework for ICL judges determining
culpability under conditions specific to each regime.

Hans Kelsen, Staatsform und Weltanschauung, Recht und Staat in Geschichte und Gegenwart Series (Tübingen:
J.C.B. Mohr, 1933( reprinted: Hans R. Klecatsky, René Marcic, Robert Schambeck (eds.), 1579 in Zalewska, “Some
Misunderstandings,” 113.
853
Clemens Jabloner, “Legal Techniques and Theory of Civilization-Reflections on Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt,”
in Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt: A Juxtaposition, eds. Dan Diner and Michael Stolleis (Tel Aviv: Bleicher Verlag,
1999), 56.
852
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Since the 1964 publication of Shklar’s Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials, the
range of the transnational intellectual enterprise has evolved to include participants from
international organizations, including the United Nations and its sub-departments, states and
their representatives, and non-governmental organizations, especially NGOs concerned with
human rights issues. The range of participants has expanded far beyond the structural limitations
imposed by a Cold War divide. Technological improvement of communication capabilities
throughout the globe has especially created a “global consciousness” of the prospect of political
interconnection through the application of jurisdictional authority over core international crimes.
As a result of the internet, instantaneous news of state-sponsored killings throughout the
world may be consumed. The same could be said of international criminal cases, including trials
conducted under conditions that generally preserve the rule of law. This prospect of global
communication over the meaning of international criminal responsibility, according to Kelsen, is
a necessary element of the dynamic construction of this term. Kelsen does not prohibit
international judges from incorporating “principles of civilization.” In fact, his claim that only
cases that are not “indifferent in themselves” can be retroactively determined are structured by an
“international community” that changes over time. Therefore, Shklar’s polemic against Kelsen as
formal, and hence “a-historical,” is incorrect. Kelsen’s philosophy, I argue, not only can
accommodate, but necessarily warrants, historical investigation.
Kelsen is perhaps the most significant theorist of ICR, a founding father of the twentieth
century discipline of ICL, who marshalled the legal-technical resources to mount a challenge in
defense of the legal validity of a system whose purpose is the determination of individual
responsibility by state officials. Kelsen’s pure theory licenses a Kantian constructivist approach
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to metaethics compatible with cognition of the relationship between once-valid and now-invalid
legal rules with respect to the application of ICR. Kelsen’s general theory of law and state
discounts individual agency; his conception of international criminal responsibility—the highest
authoritative understanding of imputation—returns it to its rightful place. The individual now has
choice.
At its most beneficial, law is a transparent medium. It maps the reasons that legal norms or
rules are coercively authorized, even when retroactively enacted. Transparency about the
conversion of moral into legal norms within a system reliant on customary laws, judicial
decision-making, and, early on, the positive law defense of ex post facto lawmaking, according
to Kelsen, produces the clearest description of the entry points to “the humanization of
humanitarian law”. Through extensive study of trial transcripts and Kelsen’s academic writings
on international criminalization in relation to key doctrinal statements of the pure theory of law, I
have argued that it has become possible to understand the structure of ICR, in accordance with
an otherwise judge-allowable purposive articulation.
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